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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MOTOR FUEL TAXATION AND PRICE DYNAMICS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
by
Aliya Sassi
University of New Hampshire, December, 2012
When the economic literature refers to characteristics of the motor fuel market in 
the EU, one has to be cautious in comparing indicators across time and space because of 
the ongoing enlargement o f the Union. This dissertation contributes to a limited empirical 
literature on motor fuel fiscal competition and discussions on fuel tourism and fiscal 
policy coordination in Europe. The first essay provides an overview of the EU market 
from 1994 to 2010 for four major motor fuels and its evolution at every stage of EU 
expansion. It examines changes in the characteristics and taxation rates o f the EU 
representative member-country and shows that the EU countries decreased their motor 
fuel excise taxes, but increased VAT taxes.
There has been an ongoing dialogue in the EU about tax harmonization because 
fuel taxes impact prices of other goods as well as economic and environmental policies 
across Europe. Prior empirical literature on motor fuel convergence either ignores newer
xix
member states or was published before data for some of those states was available. The 
second essay empirically tests for club convergence in prices and taxes for four motor 
fuels used by the EU. It treats older and newer member states separately and also 
distinguishes between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. By analyzing these 
categories o f countries separately, it attempts to obtain a more accurate picture o f fuel tax 
and price convergence and finds some evidence for the emergence of market 
segmentation. The methodology allows for non-linearity o f data, an important feature of 
prices.
By building upon the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism, the third essay 
empirically examines how political, economic, environmental and geographical factors 
influence taxes on motor fuels in the EU. It uses 2004-2010 data and spatial modeling 
techniques and finds that a 10% increase in the motor fuel excise tax by neighbors results 
in an up to 6% excise tax increase by an EU country. Countries in the EU also positively 
respond to VAT tax changes by their neighbors, meaning that national governments 
recognize mobility of tax bases for both motor fuels excise taxes and VAT taxes.
xx
ESSAY 1: 1994 -  2010 ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU AND THE EUROPEAN
MARKET FOR MOTOR FUELS
1
1.1. INTRODUCTION
Essay I o f this dissertation provides a historical discussion of the motor fuel 
market in the European Union (EU) between 1994 and 2010. It compares differences in 
economic and transport related characteristics o f a typical member country since the EU 
creation in 1993. Chapters 1.6.1 - 1.6.4 look at a few stages of the EU enlargement and 
their impact on the formation of taxation policies and real prices for four major motor 
fuels in the Common European Market.
The contributions of this essay to the literature are threefold. Firstly, the paper 
compares the evolution of motor fuel consumer prices, producer prices, and taxes 
between older and newer member states, as well as between the Eurozone and non- 
Eurozone countries. To date, prior literature on motor fuels in the EU analyzed only the 
data for the older member countries and for fewer motor fuel types. This paper looks at 
the EU and its taxation structure as a larger, more complex system because of its 
historical enlargement to the east.
Secondly, prior studies often compared tax shares among the EU member states, 
which do not serve as best indicators of the tax dynamics between countries. This is 
because an increase or a drop of tax share in a consumer price may be caused by two 
factors: a change in a motor fuel producer price or a change in total taxes, or by any 
combination of the two. In addition, changes in total tax level for motor fuels depend on 
both value added tax (VAT), a percent tax, and a lump-sum excise tax. This gives an
2
additional complexity to the European motor fuel tax system because different EU 
members may have different incentives for shifting between these two types of taxes.
Lastly, this paper recognizes that one of the common characteristics o f the 
national taxation structures in the EU is that member states practice double-taxing of 
motor fuels. The VAT tax, an ad-valorem percentage tax, is typically levied after the 
excise tax, a specific lump-sum amount tax, as well as all local taxes have been added to 
the producer price, which results in an additional tax premium. Since the compositions of 
the excise and the VAT taxes differ among the EU members, the dynamics o f total motor 
fuel taxes also differ. Prior literature typically ignores double-taxation of motor fuels in 
the EU and pays attention mostly to differences in excise taxes among members. 
Nevertheless, our data show that in 2004-2010, real values of these additional tax 
premiums in the EU were ranging from €0.056-0.115 per one liter o f unleaded gasoline 
and €0.045-0.083 for diesel.
This paper uses the newest weekly data for 1994-2010 for four major motor fuels 
from the EU Oil Bulletin published by the European Commission (see Appendix 1 .A for 
data description). The results are useful for contributing to a historical dialogue about the 
Common European Market for motor fuels and to the discussions surrounding tax 
harmonization processes in the EU.
3
1.2. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU. ITS TRANSPORT AND MOTOR
FUEL POLICIES
The origin of the European Union goes back to the Treaty o f Rome in 1957, when 
six European countries with relatively similar economic statuses decided to form the 
European Economic Community, or the EEC (Table 1). Thirty six years later, in 1993, 
twelve European countries formally established The European Union, or the EU (EU-12). 
Since then, the Union has experienced a few stages of enlargement: in 1995, 2004, and 
2007. The largest expansion happened in 2004, when ten Central and Eastern European 
countries joined the Union. The twenty five countries that formed the EU before its last 
expansion in 2007 are typically known as the EU-25. Currently, the EU unites twenty 
seven member countries (EU-27). For the purposes o f this essay, the twelve countries that 
formed the EU in 1993 and the three countries that joined it in 1995 are referred to as 
older member states (OMS). The twelve countries that joined the EU in 2004 are referred 
to as newer member states (NMS). In addition to OMS and NMS, the EU can be divided 
into the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Differences in motor fuel taxation and 
prices between OMS and NMS, as well as between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
groups will be examined later in this essay.
Once a country joins the EU, it becomes a part of the common European Internal 
Market zone that unites the EU member countries. Today, the EU consists of members 
that are diverse not only geographically, but also culturally and economically. Seventeen1
1 As o f  January 1,2012. Sixteen countries were the Eurozone members at the time o f  this study.
out of twenty seven EU members also share a common monetary policy as well as a 
common currency -  the Euro. Despite the existence of common policies and goals among 
the EU members, national-level control over taxation is still considered to be a symbol of 
sovereignty for most European countries, e.g. (Ring, 2008). Although a part o f the larger 
union, each member country still determines its own national bundle of taxation, 
budgetary, and energy policies2. It became a general practice, therefore, that the European 
Commission implements tax floors on certain goods including motor fuels, leaving it to 
the individual EU members to establish national taxation structures and tax levels.
Governments rely on tax revenues to fulfill their budgetary obligations, so tax 
revenues, including motor fuel tax revenues, are important to them. In the EU, revenues 
from indirect taxes, such as VAT and excise taxes, on average account for about 14% of 
the GDP and between 30-55% of total tax revenues. At the same time, revenues from 
motor fuel excise taxes account for about 1.5-2% of GDP and 4-5% of total tax revenues 
(Eurostat, 2011). Macroeconomic impact of taxing motor fuels is far more outreaching 
than taxing other goods. This is because transportation costs are imbedded in the price of 
most consumption goods and services, and taxes levied on motor fuels in the EU account 
for a greater share of final consumer price than in the U.S.
In addition to contributing to budget revenues, motor fuel taxes are also corrective 
taxes. Pigou (1932) was the first to propose that gasoline taxes help reduce externalities 
associated with motor fuel consumption, such as vehicle-related emissions. Gasoline 
taxes, therefore, reduce gasoline consumption towards a socially optimal level; this is
2 In March 2012, however, by signing a Fiscal Compact Treaty, all members of the EU except for the U.K. 
and the Czech Republic agreed upon collectively tightening fiscal measures starting 2013 (Council o f  the 
European Union (CEU), 2012).
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known as a Pigouvian role of taxes. Taxes remain the major policy tools in addressing 
emissions from road transport (see Appendix 1 .B), and revenues from these taxes in the 
EU are not typically earmarked for road projects like in the U.S. (Newbery & Santos, 
1999). The extent to which each national government employs them for either correction 
of market externalities or revenue generation plays an important role in fuel tax dynamics 
in all of Europe. In spite of taxation policies in place, since 1990, emissions from the 
transportation sector in the EU-27 have increased by approximately 21% (Eurostat, 2011, 
pp. 138-139). At the same time, emissions from all other sectors o f the economy have 
decreased.
Changes of the EU as a Union also played an important role in explaining these 
tax dynamics. Table 2 shows that characteristics of the EU have significantly changed 
since its creation, both because of its enlargement and because of changes within 
individual countries. Its total population has increased from roughly 186 million people 
in 1957 (then EEC), to 350 million in 1993, and to 501 million in 2010. With every stage 
of the enlargement, the characteristics o f what is typically referred to as the EU 
representative member country (RMC) have also changed. Between 1993 and 2007, the 
average population of a RMC has dropped from 29 million to 18 million, suggesting that 
smaller, relatively less populated countries have joined the union during this period.
At the same time, mean per capita GDP of a typical RMC citizen has increased by 
about 20%: from $23,777 in 1993 to $27,232 in 2007 (in $2005, Table 2). Since 1957 
when the first European community -  the EEC -  was created, mean real GDP per capita 
had increased roughly 2.6 times by 2007 (Table 2). Table 2 shows that these dramatic 
economic improvements occurred because of ongoing growth in the average growth rate
6
of GDP as well as greater trade openness. These factors also played a crucial role in 
changes related to transport and fuel consumption in every EU member country. The 
inland freight volume of the union has nearly doubled between the time of its formation 
in 1993 and the last enlargement in 2007: a jump from 833.9 to 1,719.9 billion T-km 
respectively (Table 2). During the same period, the annual inland passenger volume for 
private cars had also increased by roughly 1,400 billion passenger-km. The overall stock 
of passenger cars in the EU grew from 145.4 million vehicles in 1993 to 219.7 million in 
2007. Although, on average, the number of new passenger vehicle registrations had 
decreased from 880 to 592 thousand cars per year per RMC, per capita motorization rates 
showed a steady growth in both OMS as well as NMS.
Figure 1.
M otorization rates in o ld er and n ew er cand idate cou n tries
















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
NMS (newer members, 
candidates) 267 275 295 305 317 328 332 342 353 365 382 404
■ EU-15 (older members) 392 401 404 418 428 440 449 455 459 463 473 482
Figure 1 displays motorizations rates in OMS and NMS groups, or the average 
number of cars per 1000 inhabitants. The gap in the motorization rate between the older
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and the (future) newer members of the EU has been steadily decreasing since the 1990s 
(Figure 1). With the exception of 2001, the motorization rates for ten countries that 
eventually became NMS have been growing faster than the motorization rates for the 
fifteen OMS. What this means is that on average, residents in NMS have been acquiring 
vehicles at much higher rates than those in OMS, e.g. (Eurostat, 2009a, pp. 39-40). In 
short, by 2007, a RMC became better off economically, had higher levels of motor fuel 
consumption and fewer new passenger cars registered every year, even though 
motorization rates rose.
Figure 2.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transport in the EU,
1996-2007, in 1000 tons of C02 equivalent 
(data source: Eurostat)
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Changes in the EU have also resulted in a decrease in the overall European
volume of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, e.g. (European Environment Agency
(EEA), 2009, p. 23), but in an increase of emissions from transport (Eurostat, 2009c, p.
143). In 1993, the twelve original EU members released about 871 million tons of GHG
emissions from transport (in CO2 equivalent), and in 2007 the twenty seven EU members
of the expanded Union generated 1,298 million tons (Table 2). Thus, by 2007 a RMC
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produced on average fewer emissions from transport. Figure 2 shows that, starting in 
2004, the emissions reduction efforts were especially evident for the fifteen original 
members that were able to stabilize their GHG emissions from transport. After 2004, the 
increase in emissions from transport was primarily due to higher contributions of NMS 
countries (Figure 2).
The efforts to reduce overall GHG emissions in Europe have been mostly 
successful when directed at other sectors o f the economy, but not in regard to the 
transportation sector (Eurostat, 2009c, p. 143). Emissions from transport in the EU grew 
in spite of the fact that producer prices and VAT taxes on all motor fuels had increased 
between 1994 and 2010 (Table 4). A reduction of real excise taxes on these fuels by 14- 
18% during this period may have played a part in an increase of emissions from transport. 
Nevertheless, real consumer prices on unleaded petrol and diesel motor fuels increased 
by 12-25% during this period (Table 4), while nominal prices were up by 6 8 -8 8 % 
respectively (Table 5). This is why it is important to examine a relationship between 
European motor fuel prices and taxes: these factors are major policy taxes for economic 
activity related to passenger transport in the EU.
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1.3. MOTOR FUEL CONSUMPTION IN THE EU
Out of four types o f motor fuels discussed in this dissertation -  unleaded gasoline, 
leaded gasoline, automotive gas oil (diesel), and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fuel -  
diesel is the most popular motor fuel in the EU. About 209,059 kilotons o f oil equivalent 
of this fuel is consumed in the EU annually, accounting for roughly 70% of all motor fuel 
consumption (Figure 3). Diesel fuel typically powers larger vehicles that form the EU 
freight fleet and plays an important role in facilitation of European trade.
Both diesel and unleaded Euro-super-95 gasoline remain popular fuel choices 
among passenger car owners. Figure 3 shows that in 2010, consumption of unleaded 
Euro-super-95 gasoline in the EU accounted for roughly 30% of total motor fuel 
consumption. In addition, over half o f passenger cars in the EU were petrol-driven 
(Eurostat, 2009c, p. 93). Nevertheless, according to Eurostat, by the late 2000s, the share 
of diesel-powered passenger cars in the EU has increased, surpassing in some countries a 
50% benchmark, for example, in Belgium (59%) or Austria (55%).
Although this dissertation also discusses historical data for leaded gasoline, this 
fuel was phased out from the EU market by the mid-2000s (Lofgren & Hammar, 2000). 
Since January 2000, the EU has prohibited sales of leaded gasoline on its territory due to 
its harmful impact on human health and the environment. Leaded gasoline used to be 
particularly popular in Eastern and Central Europe, and many NMS continued using it 
until they joined the EU in 2004. In the past, this fuel was a cheaper alternative to a 
cleaner unleaded Euro-super-95 gasoline.
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Figure 3.
Motor fuel consumption in the EU, 2010 (kt)
Data source: the EU Oil Bulletin, the European Commission, 2012
Euro-super-95 ■  Diesel ■  LPG
Figure 3 shows that in 2010 consumption o f liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was 
equal to 4,527 kiloton of oil equivalent; it was much lower than consumption of diesel 
and unleaded gasoline. Liquefied petroleum gas accounted for only 2% of the EU total 
motor fuel consumption, in part due to lower energy content of this fuel compared to 
unleaded gasoline and diesel. In addition, in order to use LPG, vehicles must have an 
internal combustion engine instead of a spark ignition engine. Compared to 
environmental characteristics of other motor fuels, LPG has an advantage because it 
produces lower amount o f particulates. Currently, this fuel is being consumed in limited 
amounts in the EU countries in part because o f inconvenience to consumers: the EU has a 
relatively poor network of LPG refueling stations.
Finally, it is worth noting that these motor fuels are not substitutes in the short 
run. Each fuel type requires a different engine specification, so the consumer can switch 
from one fuel type to another only in the long run, by either acquiring a new or modifying 
the existing vehicle.
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1.4. THE STRUCTURE OF GASOLINE TAXES IN THE EU
Although this paper focuses on motor fuels, the general discussion in this sub­
chapter can be applied towards other cases when several taxes are levied together on the 
same good, such as so-called ‘sin’ goods; for example, motor fuel, cigarettes, alcohol, 
etc. The key points here are to examine the two types of taxes levied on motor fuels in the 
EU, the VAT and the excise tax, and to discuss the varied perceptions of fairness that are 
typically associated with double taxation.
There are two major motor fuel taxes that the EU motor fuel consumers pay: an 
ad valorem type (VAT) and a lump-sum type (excise) tax. Both types are taxes on 
consumption, with national governments receiving the entire revenues and sellers acting 
as facilitators of intermediate tax accounting and collection.
The VAT, or the value added tax, is an ad-valorem type tax that is proportional to 
the price. It is levied in the form of a percentage on the volume of purchase. From the end 
consumer’s point of view, a VAT levied on most goods, including motor fuels, in the EU 
is the same as a conventional retail sales tax in the U.S. The main difference between a 
VAT and a conventional retail sales tax is that the latter is only levied when a good is 
sold to the end user, while the former, VAT, is paid upon every sales transaction. Yet, 
with appropriate accounting and paperwork, non-end users, namely sellers and 
manufacturers, can deduct VAT previously paid by them on inputs, so the tax is only 
applied to the ‘value added’ during the last stage of production.
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By contrast, excise taxes are product-specific; they are typically levied to partially 
discourage consumption of so-called ‘sin’ goods that create negative externalities, such as 
motor fuels, alcohol and cigarettes. These lump-sum taxes are levied in a form of a fixed 
monetary amount per unit sold or volume purchased. The motor fuel excise taxes in the 
EU are set as a fixed lump-sum per 1000 liters of fuel, for example, €359 per 1000 liters 
of unleaded Euro-super-95. As a result, the impact on a consumer price from changes in 
taxes or producer prices is not straightforward: ad-valorem type taxes may magnify 
changes triggered by shocks on production side, while lump-sum taxes are sensitive to 
inflation and require constant revisions to maintain their real values (e.g. England, 2009).
In order to address European environmental objectives, EU legislation sets the 
following minimum rates on fuel excise taxes: €421, €359, €330, and €125 per 1000 
liters of leaded, unleaded, diesel, and LPG fuels respectively (CEU, 2003, Council 
Directive 2003/96/EC, Annex I). Current EU legislation also requires a standard 
minimum VAT rate of 15% on most goods, including motor fuels (CEU, 2006, Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC, Article 97). Both legislations allowed certain exceptions. For 
example, Luxembourg levied a lower VAT rate o f 12% on unleaded gasoline from 1994 
to 2004. Portugal is another EU member that had lower VAT rates of 5% and 12% on 
diesel between 1994 and 1996 (CEC, 1977, Council Directive 77/388/EEC3). Although 
the EU countries are not bound to a VAT tax ceiling, in 1996 they came to a collective 
agreement to make “every effort” not to exceed a 25% VAT benchmark.4 It is 
challenging for the EU as a union to make changes to its fuel tax floors because such
3 with subsequent amendments.
4 European Parliament Fact Sheets. 3.4.5. Value added tax (VAT). 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/3_4_5_en.htm
13
decisions require unanimous voting by the EU members (CEU, 2003, Council Directive 
2003/96/EC, Article 29). This limits flexibility of indirect taxation, impacting tax 
coordination processes in the EU. The unanimity rule was challenged in 2003 by a 
proposal to replace it with majority voting, but the change was not agreed upon by the 
members, which is just another example of tax revisions being a politically challenging 
task.
From the economists’ perspective, “the number o f times the item is taxed is 
economically meaningless”, because economists are typically concerned only with the 
total tax level (Gale & Slemrod, 2001, p.624). Moreover, economists would argue that 
even in the imperfectly competitive motor fuel market, both VAT and excise taxes on 
motor fuel will have similar impacts on price. This is because there are no significant 
quality differences in motor fuels sold under the same name across the EU countries; for 
example, in unleaded gasoline Euro-super-95. By contrast, a common excise tax on 
cigarettes eliminates relative price differences across brands o f different quality, reducing 
the effect of anti-smoking policy and making the VAT tax more attractive to 
policymakers (Cnossen, 2006). Under either the VAT or excise tax on motor fuel, 
therefore, national governments would obtain the same effect of motor fuel consumption 
discouragement, but they may also encounter voters’ disagreement with the fairness o f a 
smaller excise tax. This is because a smaller motor fuel excise tax in lieu of a higher 
general VAT tax may create a perception among the general public that vehicle users do 
not pay for pollution that they produce.
A higher reliance on VAT tax also forces national governments to tax domestic 
fuel producers more heavily because the biggest portion of the value added is typically
14
created at home during the refinery stage of motor fuel production. In addition, the 
volatile nature of the world oil price in combination with higher reliance on VAT (per 
cent) causes final motor fuel consumer prices to fluctuate at an even wider range, 
resulting in both greater uncertainty among producers and macroeconomic instability 
(England, 2009). If motor fuel producers and consumer prices do not move in sync, it can 
impact cyclical market changes. Hence, from the policymakers’ perspective, the choice 
between the VAT and the excise tax is dictated by a combination of factors, from 
economic factors to the variety o f views on tax fairness among voters.
In setting tax levels, policymakers also often face claims by the opposing side that 
may portray tax-setting in an unfavorable light (see Gale & Slemrod, 2001, for 
discussion). One of the arguments that may arise when two types o f taxes are levied on 
the product at the same time (an ad valorem tax and a lump-sum tax) is the case of double 
taxation. Yet, those who often bear a heavier portion of the tax burden might find such 
taxation schemes unfair. Double taxation has already been a hot topic for debate in other 
areas of economic policy, for example, taxing dividends is often portrayed as unfair. This 
is because corporations pay income taxes on profits before distributing a portion of their 
after-tax profits to shareholders, who are then obligated to pay personal taxes on their 
dividends (e.g. Rosen, 2005, p.433). In this context, it is important to briefly discuss who 
pays a higher share of the tax burden and how gasoline excise tax incidence is different 
than the incidence, for example, of the cigarette excise tax.
Typically, when taxes are being levied, both producers and consumers take on 
some of the burden. The shares of these burdens are determined by differences in 
elasticities of demand and supply, that is, by differences in percentage reactions to a one
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per cent change in price. For both cigarettes and motor fuels, demand is less elastic than 
supply, so the tax burden is shifted towards consumers (e.g. Aim, et al., 2009; Chemic & 
Reschovsky, 1997; England, 2007; Cnossen & Smart, 2005). This is because consumers 
cannot always easily give up smoking or substitute one type of motor fuel for another, at 
least in the short run. For example, Chouinard and Perloff (2004) show that in the U.S., 
elasticity of supply is greater in states that sell less gasoline, and that consumers in small 
states pay a higher share o f gasoline tax burden than those in large states. This is because 
for cigarettes, consumers are the ones primarily involved in cigarette ‘smuggling,’ but for 
gasoline, wholesalers are the ones moving motor fuel across borders (e.g. Lovenheim, 
2008).
Since the EU consumers are specifically concerned with the fairness o f the motor 
fuel tax (Hammar & Jagers, 2007), the way in which taxes are levied on motor fuels in 
Europe is worth closer examination. Double taxing of vehicle motor fuel exists in the EU 
because the VAT is levied on the volume of the purchase after the lump-sum excise tax 
has been added. Equation 1 shows that in the EU, a consumer pays the following price 
per one liter of motor fuel5:
Pc = (Pp + T  + L)( 1 +  VAT) , (1)
where Pc and P pdenote consumer and producer prices respectively (in €), T is the excise 
tax (in €), L is a combination of other local unit taxes (in €) and VAT represents the value
5 This simplified equation intends to demonstrate the structure o f  the motor fuel taxes in the EU. Under the 
assumption o f perfectly elastic supply, it also represents the supply curve. In the long run, this assumption 
seems reasonable. In the short run, however, both supply and demand are inelastic, but demand is arguably 
less elastic than supply because motor fuels have no close substitutes. Appendix D provides an additional 
discussion for a more complex case o f  inelastic supply. Also see Chouinard and Perloff (2004) who show 
that in the U.S., for example, the state gasoline tax falls almost entirely on consumers, not wholesalers.
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added tax (in %). Since local lump-sum taxes L are typically small compared to other 
taxes, I omit them and re-write Equation 1 for a single liter purchase (Equation 2):
Pc = Pp( l  + V AT )+ T(1 + VAT)  (2)
The last term of Equation 2 shows that, in addition to producer price, the VAT tax
base includes lump-sum taxes. The EU data on motor fuels show that these additional tax
premiums (T • VAT) varied across member countries and were relatively large. For
example, in 2004-2010, these tax premiums reached, on average, €0.085 per one liter of
unleaded gasoline and €0.064 for diesel (see Appendix l.C, Figures 9-10). Next, by total
differentiation of Equation 2 with respect to time I obtain Equation 3:
d Pc dPp dVAT dT  /  dVAT dT\
- 3 — =  - j — ( l  +  VAT)  +  Pp —-—  +  — + T — -—  + VAT — ) (3)
dt  d t  d t  d t  \  d t  d t /
The first term on the right hand side o f Equation 3 suggests that an increase in
producer price for motor fuel causes both consumer price and the VAT tax revenue from 
one liter of fuel to increase. The second and the third terms on the right hand side of 
Equation 3 mean that any change in either VAT or excise tax rates impacts the consumer 
price. The last two terms in the brackets on the right hand side of Equation 3 suggest that 
any change in one tax on motor fuel further magnifies the impact of another tax on 
consumer price.
In sum, any changes in either the excise tax or the VAT tax introduce additional 
shocks to producers and consumers. Because of the perception of fairness, these shocks, 
as well as the choice between the two types o f taxes, may be more meaningful than has 
been previously assumed by studies that only include the excise taxes in their framework 
(e.g. Dreher & Kreiger, 2008). Additional tax burdens from double-taxing in the EU are 
most likely to be passed on to motor fuel consumers because the elasticity o f demand is
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lower than the elasticity o f supply (e.g. Chouinard & Perloff, 2004; Pock, 2010). This is 
why it is worth examining motor fuel taxation patterns in the EU: it allows for more 
meaningful motor fuel price and tax comparisons across the EU members.
18
1.5. OPTIMAL TAXATION AND THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND OF THE
MOTOR FUEL EXCISE TAX
Economic literature on optimal taxation discussing the distortionary impact of 
taxes deals with the optimal choice of type and rate of the tax. Frank Ramsey (1927) 
suggested that governments should set tax rates in such a way that marginal deadweight 
losses of different taxation policies are equalized. According to Ramsey’s inverse 
elasticity rule, unless the labor supply is inelastic, necessities, such as gasoline, should be 
taxed more heavily than luxuries (Ramsey, 1927, p.58). The Ramsey rule is often 
critiqued on the grounds o f key assumptions, implementability, and fairness (see Selim, 
2007 for a comprehensive summary). Nan (1995), for example, shows that under the 
Clinton administration, petroleum and energy products were taxed at rates higher than 
Ramsey’s excess burden minimizing rates in part because the rule ignores government 
budgets.
Minimizing total excess burden is not the only goal in choosing the tax rate; 
motor fuel excise taxes also reduce motor fuel consumption to a socially optimal level by 
reducing externalities associated with fuel consumption (Pigou, 1932). Ramsey (1927, 
p.47) specifically states that he excludes the Pigouvian feature of the tax from his 
assessment of the tax burden. Yet, while motor fuels’ excise taxes are environmental 
(Pigouvian) taxes by nature, internalizing externalities is not the only gain associated 
with this tax policy. This is because environmental taxes impact prices on goods and 
services and distort both consumers’ choices and the labor market.
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During the last couple of decades, debates about “green tax reforms” emphasized 
important interaction between new environmental policies and existing taxation policies 
in place (Pearce, 1991; Rotemberg & Woodford, 1994; Oates, 1995; Ballard et al., 2005, 
among others). These debates are based on the so-called ‘double dividend’ literature that 
suggests that Pigouvian taxes can be used not only to reduce pollution levels, but also to 
reduce existing distortionary non-environmental taxes, for example, income, labor, or 
sales taxes, resulting in a ‘double dividend’ (Sandmo, 1975; Terkla, 1984). That is, an 
increasingly popular idea among policymakers is the idea behind the double dividend: to 
tax “bads” instead of “goods” (Pigou, 1932) by “swapping” environmental taxes for non- 
environmental distortive taxes (Glouder, 1995; 1998).
In addition to the Pigouvian effect o f reduced externalities, there are two other 
effects of every tax policy that a policymaker must consider: a revenue-recycling effect 
and a tax-interaction effect (Parry, 1995; Glouder, 1995). The revenue-recycling effect 
suggests that environmental tax revenues may be recycled to reduce gross distortionary 
costs of taxation policies. The tax-interaction effect works in the opposite direction than 
the revenue-recycling effect; it suggests that reduced rates o f pre-existing distortionary 
taxes will not necessarily fully offset the non-environmental distortions created by the 
new environmental tax. Just like other taxes, environmental taxes, such as motor fuel 
excise taxes, alter the pattern of economic activity. They raise the cost of production and 
magnify distortions generated by pre-existing taxes on factors of production (capital and 
labor), creating a tax-interaction effect (Bovenberg & de Mooij, 1994b). The tax- 
interaction effect is also found to be of a greater magnitude in a second best policy setting 
(e.g. Glouder, 1998), the point relevant to taxation of motor fuels.
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Glouder (1995) distinguishes between a weak and a strong version of the double 
dividend. A weak double dividend is associated with welfare improvement for the case 
when recycling environmental tax revenues via distortionary tax cuts results in cost 
savings, compared to the case when these revenues are returned in a lump-sum fashion 
(e.g. Metcalf et al., 2004; Babiker et al., 2003). A strong double dividend refers to 
revenue-neutral tax substitution with zero or negative gross cost of tax policy changes 
(Bovenberg & de Mooij, 1994a, 1994b).
Empirical studies of the double dividend typically use computational general 
equilibrium models and provide mixed findings, but generally find some support for the 
double dividend of the gasoline excise tax. For example, Gloom et al. (2008) find that 
increasing gasoline and fuel taxes in the U.S. and recycling revenues to reduce capital 
income taxes lead to welfare gains from both an increased consumption and an 
improvement in environmental quality. Van Heerden et al. (2006) find a positive double 
dividend effect of gasoline consumption taxes in South Africa, for the case when tax 
revenues are recycled to either reduce VAT taxes or food prices. Their results also 
suggest that recycling gasoline tax revenues to reduce food prices also leads to a GDP 
increase. Bovenberg and Glouder (1997) evaluate an increase in U.S. federal gasoline 
taxes for the revenue-neutral case, with revenues being devoted to a reduction in income 
taxes. According to Bovenberg and Glouder (1997), although this policy produces a tax- 
shifting effect away from the over-taxed factor of production (capital) towards the under- 
taxed factor (labor), while gross costs of the policy are reduced, they remain positive.
To summarize, when implementing environmental policy, a policymaker has to 
take into consideration interdependence of various tax policies because of the interacting
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goals of these policies. On one hand, ‘green’ gasoline excise taxes affect consumers and 
producers both directly and indirectly. These taxes also have a regressive effect on low- 
income population, including both vehicle drivers as well as non-drivers that consume 
goods with high embedded transportation costs. On the other hand, gasoline excise taxes 
increase welfare because of both the Pigouvian effect and the revenue-recycling effect; 
but they may also partially decrease welfare because of the tax-interaction effect. By 
further increasing the existing motor fuel excise taxes, the EU national governments may 
consider exploring the double dividend side of this tax by lowering, for example, a 
distortive VAT consumption tax.
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1.6. MOTOR FUEL PRICES AND TAXES IN 1994-2010
1.6.1. A General Overview of Real Price Dynamics in the EU
The EU is a good example for analyzing motor fuel prices and taxation patterns in 
both the short and long runs. In Europe, unlike the U.S., taxation is a primary policy tool 
for reducing GHG emissions from transport, which results in overall higher levels of 
motor fuel taxes and greater variation in tax rates among countries. Between 1994 and 
2010, the EU average real prices for motor fuels increased between 2% and 25% (Table 
4) , 6 depending on the fuel type.
Producer prices and, more importantly, changes in the price of oil, were key 
elements in determining the behavior of consumer prices (Figures 4-5). From 1994 to 
2 0 1 0  real consumer prices on two major motor fuels, such as unleaded fuel and diesel 
fuel, had increased by an average of €173-6199, or by 12-25%. During the same period, 
producer prices on these fuels had increased by an average of €113-6192, which 
corresponds to an increase of 62-76% in producer price (Table 4). During this period, the 
price of oil was largely influenced by global geopolitical events, including the 2004 
enlargement of the EU. For example, the growing oil prices in 2003-2008 may be 
explained by a rapid global economic expansion, which was met by a stagnant supply. In 
addition, geopolitical and speculative factors also played some role on this oil price 
growth (e.g. Kesicki, 2010; Turner, et al., 2011; Coleman, 2012). A subsequent
6 Monthly consumer price indices (CPI) from the UNECE Statistical Division database are used here to 
convert tax and price data into real values. See Appendix E for addition discussion.
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Figure 4.
Average real consumer prices on motor fuels in the EU, in Euro currency
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Figure 5.
Average real producer prices on motor fuels in the EU, in Euro currency








01jan1995 01jan2000 01jan2005 01jan2010
time
aver, real price of unleaded Euro-super-95 
aver, rea price of d iesel 
aver, real price of LPG
aver, real price of lead replacement (Super) fuel
24
sharp drop of motor fuel prices in the EU in the late 2000s may be explained by the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the slow recovery, including an economic downturn in 
the EU.
Over time, however, real consumer prices on motor fuels can only be partially 
explained by producer price levels and dynamics. Until 2004, real producer prices were 
roughly equal among different motor fuel types, suggesting that taxes and their 
composition were also major components of motor fuel price analysis. Figures 4 and 5 
show that tax differences introduced price differences between different types o f motor 
fuels. Although from 1994 to 2010 both producer and consumer prices on motor fuels 
increased, the average levels and compositions of taxes on motor fuels for a typical EU 
country also changed.
Prior studies of motor fuel taxes in the EU often concentrated on tax shares (taxes 
as percentages of final consumer prices o f fuel), which do not necessarily accurately 
reflect the real extent o f tax burden and taxation dynamics (e.g. Dreher & Krieger, 2008, 
2010). This is because any combination o f the two factors may impact the change of 
motor fuel tax shares over time: producer prices and tax rates. All else constant, tax share 
in a consumer price may drop solely because of an increase in producer price. In the EU, 
depending on the motor fuel type, both factors played a role in tax share changes (Table 
4). Furthermore, tax share calculations normally focus on just the excise tax.
To conclude, in spite of the fact that in 2004 the EU grew and took over more 
diverse and economically weaker countries, motor fuel taxing behavior became much 
more similar across the enlarged Union (EU-27), especially for VAT taxes (Table 4). In
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addition, although total level o f taxes on unleaded gasoline have decreased by about 
8.7%, it appears that on average, the EU member countries did not display strong “race- 
to-the-bottom” type tax setting behavior. They rather moved towards an overall decrease 
in their excise taxes, but an increase of VAT taxes on vehicle motor fuels. This is despite 
of greater volatility of the oil price and motor fuel producer prices than in the mid-1990s, 
and the fact that VAT tax is a percent tax that intensifies such volatility of producer 
prices. The movement away from a lump-sum excise tax towards an ad-valorem VAT tax 
suggests that the EU national governments were willing to rely more on volatile but 
potentially higher tax revenues than in the mid-1990s. Thus, such a move away from 
excise taxes towards VAT taxes is not surprising, since the price of oil had been primarily 
growing during the analyzed period. In addition, reduction o f excise taxes in the EU may 
also indirectly suggest some degree of fiscal competition among member states in terms 
of setting their motor fuel excise taxes.
1.6.2. Motor Fuel Taxes and Prices in OMS versus NMS
The biggest expansion of the EU occurred in 2004, when ten countries from 
Eastern and Central Europe joined the Union. Because of Soviet-type inherited models of 
industrial organization, transport infrastructures, and environmental regulations, these 
NMS were less economically advanced and had poorer environmental quality than OMS 
(e.g. Carmin & VanDeveer, 2005). Upon their membership in 2004, NMS were obligated 
to adopt the entire legislative and regulatory body of the EU, the acquis communautaire, 
including the common environmental regulatory framework. In practice, however, their 
political will and ability to implement these environmental policies remained
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questionable (e.g. Schreurs, 2005; Pavlinek & Pickles, 2005). Because of the acquis and 
because in the 2000s tax harmonization was at the forefront o f the EU policy arena, it is 
worth examining motor fuel price and tax dynamics in NMS separately from OMS.
Since 2004 when NMS joined the EU, it was expected that these countries would 
raise and harmonize their taxation policies with the existing EU members, and that motor 
fuel prices in NMS would reflect the pricing situation on the Internal European Market. 
Such harmonization process was impacted by two factors. Firstly, compared to OMS, 
almost all NMS were facing higher motorization growth rates (Eurostat, 2009a, p. 39-40); 
higher motor fuel taxes could have slowed down the economic activity. Secondly, while 
under the Kyoto Protocol OMS committed to sharing the burden of reducing EU 
emissions in 2008-2012 (CEU, 2002, Council Decision 2002/358/EC), NMS were facing 
individual, non-shared emission reduction targets. This is because the Kyoto Protocol 
was ratified in 2004, before NMS joined the EU. For most NMS, such emission reduction 
targets were not a concern and provided rather a comfortable safety net in case a country 
decided to significantly increase its emission level. With the exception of Slovenia, actual 
emissions in NMS countries were considerably lower than their set Kyoto targets (e.g. 
Eurostat, 2009b, p. 18). In addition, Cyprus and Malta did not face any Kyoto targets at 
all.
Between 2004 and 2010, real consumer prices for unleaded gasoline in NMS 
countries were, on average, about 24-30% lower than in OMS countries. For diesel, this 
difference increased from 12% to 21%. By 2010, these differences corresponded to €280 
per 1000 liters for unleaded gasoline and €182 for diesel respectively (Table 6 ). 
Surprisingly, differences in motor fuel producer prices between OMS and NMS groups
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were relatively small compared to differences in motor fuel consumer prices. For 
example, in 2010, average differences in real producer prices for Euro-super-95 gasoline 
and diesel fuel were about 13-14%. Taxation, hence, rather than producer price 
differences, played a major role in a consumer price gap between these two groups, OMS 
and NMS. For example, the real tax burden of unleaded gasoline was, on average, 45- 
47% higher in OMS than in NMS, or by €225-228 per 1000 liters. For diesel, this 
difference was also substantial, 27-28% or €109-121 per 1000 liters o f diesel (Table 6 ).
Compared to other motor fuels, LPG fuel was roughly half as expensive. The 
average difference in real consumer prices between OMS and NMS groups was also 
smaller for LPG than for other fuels (Table 6 ). By 2010, this difference corresponded to 
about €0.097 per one liter of LPG fuel, or 20%, up from 6 % in 2004. Because LPG fuel is 
considered to be environmentally cleaner, taxes on LPG fuel were much lower than taxes 
on other motor fuels. Yet, unlike the situation for other motor fuels, total taxes on LPG 
were slightly higher in the NMS group (Table 6 ). Although this taxation gap between 
NMS and OMS had decreased in the late 2000s, on average, higher producer prices in 
OMS outweighed the impact of higher taxes in NMS for this fuel. As a result, despite 
higher taxes, LPG fuel was cheaper on the territories o f newer members o f the Union.
Real consumer prices on LPG were especially high in France and Bulgaria and 
low in Belgium and Luxembourg. High LPG consumer prices in France were driven by 
the highest LPG producer prices in Europe. Bulgaria was a special case, a country that 
possessed both high taxes and high producer prices on LPG fuel. As a result, the most 
expensive LPG fuel in the EU was in Bulgaria. Low LPG prices in Belgium and 
Luxembourg can be explained by low taxes.
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1.6.3. Policy ‘Leaders,’ ‘Fence-sitters’ and ‘Foot-draggers’
The environmental policy literature suggests that there were behavioral 
differences among the national governments in their approaches to environmental policy, 
for example, between northern and southern European countries (e.g. Pavlinek & Pickles, 
2005). In addition, differences in approaches to environmental taxation existed not only 
between OMS and NMS groups, but also among the OMS themselves. Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany, along with Austria, Finland and Sweden, were often referred 
to as ‘leaders’ or ‘pace-setters’ in shaping the EU environmental regulation (e.g. 
Liefferink & Andersen, 1998). By contrast, Portugal, Greece and Spain were known as 
‘laggards’ or ‘foot-draggers,’ because they often acted as reluctant environmental policy- 
takers in the EU (Borzel, 2005). These terms tend to refer more broadly to countries’ 
personality types in setting environmental policy.
In relation to motor fuels, the OMS data for 1994-2010 show that some ‘leaders’ 
(‘pace-setters’) like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland had the highest real 
consumer prices on unleaded gasoline; other ‘leaders’ like Sweden and Germany -  on 
diesel. These OMS, along with the U.K. had traditionally kept their motor fuel taxes 
among the highest in the EU.
The U.K. is an interesting case on its own. Britain was typically referred to as a 
‘fence-sitter’ in European environmental policy, a country that either takes an indifferent 
position, or switches its behavior from a ‘laggard’ to an occasional ‘pace-setter’ (e.g. 
Borzel, 2005). In relation to motor fuels, however, the U.K. had been known as a definite 
‘leader’ in part, perhaps, due to natural geographical barriers to cross-border motor fuel
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shopping. Starting in the late 1990s, the U.K. earned its reputation for its high prices on 
all types of motor fuel, primarily because of much tighter motor fuel taxation policies 
than in other EU countries, especially for diesel. In some years, total taxes paid on 
unleaded gasoline were over 80% of the final consumer price (Smith, 2000). By the end 
of the 2000s, nevertheless, British prices on motor fuels became more moderate and 
harmonized with the rest of the EU, due, in part, to a temporary decrease o f VAT rates 
and fuel tax freezes.
Starting in 2000, the U.K. suffered from a series o f large protests against high 
motor fuel prices that were driven by high taxes. Many protesters were conservative 
farmers and truck drivers; in 2 0 0 0 , for example, they blocked access to fuel refineries and 
eventually caused temporary shortages o f gasoline at fueling stations (e.g. The 
Economist, 2000; 2012). Nevertheless, protests gained some public support, and the 
British government agreed to revise and freeze fuel excise tax rates. Protests continued 
for almost a decade, and in 2 0 1 1 , the government promised to implement a flexible 
taxation stabilizing scheme (e.g. Hotter, 2011).
Most environmental policy ‘pace-setters’ displayed their typical policy-setting 
personalities in relation to motor fuel taxation, but not all ‘foot-draggers’ did the same. 
Just like with other environmental policies, with motor fuel taxation policies, Spain 
remained a ‘laggard’ while Portugal did not. The data show that in 1993-2010 Portugal, 
for example, paid close attention to its motor fuel taxation policies and adjusted its excise 
taxes more often than any other EU member: 52 times for unleaded gasoline and 35 times 
for diesel.
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Greece also remained a ‘laggard’ up until the financial crisis o f the late 2000s. 
After keeping motor fuel taxes low for years, Greece sharply increased them to address 
budgetary needs rather than environmental concerns. A sharp increase o f motor fuel taxes 
led to a steep jump in motor fuel consumer prices, with Greek motor fuel prices quickly 
becoming among the highest in the EU. These policies, however, don’t imply that Greece 
switched its policy-setting personality from a ‘laggard’ to a ‘leader.’ It is rather consistent 
with the economic literature that originated in works by Ramsey (1927): at a time of 
fiscal difficulties, countries often increase their indirect taxes on consumption goods, 
including motor fuel excise taxes, rather than taxes on income and savings. By doing so, 
governments encourage work rather than leisure (e.g. Selim, 2007).
Although a typical environmental policy ‘fence-sitter,’ Luxembourg was one of 
the two biggest ‘foot-draggers,’ or ‘laggards,’ in motor fuel taxation. Both Luxemburg 
and Spain, traditionally maintained their motor fuel taxes low, especially compared to 
other OMS. As a consequence, Luxembourg and Spain traditionally had some of the 
lowest real consumer prices on unleaded and diesel fuels among OMS. Their motor fuel 
prices and taxes were more consistent with NMS levels than OMS levels. This may also 
be the reason why, by the late 2000s, Luxembourg and Spain continued to be absolute 
leaders in per capita greenhouse gas emissions in the EU (EEA, 2009, p.27).
Because of the common environmental commitments, before and immediately 
after the 2004 expansion of the Union, there was a concern that NMS would join the 
‘laggards’ and offset the progressive nature of the EU environmental policy (VanDeveer 
& Carmin, 2005). Most NMS entered the EU in 2004 with relatively modest taxation
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rates. Some of them became new ‘leaders,’ at least among NMS, while others did, 
indeed, remain ‘laggards.’
On the one hand, by the end o f 2000s many newer members made efforts to 
harmonize their motor fuel taxes with OMS levels. For example, during the late 2000s 
Malta and the Baltic countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania, raised their taxes on 
unleaded gasoline and diesel. Similarly, Slovenia, a country that already had relatively 
high taxes on diesel compared to other NMS, also raised them to levels more consistent 
with diesel tax levels of OMS. Lithuania was the only country that drastically raised its 
LPG taxes by increasing both the VAT tax rates and more than doubling its LPG excise 
tax rates. With the exception of Slovenia, harmonization efforts o f these NMS cannot be 
directly attributed to compliance with their 2008-2012 Kyoto emission targets. This is 
because in 2009, the average emissions in Estonia and Lithuania were already below their 
individual Kyoto targets; Malta had no assigned targets at all (EEA, 2009, p.71-73). 
Nevertheless, all of these motor fuel policy changes had occurred in the late 2000s, that 
is, at the time of financial crisis. These policy changes, hence, may be partially attributed 
to countries’ addressing their budgetary needs, rather than to environmental political 
pressures from the rest of the EU.
On the other hand, some NMS joined the motor fuel policy ‘laggards’ group. 
Cyprus, for example, remained known as one European country with some of the lowest 
taxes. Consequently, in 2004-2010, real consumer prices for both unleaded petrol and 
diesel in Cyprus were low. The fact that Cyprus did not face any Kyoto emission 
reduction targets may help explain low motor fuel taxes and why Cyprus was among few 
EU members with per capita growth in emissions (EEA, 2009, p.27). Between 1990 and
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2007, transport-related emissions in Cyprus nearly tripled (EEA, 2010, p. 15). Finally, in 
the late 2000s, some NMS entered the Eurozone. This new membership introduced an 
opportunity to reexamine their national motor fuel taxes.
1.6.4. Motor Fuel Taxes and Prices in the Eurozone versus Non-Eurozone Countries
The Eurozone, the zone of a common currency -  the Euro, originated in 1999 as a 
single monetary union between eleven EU members. In 2001, Greece also joined the 
Eurozone; Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta joined it in the late 2000s. By non- 
Eurozone, this paper refers to the EU members that were a part of the EU between 1999 
and 2010, but not a part of the Eurozone (Table 1).
The data show that between 1999 and 2010, real consumer prices on leaded, 
unleaded and diesel motor fuels were, on average, different between the Eurozone and 
non-Eurozone groups (e.g. Figure 6 ). Since real motor fuel producer prices in these two 
sets of countries were roughly the same, differences in taxes, hence, once again help 
explain this consumer price disparity. For leaded and unleaded gasoline, average tax and, 
consequently, consumer price differences remained large even after 2004, about €100- 
180 per 1 0 0 0  liters.
For diesel, however, tax and real consumer prices difference became negligible 
after 2004, at least until the late 2000s (Figure 7). For LPG fuel, taxes in non-Eurozone 
countries were on average slightly higher than in the Eurozone both before and after 
2004. Yet, the real consumer prices on LPG were, on average, higher in the Eurozone 
because of higher producer prices in this group.
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Figure 6.
Average real consumer prices on unleaded gasoline, in euro 
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Figure 7.
Average real consumer prices on diesel in the EU, in euro
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There were a few major reasons for these differences in motor fuel taxation between the 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone. Firstly, at any point in time, the Eurozone countries 
possessed different economic characteristics than non-Eurozone countries. Before the 
2004 enlargement of the EU, the non-Eurozone group consisted of the economically 
superior Scandinavian countries and the U.K., countries that were known as ‘leaders’ in 
motor fuel taxation. Then, in 2004, the average consumer prices on motor fuels in the 
non-Eurozone group experienced a sharp drop (Figures 6-7). After the 2004 EU 
enlargement, most countries in the new, enlarged non-Eurozone group were from the 
economically weaker Eastern and Central Europe (Table 1).
Secondly, inflation may have played an important role in motor fuel policy design 
for these two groups. National excise tax rates are sensitive to inflation because they are 
established in a form of fixed lump-sum amounts in national currency. The inflation rate 
in the Eurozone has been low because of its conservative approach to a common 
monetary policy. By contrast, inflation and reliability of real excise tax revenues may 
have been a concern in countries that joined the non-Eurozone group after 2004. Unless 
excise taxes were adjusted frequently, like in Slovenia and Elungary, the fixed nominal 
amount o f the motor fuel excise tax made the corresponding tax revenues vulnerable to 
inflation (e.g. England, 2009). Also, frequent adjustment o f motor fuel excise taxes is 
often a politically challenging task. For some new members of the Eurozone, however, 
switching to the euro currency gave an opportunity to reevaluate motor fuel excise tax 
policies. For example, Slovakia, after joining the Eurozone in 2009, altogether canceled 
its excise tax rates on LPG fuel.
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Lastly, consumer prices in the Eurozone countries were displayed in the same 
currency, allowing for easy comparison among its members. Discounting other factors, 
non-Eurozone consumers did not always possess perfect information about exchange 
rates, inflation rates, and fuel prices in neighboring countries to make similarity 
comparisons at the time of their purchase. Under these circumstances of incomplete 
information in non-Eurozone countries, pressures on national governments from their 
citizens regarding motor fuel policies could have been weaker than in the Eurozone. 
Diesel fuel prices in 2004-2009 were the exception because on average there were no 
significant price differences between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone. This may 
indirectly suggest that NMS countries were under pressure to reduce diesel fuel tourism 
that is typically caused by truck drivers, who are highly mobile across national borders 
and compare prices more frequently.
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CONCLUSION
Between the early 1990s and 2010, the motor fuel market in the EU went through 
a series of drastic changes. A variety of factors influenced these transformations -  from 
the EU enlargement, to the creation o f the Eurozone, to dramatic changes in both 
production costs and tax structures of individual member countries. By looking at OMS 
and NMS as well as at the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries as separate but related 
groups, this essay provides a better picture o f the EU motor fuel market of the 1990s- 
2000s. Nobody has gathered this information in a single paper before, especially for the 
newer EU member-countries. This is exactly where this essay fits in the literature. I 
believe it is important for the European Commission policymakers and other stakeholders 
to understand the complexity of the EU transformations and their impact on motor fuel 
market and tax-setting behaviors of both newer and older member-countries.
After the creation of Eurozone in 1999, average producer prices on motor fuels 
were nearly identical between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, with the 
exception of LPG fuel. Tax levels, however, were higher in the non-Eurozone group. 
After the largest expansion of the EU in 2004, differences in taxation between OMS and 
NMS introduced substantial differences in real consumer prices between these groups. 
When NMS countries joined the EU in 2004, they also changed the composition o f the 
non-Eurozone group. If, before 2004, average consumer prices on leaded, unleaded and 
diesel fuels were, on average, lower in the Eurozone, after 2004 the situation had 
reversed. This was because the ten newer members were primarily from Eastern and
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Central Europe; they were weaker economically and had lower motor fuel taxes than 
OMS countries. At the same time, real producer prices remained almost identical between 
the OMS and NMS during the entire period of 2004-2010. The data also show that while 
motor fuel tax shares in the EU, on average, decreased, it happened primarily due to 
raising producer prices and higher oil prices.
In order to guide the motor fuel internal market in the EU, the European 
Commission imposed tax floor policies (e.g. CEU, 2003, Council Directive 2003/96/EC). 
Following these guidelines, the member states were free in setting their own national 
motor fuel policies. In setting environmental policies, different OMS traditionally were 
known for their different policy setting personalities as either ‘leaders,’ ‘fence-sitters,’ or 
‘laggards.’ This paper shows that in taxing motor fuels, OMS also assumed the 
corresponding personalities, except for the U.K. that became a ‘leader.’ For example, 
some OMS traditionally kept their motor fuel taxes either low, like Spain, or high, like 
the Netherlands. Newer states also assumed similar personalities as either ‘laggards’ or 
‘leaders,’ at least among NMS. The analysis also reveals that for some NMS ‘leaders,’ 
changes in motor fuel policies could be attributed to adapting to the financial crisis o f the 
late 2000s, rather than to addressing environmental concerns such as transport emissions.
One of the key takeaways of this essay is that an important outcome of the EU 
transformation, in real terms, is that the EU members were slowly switching from lump­
sum motor fuel excise taxes to ad valorem VAT taxes. That is, they were shifting the tax 
burden away from polluters towards the general public, which partially explains why the 
EU transportation sector was the only sector of the economy that experienced an absolute 
increase in exhaust emissions.
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Overall, this essay lays the groundwork for studying the unified internal market 
for motor fuel in the EU and whether long-term prices and tax policies will become more 
homogeneous over time. The question remains, however, about the long-term outcome 
of these transformations in the EU and how members’ individual policy-setting 
personalities reacted to these changes. This question can be answered only empirically. 
Understanding how these tax-policy setting personalities o f individual member states 
interact with each other in a complex system like the EU is critical for predicting both 
short-term and long-term motor fuel price outcomes.
One testable hypothesis for future research is that, based on findings about 
differences in NMSs’ tax policy-setting personalities, at least some NMS will harmonize 
their taxes on motor fuels with OMS in the long run. It is possible, given that motor fuel 
differences in producer prices remain small, tax-setting behaviors will drive fiscal 
harmonization efforts as well as transport emission reduction efforts in the EU both in the 
short and the long run. Another hypothesis worth testing is whether differences and 
similarities in socio-economic factors, for example, between the EU members that are 
neighbors, serve as additional factors that shape a country’s tax-setting personality. These 
questions will be researched in the next two essays of this dissertation.
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The EU Enlargement Timeline









































France FR 1957 OMS 1999
Germany DE 1957 OMS 1999
Italy IT 1957 OMS 1999
Luxembourg LU 1957 OMS 1999
Netherlands NL 1957 OMS 1999
Denmark DK 1973 OMS _
Ireland IE 1973 OMS 1999
The U.K. UK 1973 OMS _
Greece EL 1981 OMS 2001
Portugal PT 1986 OMS 1999
Spain ES 1986 OMS 1999
Austria AU 1995 OMS 1999
Finland FI 1995 OMS 1999
Sweden SE 1995 OMS _
Cyprus CY 2004 NWS 2008
Czech
Republic CZ 2004 NMS
Estonia EE 2004 NMS 2011
Hungary HU 2004 NMS -
Latvia LV 2004 NMS -
Lithuania LT 2004 NMS -
Malta MT 2004 NMS 2008
Poland PL 2004 NMS -
Slovakia SK 2004 NMS 2009
Slovenia SI 2004 NMS 2007
Bulgaria BG 2007 NMS -
Romania RO 2007 NMS -
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Table 2. The European Union and Community in 1957-20107
Year 1957 1993 1995 2004 2007 2010
Name of the 
Union EEC EU-12 EU-15 EU-25 EU-27 EU-27
Number of 
Members 6 12 15 25 27 27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Population8
Total population 185,677,260 349,858,760 374,239,930 458,349,900 490,393,880 501,103,425
Mean
population
30,946,210 29,154,900 24,949,330 18,334,000 18,162,740 18,559,386
St. dev. 
population
28,134,590 28,050,200 26,636,290 23,710,680 23,017,100 23,442,236
Max population 71,019,070 81,132,270 81,653,700 82,424,610 82,401,000 81,802,257
Min population 308,450 398,080 409,700 396,850 401,880 412,970
GDP per 
Capita, $2005
Mean GDP per 
capita
10,477.27 23,777.01 24,904.65 25,548.11 27,232.00 na
St. dev. GDP 
per capita
3,936.60 8,576.84 7,727.89 11,741.76 13,308.92 na
Max GPD per 
capita
16,974.68 48,633.00 49,863.74 68,390.36 77,783.50 na
Min GDP per 
capita
6,802.39 15,280.04 16,131.11 10,908.69 9,313.56 na
GDP Growth 
Rate Among 




3.24 -0.73 3.11 3.72 4.73 na
St. dev. growth 
rate
2.09 1.89 2.53 2.21 2.58 na
Max growth rate 5.87 3.02 10.89 8.61 10.36 na
Min growth rate 1.04 -2.52 -0.30 0.09 1.35 na
Openness, % in 
$2005
Mean openness 49.81 71.56 75.17 109.32 120.60 na
St. dev. 
openness
50.29 51.68 48.91 53.23 55.34 na
Max openness 134.47 205.53 218.23 287.04 301.41 na
Min openness 12.68 32.55 38.61 51.95 55.18 na
7 Source o f data on population, GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, and openness for 1957-2007: Alan 
Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International 
Comparisons o f  Production, Income and Prices at the University o f  Pennsylvania, August 2009.
8 Source o f population 2010 data: Eurostat online database.
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Table 2. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Motorization 























M illion tons 
C 0 2
Equivalent10
na 871.38 946.32 1,229.19 1,297.57 na
Average GHG 
emissions
na 72.62 63.09 49.17 48.06 na
St.dev. GHG 
emissions
na 65.42 62.77 62.04 60.69 na
Max GHG 
emissions
na 198.59 199.18 199.83 188.85 na
Min GHG 
emissions
na 4.05 4.10 2.77 3.27 na
Inland Freight, 
Million T-km"
na 833,946.00 1,016,944.00 1,471,730.00 1,719,875.00 na
Mean freight na 69,495.50 67,796.27 63,988.26 68,795.00 na
St.dev. freight na 74,296.41 78,859.20 84,213.44 93,783.42 na
Max freight na 211,622.00 237,515.00 303,744.00 343,439.00 na
Min freight na 484.00 530.00 580.00 587.00 na
9 Source: Eurostat database. For 2004, data on motorization rates are not available for Denmark, Malta, 
Greece, Portugal. For 2007, data is not available for Malta, Greece and Portugal.
10 Data source: EEA.
11 Data source: OECD statistical database. For 2004 and 2007, data for Cyprus and Malta are not available.
42
Table 2. (continued)





na 3,043,866.00 3,401,321.00 4,300,919.00 4,445,164.00 na
Mean passenger 
transport
na 304,386.60 283,443.42 238,939.94 246,953.56 na
St.dev. passenger 
transport
na 289,772.21 295,100.79 292,462.01 296,177.15 na
Max passenger 
transport
na 729,500.00 815,300.00 868,700.00 868,000.00 na
Min passenger 
transport
na 21,656.00 25,781.00 22,042.00 24,355.00 na
New Passenger 
Car Registration13
na 10,562,929 11,805,067 10,989,204 14,198,226 na
Mean registration na 880,244.08 787,004.47 578,379.16 591,592.75 na
St.dev. registration na 999,644.65 985,881.88 954,721.99 851,219.72 na
Max registration na 3,194,204.00 3,314,061.00 3,266,826.00 3,148,163.00 na
Min registration na 29,927.00 28,806.00 16,514.00 6,223.00 na
Stock of
Passenger Cars14
na 145,353,064 160,174,996 210,136,292 219,729,733
Mean stock na 12,112,755.33 10,678,333.07 8,755,678.83 8,789,189.32 na
St.dev. stock na 13,198,491.07 12,699,833.95 12,674,289.66 12,331,261.39 na
Max stock na 38,772,000.00 40,404,294.00 45,376,000.00 41,184,000.00 na
Min stock na 217,754.00 231,666.00 204,949.00 273,784.00 na
12 Data source: OECD statistical database. Note, that data are not available for Ireland and Luxembourg in 
1993, 1995, 2004, and 2007; Austria in 1995 and 2004; Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta in 2004 and 
2007; Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
13 Data source: UNECE database. Note, that data are not available for Greece, Italy, and Portugal in 2004 
and 2007; Luxembourg, Malta, and Spain in 2004.
14 Data source: UNECE database. Note, that data are not available for Portugal in 2004 and 2007; Greece in 
2007.
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Table 3. Table of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Description
EEC European Economic Community
EU The European Union
EU-12 The twelve original members o f the European Union
EU-27 The European Union as of 2007
EU-25 The European Union as of 2004
OMS, or 
EU-15
The twelve countries that formed the EU in 1993 and the three countries 
that joined the EU in 1995 are referred to as older member states
NMS The twelve countries that joined the EU in 2004 are referred to as newer 
member states
EZ-12 The Eurozone group, consists the 11 original Eurozone countries and 
Greece
RMS Representative member country of the EU
VAT Value added tax - an ad valorem type tax; it is levied in the form of %
LPG Liquid petroleum gas
UK The United Kingdom (Great Brittan)
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions
CPI Consumer price index
ETS Emission Trading Scheme
CEU The Council of the European Union
CEC The Council of the European Community
EEA European Environment Agency
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Table 4. Mean Real Prices and Taxes per 1000 Liters of Motor Fuel in the EU
between 1994 and 2010 (standard deviation in parenthesis)
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(178.22) 3.97% 7.44%, 11.70%

















































(4.96) -7.60 -5.77 -13.37











(144.57) -6.21% -2.67% -8.71%
Observations 576 735 1,094 1,225 594
n 12 15 25 25 27













(128.34) 11.58% 12.12%, 25.10%











(52.67) 37.79%, 27.28%, 75.38%









(78.19) -9.88% -5.03% -14.41%











(2.50) 2.23 0.52 2.75











(4.74) -8.66 -5.51 -14.17











(99.85) -2.22%, 0.86% -1.38%
Observations 576 735 1,094 1,225 594
n 12 15 25 25 27
T 48 49 44 49 22
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Table 4. (continued)










EU  Members EU-12 EU-15 EU-25 EU-27 EU-27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LPG Fuel
Consumer price 






(92.67) na 10.62% na







(80.71) na 12.74% na




(36.42) na -3.51% na




(3.65) na 1.01 na







(8.56) na -0.80 na
Total taxes per 






(47.12) na 5.81% na
Observations 0 0 642 784 396
n 0 0 16 16 18











(182.45) na na 2.05% na na







(56.83) na na 40.29% na na







(142.65) na na -15.84% na na







(1.10) na na 0.07 na na







(6.47) na na -10.45 na na







(170.02) na na -11.74% na na
Observations 576 588 436 0 0
n 12 12 11 0 0
T 48 49 40 0 0
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Table 5. Mean Nominal Prices and Taxes per 1000 Liters of Motor Fuel in the EU
between 1994 and 2010 (standard deviation in parenthesis)













EU  Members EU-12 EU-15 EU-25 EU-27 EU-27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unleaded Euro- 
super-95
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(104.69) 14.10% 7.57% 22.73%























(4.96) -10.74% -9.13% -18.89%
Observations 576 735 1,094 1,225 594
n 12 15 25 25 27
T 48 49 44 49 22
Diesel
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(4.74) -13.23% -9.70% -21.65%
Observations 576 735 1,094 1,225 594
n 12 15 25 25 27
T 48 49 44 49 22
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Table 5. (continued)













EU Members EU-12 EU-15 EU-25 EU-27 EU-27
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
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(103.59) na 32.42%, na







(80.09) na 34.21%, na




(46.83) na 18.00% na
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(8.56) na -2.64% na
Observations 0 0 642 784 396
n 0 0 16 16 18
T 0 0 40 49 22
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(Super) Fuel







(184.00) na na 30.61% na na







(57.43) na na 80.22% na na







(141.04) na na 7.55% na na







(1.10) na na 0.39% na na







(6.47) na na -14.26% na na
Observations 576 588 436 0 0
n 12 12 11 0 0
T 48 49 40 0 0
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price, € 1066.99 858.34 208.65 24% 1,203.63 923.51 280.12 30% 136.64 65.17
Producer 
price, € 355.12 374.78 -19.66 -5% 477.52 422.67 54.85 13% 122.40 47.89
Total tax 
level, € 711.86 483.57 228.29 47% 726.11 500.84 225.27 45% 14.25 17.27
Excise tax, 
€ 538.78 348.51 190.27 55% 530.64 339.89 190.75 56% -8.15 -8.62
VAT, % 19.67 19.20 0.47 2% 20.07 20.00 0.07 0% 0.40 0.80
Diesel
Consumer 
price, € 881.18 784.78 96.40 12% 1,036.87 854.72 182.15 21% 155.69 69.94
Producer 
price, € 358.71 372.22 -13.51 -4% 489.36 428.27 61.09 14% 130.65 56.05
Total tax 
level, € 522.47 412.55 109.92 27% 547.50 426.45 121.05 28% 25.03 13.90
Excise tax, 
€ 379.62 288.78 90.84 31% 377.08 276.53 100.55 36% -2.54 -12.25
VAT, % 18.17 19.20 -1.03 -5% 20.07 20.00 0.07 0% 1.90 0.80
LPG
Consumer 
price, € 482.95 456.84 26.11 6% 577.76 480.53 97.23 20% 94.81 23.69
Producer 
price, € 350.47 294.91 55.56 19% 432.28 321.05 111.23 35% 81.81 26.14
Total tax 
level, € 132.49 161.93 -29.44 -18% 145.48 159.48 -14.00 -9% 12.99 -2.45
Excise tax, 
€ 80.16 69.05 11.11 16% 70.78 62.77 8.01 13% -9.38 -6.27
VAT, % 19.21 19.20 0.01 0% 19.31 20.00 -0.69 -3% 0.10 0.80
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THE DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The weekly data for 27 EU members for the total period of January 3, 1994 - June 
7, 2010 are from the EU Oil Bulletin published by the European Commission. The 
dataset is in the form of unbalanced panel; it includes pre-tax and tax-inclusive prices, 
value-added tax (VAT) rates, excise tax rates and exchange rates. The data are for four 
types of motor vehicle fuels: unleaded petrol (Euro-super-95), automotive gas oil (diesel), 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) motor fuel and lead replacement (Super) petrol. The 
maximum number of weeks for diesel and unleaded gasoline is 858. For the LPG fuel, 
the data is available only for 2000-2010, and for lead replacement fuel the data is for 
1994-2005.
The original data comes in two separate data files. All prices and excise tax levels 
are converted to euro. Monthly consumer price indices (CPI) from the UNECE Statistical 
Division database help converting data into real values. For Ireland, from 1994-1996, 
additional CPI data is provided by the Central Statistics Office o f Ireland. In order to 
match weekly prices, monthly CPI indices are transformed into weekly indices using the 
geometric mean formula for weekly growth rates. The tax level for each motor fuel is 
approximated as a difference between real consumer and producer prices.
Table 7 provides summary statistics o f this unbalanced data sample. It shows that 
from 1994-2010, real mean consumer prices were equal to €1034 per 1000 liters of 
unleaded Euro-super-95 and €888 for diesel. Real mean producer prices were €375 and 
€387 respectively. During this period, real consumer and real producer prices on both 
Euro-super-95 and on diesel experienced high price variation. For diesel, deviations from 
the mean price were, on average, higher within countries than between countries. Price 
volatility of both fuels seemed to have been driven by countries’ ongoing internal 
volatility on the production side. In addition, during the analyzed period, there were 
large differences in both types of taxes between the EU members.
For both Euro-super-95 and diesel fuel, mean VAT tax rates were roughly the 
same (19.3%), but mean excise taxes for unleaded fuel (€491) were much higher than for 
diesel (€355). For Euro-super-95, these mean excise taxes varied at a greater standard 
deviation rate of €126 than for diesel (€101). As a result, mean shares o f total taxes in a 
consumer price accounted for 63% for Euro-super-95 and 57% for diesel. By contrast to 
price variation, tax shares on all types of fuel varied slightly more between the EU 
members than within a given country, with an average deviation in tax shares of roughly 
9%.
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The data on LPG fuel are only available for fewer countries and shorter time 
periods; it starts in 2000. During 2000-2010, real mean consumer price on LPG fuel was 
much lower (€509) and more stable than for other types of motor fuels. At the same time, 
real mean producer price on LPG (€359) was only slightly lower than producer prices on 
other fuels. Tax levels on LPG were also much lower than for other types o f motor fuels. 
Average VAT tax rate for LPG was equal to 18.3%, and mean excise tax rate was €70 per 
1000 liters, which was 5-7 times lower than for diesel and unleaded gasoline. This is 
why, on average, taxes accounted for only 29% of the consumer price for LPG, or 
roughly two times lower than for other motor fuels.
Data on lead replacement (Super) petrol is also only available for fewer countries 
and shorter time periods; it ends in 2005. Between 1994 and 2005, real mean consumer 
price o f leaded gasoline was equal to €1074 per 1000 liters, which is roughly three times 
higher than the producer price o f €332 (Table 3). These mean levels o f Super fuel were 
almost identical to corresponding values for unleaded Euro-super-95 fuel, and were only 
slightly above the price of diesel. During the same time period, mean excise tax for lead 
replacement gasoline was the highest among all motor fuels (€576). Average VAT tax 
rate for this fuel was 18.2%, or well above the tax floor. For lead replacement petrol, 
relatively high excise taxes and their frequent changes may be explained by the members’ 
efforts to phase this fuel out from the market.
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Table 7. Summary Statistics: Real Prices and Taxes on Motor Fuels in the EU
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
( l ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unleaded: 1994-2010
rprice overall 1034.65 163.33 531.67 1692.53 N =  15197 n = 27
between 138.65 720.88 1251.01
within 109.77 640.06 1476.16
rpfO overall 375.19 96.28 157.90 793.21 N =  15197 n = 27
between 46.64 314.37 529.25
within 87.68 173.41 773.79
rexcisef overall 491.09 125.71 208.04 946.48 N = 15197 n = 27
between 130.50 246.10 674.28
within 47.84 283.54 763.28
fuel95vat overall 19.32 2.99 12.00 25.00 N = 15197 n = 27
between 2.65 13.00 25.00
within 0.80 16.91 22.35
share_f95 overall 63.40 8.86 39.63 85.95 N =  15197 n = 27
between 8.08 46.50 72.89
within 5.40 45.40 79.24
Diesel: 1994 - 2010
rpdiesel overall 887.58 167.82 508.57 1615.58 N =  15197 n = 27
between 99.37 722.31 1194.96
within 134.96 467.18 1407.62
rpdO overall 387.92 117.30 154.77 828.11 N = 15197 n = 27
between 51.00 327.26 513.12
within 109.09 176.22 833.19
rexcised overall 355.19 101.09 177.18 946.48 N = 15197 n =  27
between 92.98 207.29 674.69
within 39.64 141.47 626.98
dieselvat overall 19.32 3.06 5.00 25.00 N =  15197 n = 27
between 2.54 15.00 25.00
within 1.35 7.81 23.81
share_diesel overall 56.58 8.81 33.17 86.17 N = 15197 n = 27
between 7.10 41.52 71.45
within 6.13 37.92 72.41
LPG Fuel: 2000-2010
rplpg overall 508.87 87.71 314.86 838.45 N = 6429 n =  18
between 72.41 404.59 662.14
within 58.90 280.34 805.74
rplpgO overall 359.45 69.49 160.94 571.02 N = 6429 n =  18
between 52.72 245.15 456.14
within 49.49 170.81 609.89
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Table 7. (continued)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rexciselpg overall 70.37 38.76 0 170.88 N = 6429 n =  18
between 33.97 0 145.57
within 16.19 -6.81 124.57
lpgvat overall 18.29 3.99 6.00 25.00 N = 6429 n =  18
between 3.48 6.00 22.15
within 0.79 15.41 21.14
sharelpg overall 29.17 8.31 14.57 53.66 N = 6429 n =  18
between 7.13 17.35 41.78
within 3.57 14.29 48.65
Leaded (Super) Fuel: 
1994 - 2005
rpsuper overall 1073.93 158.71 742.65 1666.04 N = 5412 n =  17
between 144.92 798.42 1310.74
within 92.48 708.59 1514.28
rpsO overall 331.92 90.32 157.05 685.83 N = 5412 n = 17
between 56.58 242.65 468.07
within 77.99 182.44 633.15
rexcises overall 575.57 131.06 318.79 986.80 N = 5412 n =  17
between 130.53 349.84 755.63
within 69.34 352.25 860.38
supervat overall 18.21 2.26 12.00 25.00 N = 5412 n = 17
between 2.64 13.89 25.00
within 0.66 16.32 21.59
sharesuper overall 68.80 8.22 44.90 86.56 N = 5412 n =  17
between 7.29 52.31 76.63
within 6.00 48.04 82.81
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APPENDIX l.B  
GHG EMISSIONS SECTORS IN TH E EU
Figure 8 shows a scheme of major EU policies that target GHG emissions in major 
emitting industries. With the exception of transport, housing, agriculture and waste 
industries, GHG emissions are regulated through the Emission Trading System (ETS). 
ETS is the cap-and-trade type emission permit market. It is worth noticing that the VAT 
tax and the excise tax on fuel remain major policy tools in the EU in addressing social 
costs from transport.15
Figure 8. M ajor GHG Policies in the EU and the Place of M otor Fuel Taxation in



























15 For additional discussion see TERM 26 EEA 31. 2006 (EEA, 2006)
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APPENDIX l.C
Table 8. Average Real Tax Premiums on Unleaded Gasoline and Diesel, 2004-2010
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mean tax mean VAT surcharge
Data source The EU Oil Bulletin, the European Commission
Figure 10.
Average tax level and VAT surcharge from double-taxation, 1994 - 2010
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APPENDIX 1.D
EXCESS TAX BURDEN OF MOTOR FUEL TAXES IN THE EU
The classical textbook version typically portrays the concept of excess burden 
using compensated demand curves and a single tax (e.g. Rosen, 2005, p.314-315). 
Following similar model, for simplicity, assume that the compensated demand curve can 
be depictured as a straight line and that marginal cost of one liter of motor fuel in the EU 
is constant. Under these assumptions, the supply curve becomes the horizontal line S at 
price P (Figure 11). Consumer surplus APH is the area between the price and the demand 
curve. Then, the excess burden from a single VAT tax on motor fuel is the area of 
triangle ABC, which is equivalent to:
RAb c = \ w -AQ (d.l)
Under a single tax, the difference between gross and net price is equal to
APBC =  (P( 1 +  VAT) -  P) =  P ■ VAT (d.2)
where P is price before tax and is the VAT is the percentage rate of the Value Added Tax. 
Given that by definition the value of compensated price elasticity o f demand (77) is:
* =  T r l  ’ <d-3>
from Equation (d.3), change in quantity demanded can be written as
4Q = ^  (d.4)
Using Equations (d.2) and (d.4), Equation (d .l) becomes:
R a b c  =  |(^C1 + VAT) -  P) • AQ = \ P  • VAT (d.5)
or, using (d.2), the area o f triangle ABC is
_  yQ P jV A T )2 
K a BC — 2
Now, suppose that instead of a single tax, two taxes are levied on this motor fuel, 
the VAT tax and the excise tax T  (Figure 11). The new consumer surplus is depictured as
the area AHI. The excess burden from both the excise and the VAT taxes on motor fuel
increases to the area of triangle ADE. Simple algebra helps estimate the area of the new 
triangle ADE using Equation (d. 1):
Rade = l ( ( P  + T X 1  +  VAT) - P )  AQ (d.7)
With two taxes, the change in price can be estimated by Equation (d.8 ):
&Pade =  ((P  +  T )( l  +  VAT) -  P) =  P • VAT + T ■ VAT +  T  (d.8 )
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Then, using Equation (d.8 ), Equation (d.7) can be re-written as Equation (d.9):
Rade = \{ (P  + D (  1 +  VAT) -  P ) =  2£ (p  ■ VAT +  T ■ IMT +  T )2
(d.9)
Using Equation (d.6 ), the formula for excess burden16 becomes Equation (d.10):
t]Q(VAT)2 , nQ TVAT  , 77<3T2 „  , VQTVAT  ,
*ADE ~  " I p r ~^T  -  «i4BC +  p l"~2P~ (d.10)
Equation (d.10) shows that in addition to excess burdens o f the VAT and excise
taxes, an extra burden arises from interaction between these two taxes. This additional
excess burden is captured by the second term on the right hand side ^ QT^AT^ 0f  Equation
(d.1 0 ).
The above discussion of excess tax burden, however, does not account for the 
substitution effects between the motor fuel excise tax and VAT. A new excise tax T shifts 
the supply upward from S’ to S” and results in environmental improvement. Figure 11 
pictures this environmental improvement with area o f the rectangle EFHC = T(QX — Q2). 
Then, the welfare gain of the excise tax is EFC= T(QX — <22) /2 . Following the earlier 
discussion of the double dividend literature17 (chapter 1.5), the EU national governments 
may choose to increase the environmental excise taxes and to decrease the distortionary 
VAT, while keeping the overall tax level the same. Then, the supply curve shifts S’ 
downward and the area o f the triangle EFHC becomes bigger. This leads to a bigger 
welfare gain of the Pigouvian tax from bigger emission reductions. Such policy will 
reduce some of VAT distortions; this is because the tax burden will be shifted away from 
the general public (non-polluters) towards motor fuel consumers (polluters). Thus, the 
substitution between the motor fuel excise tax and the VAT increases fairness.
16 When the supply curve is upward sloping, the formula for excess burden becomes
/ Q(VAT) 2 QTVAT QT2\  /1  1 \ _1
\  2 +  P + ~ 2 p ) \ t ] + l )
where e is the elasticity o f  supply. As e  approaches infinity, this expression becomes equation (d.10).
17 In this simple, partial equilibrium set-up, the tax-interaction effect o f  the double dividend cannot be 
evaluated and, therefore, is ignored.
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APPEDIX l.E
TAX CHANGES IN THE EU
Seven Stages of Motor Fuel Price Dynamics
The behavior of real motor fuel consumer and producer prices on leaded, 
unleaded and diesel fuel between 1994 and 2010 in the EU can be informally separated 
into seven stages (Figures 4-5). During the first stage between 1994 and 1999 and the 
fourth stage between 2002 and 2004, real prices for motor fuels were relatively stable, 
with a slight price drop in the late 1990s. A significant price growth occurred during the 
second stage between 1999 and 2000, which was followed by a gradual price drop during 
the third stage in 2001-2002. After the relative stability of the mid-2000s, motor fuel 
consumer prices again began to consistently but erratically increase in 2004-2008 (the 
fifth stage), primarily due to corresponding behavior of producer prices in the 2000s. In 
2008, motor fuel consumer price collapsed (the sixth stage), and the final, seventh stage, 
of price growth began in the late 2008-2009.
As a result of these transformations, between 1994 and 2010 in the EU, both real 
and nominal producer and consumer prices for motor fuels have, on average, increased 
(Tables 4 and 5). For example, in 1994, the average real consumer prices for motor fuels 
were approximately €966 per 1000 liters of unleaded petrol and €764 for diesel. By 2010, 
these prices reached roughly €1079 and €956 respectively (Table 4, Figure 4), reflecting 
increases of 12% and 25%. While fewer data and shorter time periods are available for 
lead replacement (Super) fuel, its average real consumer price had slightly risen from 
€1036 in 1994 to €1057 in 2004, or by 2% (Table 5, Figure 4). The LPG data are also 
only available for fewer years, for the period 2000-2010. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
LPG fuel was much cheaper than other motor fuels, but its real consumer prices also 
increased: from €473 in 2000 to €524 in 2010, or by 11% (Table 4, Figure 4).
Before 2004, producer prices were almost identical across different fuel types 
(Figure 5). After the largest expansion of the EU in 2004, these prices began to slowly 
diverge among different motor fuels, especially the price of LPG fuel. In 1994, the 
average real producer prices were in a benchmark of €280 for Euro-super-95 and €263 
for diesel per 1000 liters. By 2010, these prices increased 62% and 76% respectively, and 
were equal to €453 for unleaded gasoline and €462 for diesel (Table 4, Figure 5).
Data for lead replacement gasoline is available for fewer countries and years, but 
shows a similar pattern. Between 1994 and 2004, real producer prices on leaded fuel have 
increased from €274 to €385, or by 40%, and were roughly equal to producer prices on 
other major types of motor fuels at that time (Table 4). By the middle of 2010, the 
average real producer price for LPG had reached €370 -  a level about 20% lower than for 
diesel and unleaded fuel (Table 4). Lower taxes, however, were the major reason why the
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average LPG consumer prices in the EU remained almost twice lower than prices on 
other motor fuels. Similarly, for other motor fuels, the dynamics of consumer prices were 
defined by movements in producer prices, but large level differences in consumer prices 
between fuels were defined by differences in taxes between these fuel types.
Motor Fuel Taxes in the EU: Tax Share in a Consumer Final Price
Figure 12 shows that between 1994 and 2010 in the EU, tax shares in consumer 
prices of motor fuels mirrored all stages of changes on the production side: as motor fuel 
producer prices were constantly rising since 1999, tax shares were shrinking (Figures 5, 
12). During this period, the average tax shares decreased by approximately 14% for 
diesel and unleaded gasoline (Table 4).
Figure 12.
Average tax shares on motor fuels in the EU, % 
January 1994 - June 2010










lead replacement (Super) fuel
By the summer of 2010, the average tax share in the final consumer price of 
unleaded Euro-super-95 dropped to below 60%; for diesel it dropped below 52% (Table 
4, Figure 5). These numbers were down from roughly 70% and 65% respectively in the 
mid-1990s. For lead replacement fuel, the tax share mirrored changes for unleaded fuel in 
1994-2004. By contrast, the average tax share o f LPG fuel remained relatively stable at a 
level of about 30% in 2000-2010 (Table 4, Figure 12), and decreased only slightly due to 
smaller change in an average LPG producer price.
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These changes in tax shares for unleaded Euro-super-95 fuel and for lead 
replacement gasoline were triggered by both an increase in producer price and a decrease 
in taxes during this period. For example, between 2010 and 1994, the total real amount of 
taxes (both excise and VAT) per 1000 liters of unleaded fuel had decreased by about 
8.7% (Table 4). For diesel, the total real amount of taxes remained roughly the same as in 
in the mid-1990, suggesting that an increase in producer prices alone accounted for a tax 
share drop for this fuel. Finally, total taxes on LPG fuel had increased by about 6 % in 
2004-2010, meaning that both factors played an important role in LPG tax share 
dynamic, but producer prices grew slightly faster.
In regard to tax composition, two types of major changes in taxing motor fuels 
happened in the EU in 1994-2010. Firstly, on average, the EU members were partially 
shifting from motor fuel excise taxes to VAT taxes. Secondly, the variation in both VAT 
and excise tax rates among the EU member countries became smaller by 2010, especially 
for the VAT tax. During 1994-2010 the average VAT tax rate levied on motor fuels in the 
EU had increased from 18% to 20% for unleaded gasoline and from 17% to 20% on 
diesel (Table 4). In the mid-1990s, these average VAT rates among EU-15 countries 
varied by 3-5% from the mean, but by 2010, this variation across members in the 
enlarged EU-27 became tighter. Real excise tax rates on motor fuels steadily decreased in 
1994-2010; they fell by €56 for diesel and €95 for unleaded gasoline, or a 15-18% drop 
(Table 4). Even for lead replacement gasoline, real excise taxes had decreased by €95 in 
1994-2004. In 2004, when newer member states joined the Union, variation in excise tax 
rates became relatively large among the EU members, but it also decreased by 2010.
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ESSAY 2: CLUB CONVERGENCE IN THE EU: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MOTOR FUEL PRICES AND TAXES
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2.1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Taxing motor fuels differs from taxing other consumption goods. It has a 
macroeconomic impact because transportation costs are typically embedded in the price 
of most other goods and services. There is also the second, environmental, aspect of 
motor fuel taxes: they facilitate a reduction of externalities associated with motor fuel 
consumption (Pigou, 1932). Ryan et al. (2009), for example, show that taxes are a more 
powerful tool for reducing CO2 emissions from new vehicles than voluntary agreements 
by automobile manufacturers.
Analyzing national approaches to motor fuel taxation in Europe contributes to a 
broader discussion of fiscal dis-harmonization among the EU member countries. Since 
the creation of the Eurozone in 1999 and the largest expansion of the EU in 2004, there 
has been surprisingly little discussion in the literature of the role played by differences in 
national fiscal policies. Moreover, countries that joined the EU in 2004 were from 
Central and Eastern Europe; they were weaker economically and, as a result, required 
aggressive government borrowing and spending in order to grow their economies. It is 
possible that the divide in fiscal policies and budgets made the EU more vulnerable to 
risks, and triggered the frustrating struggles of the early 2010s. When the Eurozone 
countries delegated control over their monetary policies, they implicitly assumed that 
economic and financial risks would be shared among the Eurozone members. It is not 
surprising that, in a setting where monetary policies are harmonized in some countries 
(the Eurozone) and disharmonized in others (non-Eurozone countries), and fiscal policies
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are set by the EU members sovereignly, the euro grows weaker and the Common Market 
becomes unstable. Although this paper focuses on motor fuels, in a broader sense the 
latest crisis has revealed tensions between the setting of national fiscal policies and the 
operation of a common monetary union.
In the EU, differences in motor fuel tax rates among member states remain large, 
and this contributes to fuel price differences among member states (e.g. Newbery, 2005; 
Rietveld & Woudenberg, 2005). For example, my data show that from 1994-2010 total 
taxes on unleaded gasoline and diesel fuel accounted, on average, for 57-63% of the final 
price and varied across members by roughly 7-8%. According to the European Treaty, 
tax differences are typically considered to be barriers to a smooth operation of the 
Common European Market. Given such wide tax variation, the question remains whether 
national economies are moving toward the Union goals o f social, environmental, and 
economic homogeneity among the EU members and the highly competitive European 
Common Market. In this context, an analysis of long-run behavior as well as the 
relationship between consumer prices, producer prices, and taxes would shed more light 
on fiscal harmonization and on the long-run feasibility of a common, highly competitive 
market for motor fuels in the EU.
This study looks at two forms of convergence, tax convergence and price 
convergence, which may occur separately from one another because of different 
underlying forces behind them. The concept of convergence implies a gradual and 
eventual reduction of level differences either among all economic units or among units 
within sub-groups (clubs). In other words, convergence of motor fuel prices among the 
EU members implies that motor fuel prices across the EU move towards a common price
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level; divergence and club convergence suggest that the market is segmented. If motor 
fuel prices converge, the EU as a whole would benefit from a smoother, non-distortive 
operation of the Common Market for motor fuels. On the other hand, price divergence 
among the EU members suggests the presence o f market frictions such as large 
differences in taxation policies, market power, transportation costs, etc.
For taxes, convergence implies that national governments in the EU harmonized 
their total motor fuel taxation levels among each other. Under this scenario, national 
governments give up some control over addressing social costs associated with motor 
fuel consumption, such as local noise, air pollution from exhaust emissions, road 
congestion, traffic fatalities, etc. If motor fuel tax levels do not converge in the long run, 
it implies that sovereign governments maintain control over their national fuel tax 
systems, even with the Common Market. Given that local pollution and other social costs 
like congestion vary among the EU members, a disharmonized tax scenario helps 
national governments to address transport related social costs more efficiently. This is 
why examining tax convergence in the EU is important: it adds to the discussions of 
environmental conditions and motor fuel price dynamics in the entire EU region.
Despite its importance, the literature on motor fuel price dynamics and tax 
convergence in the EU remains limited. Studies of motor fuel prices in the EU are also 
typically limited to a single country analysis (e.g. Asplund et al., 2000), and only a few 
authors attempt to examine motor fuel price adjustments in a multi-country framework 
(e.g. Wlazlowski et al., 2009). While the economic literature on motor fuel taxes pays 
attention to environmental and climate change policies in the EU (e.g. Sterner, 2007, 
2010; Schreurs, Selin & VanDeveer, 2009) and to cross-border fuel shopping (e.g. Leal et
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al., 2009; Banfi et al., 2005), the long-run state of motor fuel taxation -  an important 
factor for relevant policy analysis -  remains underexplored. This is in spite of findings 
that higher taxes reduce demand for motor fuel (Sterner, 2007) and for new cars (Ryan et 
al., 2009). Oates (2001a) suggests that, in general, the literature on tax harmonization and 
fiscal competition is large but exceedingly theoretical. In regard to motor fuels in 
particular, even the recent studies of price and tax convergence in the EU include only 
older member states (e.g. Robinson, 2007; Dreher & Krieger, 2008, 2010; Bilgili, 2010). 
Some of their findings, therefore, have limited relevance to policy implications in the EU 
as a whole.
In order to address these shortcomings, this paper asks whether there has been 
convergence or divergence in motor fuel taxes and prices among the EU members at 
different stages since 1994. For the purpose of this essay, the twelve countries that 
formed the EU and the three countries that joined it in 1995 are referred to as older 
member states (OMS). The twelve countries that joined the EU after 1995 are referred to 
as newer member states (NMS).
The first contribution of this paper to the body of economic research on motor 
fuels is that it adds to the limited empirical literature on fiscal competition and tax 
harmonization (e.g. England, 2007; Lockwood & Migali, 2009; Rietveld et al., 2001; 
Wildasin, 2006). Secondly, by including both OMS and NMS, the paper takes into 
consideration data from after the largest EU expansion. It also separates the Eurozone 
from non-Eurozone countries. This separation on its own provides an interesting insight 
into how national motor fuel markets and national policies are interrelated in the EU. 
Finally, I show that after the largest expansion of the EU in 2004, motor fuel markets
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have not been completely integrated, even in the absence of trade restrictions. To achieve 
this in a more effective way than previous studies, I use a newer club convergence 
methodology developed by Phillips and Sul (2007) and extend the analysis to four types 
of motor fuels: unleaded gasoline, automotive gas oil (diesel), liquid petroleum gas 
(LPG) and lead replacement fuel. The essay also adds to the empirical literature on the 
Law of One Price (LOP) and international price convergence (e.g. Funke & Koske, 2008; 
Goldberg & Verboven, 2005; Egger, Gruber & Pfaffermayr, 2009).
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2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON FUEL PRICE AND TAX CONVERGENCE
Convergence in motor fuel taxes and convergence in motor fuel prices result from 
different driving forces. The theory of the Law o f One Price (LOP) predicts that in 
competitive markets and in the absence of market frictions, consumer prices on identical 
commodities expressed in the common currency should eventually equalize among 
countries because of arbitrage opportunities (e.g. Isard, 1978; Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 
1991). The underlying assumptions of the LOP are that there are no trade restrictions and 
that transportation costs are negligible. Then, according to LOP, if motor fuel taxes 
converge and production costs remain small in the EU, motor fuel consumer prices 
should also converge because of the commonality of the European market.
Rietveld and Woudenberg (2005) suggest that variation in production costs of 
fuels among most countries is typically small; it plays little role in explaining variation in 
consumer prices on motor fuels. Production costs are better at explaining levels rather 
than variation of motor fuel consumer prices (e.g. Wlazlowski et al., 2009; Dreher & 
Krieger, 2008, 2010). Since producers in all countries face a nearly identical price of 
crude oil in spot markets, variation in producer prices among countries can be entirely 
attributed to the differences in refining capacities, costs of production, or differences in 
market power of local gasoline producers (e.g. Rietveld et a l ,  2001). Taxes, however, 
remain an important factor in explaining motor fuel price variation among economic 
units, including members of the EU (e.g. Newbery, 2005; Rietveld & Woudenberg, 2005; 
Rietveld et al., 2001). Nevertheless, Dreher and Krieger (2010) show that for OMS the
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convergence in consumer prices of diesel is driven by the convergence of producer prices 
rather than by tax convergence.
Tax convergence or divergence, unlike price convergence, is mainly driven by 
broadly defined political forces (e.g. Ilzkovitz, et al., 2007) and the stringency of 
environmental policies (e.g. European Commission, 2011) both at the national level and 
the EU level. According to fiscal competition literature (e.g. Oates & Schwab, 1988; 
Wilson 1999; Oates, 2001a, 2001b; Rork, 2003; Giuliodori & Beetsma, 2008), 
neighboring states may fiscally compete with one another. In addition, the theory of 
yardstick competition suggests that voters may pressure their governments to reduce the 
tax burden, especially during the pre-election period (Besley & Case, 1995). Voters pay 
attention to consumer prices on motor fuels, as well as price differences, because the 
topic is being discussed frequently in the media (e.g. Lofgren & Nordblom, 2010). Thus, 
national motor fuel tax policies and changes to these policies may influence and be 
influenced by not only fuel prices within a given country, but also in neighboring regions. 
In the long run, the interrelation of policies may lead to convergence.
Historically, this general urgency for commonality and unification of Europe is a 
legacy of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (e.g. Carmin & VanDeveer, 2005). European 
nations aimed to reduce tariffs, support multinational corporations, connect transportation 
infrastructures, etc. They also worked towards enlarging the EU and expanding economic 
zones, including the zone of common visa requirements, the zone of common currency, 
etc. Moreover, during the 1990s and 2000s, there has been additional pressure on the EU 
members to comply with common climate change goals and to revise national emission 
policies (e.g. the Council of European Communities, 2003; European Commission, 2001,
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2008, 2010) . 18 These efforts resulted in calls for further harmonization of taxation 
structures among the members (e.g. Ilzkovitz et al., 2007; Newbery, 2005; the Council of 
European Communities, 1992a, 1992b; the European Commission, 2007, 2011).
A growing literature on fuel price convergence and tax convergence provides 
limited agreement on whether fuel consumer prices converge among European countries, 
and what the role of taxes is in this process. Bentzen (2003) uses data from 1978-2002 
and finds only weak evidence that petroleum prices, when expressed in a common 
currency, converge among European OECD countries, but not among all OECD 
members. Without formally testing for it, Bentzen (2003) attributes such convergence to 
tax harmonization processes in the EU. Wlazlowski et al. (2009) analyze fuel price 
dynamics among OMS and suggest that consumers react to low fuel prices in neighboring 
countries by travelling across borders to take advantage of these opportunities. Dreher 
and Krieger (2008, 2010) use the nominal data for OMS from 1994-2004 and a panel unit 
root test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). They examine if  the LOP holds for 
consumer and producer prices of unleaded petrol and diesel fuel and also emphasize the 
role of consumer arbitrage (fuel tourism) in these convergence processes. Dreher and 
Krieger (2008, 2010) find a relatively fast convergence in consumer prices on diesel and 
unleaded fuel among OMS, which they also partially attribute to consumer arbitrage, at 
least for diesel. Their results show rapid producer price convergence and slower fuel tax 
convergence among OMS.
To the best of my knowledge, there have been only two published papers that 
empirically test motor fuel tax convergence. Bilgili (2010) utilizes quarterly data from
18 A more recent proposal is to tax fuels and electricity according to their (1) energy content, or (2) 
alternatively, respective C 0 2 content (European Commission, COM 169/3, 2011)
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1979-2008 for twelve out of fifteen OMS for light fuel oil and automotive diesel fuels 
and the Lagrange Multiplier unit root test. He finds mixed evidence of tax convergence in 
the EU: taxes for household automotive diesel converge in nine out of twelve countries, 
but diverge for Germany, Luxembourg, and the U.K.. Dreher and Krieger (2010) find 
some support for tax convergence in both value added taxes (VAT) and the excise taxes 
as well as in tax shares among OMS, but not for convergence in absolute tax levels.
There are also a number of recent studies on the LOP of natural gas prices in the 
EU that generally conclude that these prices converge within the European region or sub- 
regions (e.g. Siliverstovs et al., 2005; Asche et al., 2002; Robinson, 2007, Neumann et 
al., 2006; Panagiotidis & Rutledge, 2007). These findings on natural gas convergence are 
not surprising because of fixed contracts rigidity (Rosendahl & Sagen, 2009). 
Transportation costs within Europe are lower for natural gas because it is transported by 
pipeline. This is not the case for motor fuels because they are harder to transport long 
distances, especially if  countries have natural geographical barriers. Thus, the relative 
rather than the absolute LOP may hold for motor fuel prices in the EU, as some 
segmentation of markets is possible even within the Union.
In sum, prior studies of motor fuels often rely on unit root tests that ignore the fact 
that individual time series in the panel may have non-linear behavior. This is in spite of 
the fact that gasoline prices can be stickier downwards than upwards (e.g. Asplund et al., 
2000) and that governments also may display non-linear fiscal behavior (e.g. Chortareas, 
Kapetanios & Uctum, 2008). Choi and Moh (2007) show that, even if  the time series in 
the panel are sufficiently long and persistence is not an issue, standard unit root tests 
suffer from low power and become biased towards non-rejecting a unit root if analyzed
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series follow non-linear dynamics. Traditional panel unit root tests also tend to suffer 
from several limitations and weaknesses such as occasional failure to account for cross- 
sectional dependence, difficulty interpreting a null hypothesis, assuming a linear model 
specification, etc. (see Choi, 2004 for discussion). Thus, some of the studies described 
earlier rely on empirical techniques that might be improved using a variety o f newer 
empirical tools for panel analysis, including a non-linear approach to modeling 
convergence by Phillips and Sul (2007). This paper reconciles the existing findings and 
uses a newer empirical approach to inquire about motor fuel price and tax convergence 
patterns in the enlarged EU.
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2.3. MODELING CONVERGENCE OF MOTOR FUEL PRICES AND TAXES
My empirical analysis relies on a methodological approach proposed by Phillips 
and Sul (2007). I test for convergence in balanced panels through identification of 
convergence clubs (see Appendix 2.A). A notable advantage of this method is that it 
captures nonlinear transition mechanisms. Given the ample empirical evidence on the 
nonlinearity o f relative prices in the PPP literature (e.g. Taylor, 2001; Taylor & Taylor, 
2004; Kilic, 2009; Norman, 2010 among others), this feature is appealing in my analysis. 
Another feature of this methodological approach is that it allows for individual 
heterogeneity of units within a panel, without pre-selecting club members or imposing 
specific assumptions about trend stationarity or stochastic non-stationarity of the 
dependent variable. The method also allows for transitional dynamics, that is, for 
convergence testing regardless o f whether economies are initially in a state of transition 
or near steady state equilibrium. It deals directly with individual heterogeneity, addresses 
autocorrelation concerns, and produces results that are easy to interpret. Since motor fuel 
prices and taxes for individual countries take a wide range of values over the period 
1994-2010 and possibly have different convergence paths, this methodological approach 
is appropriate to test for fuel price and tax convergence.
2.3.1. Empirical Model
Time enters my model in a non-linear fashion as the following. Let y it denote the 
dependent variable (either tax level or price o f motor fuel) in country i at time t,
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where i =  1 ,2, t  =  1,2,... ,T . The - dependent variable in my model can be 
decomposed into two components (Equation 4):
y u  = 9 i t  + (P i t , (4)
where g it represents systematic components, which include common components of 
cross-sectional dependence in a panel, and q)it captures transitory components. Under 
this specification, the framework can take a form of a linear or a non-linear process, 
either stationary or not. In a more general setting, the model takes a nonlinear form 
(Equation 5):
y it =  SitYt , for all i and t ,  w here (5)
o (9 i t  (P i t)
S it =  pr  (6 )
where Yt is a common component and 8it (Equation 6 ) is a time varying idiosyncratic 
component. That is, 8it measures economic distance between a common panel trend 
Yt and a country’s individual value of y it at time t (Equation 5). In the case o f fuel
taxation, Yt stands for a common tax trend in the entire EU, while 8it depicts a relative
share of a single country’s tax level in common tax trend Yt in the EU at time t. In the 
case of price convergence, Yt stands for a common price trend in the EU, and Sit
represent a relative share of a single country’s influence on the EU price at time t. A
semi-parametric form of the economic distance component ensures its convergence to a 
constant over time for all cx> 0 (Equation 7):
8it =  Si +  <% = Si + L ^ tK fit t > l ,  o{ > 0, for all i (7)
In Equation 7, 8t and represent constants, the error term f lt is iid N(0, 1) and 
weakly dependent over time via slowly varying time function L(t), such
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thatlim^oo L(t) =  oo. Under a semi-parametric specification, <5jt converges to 8t for all 
non-negative values decay rate of oc. Parameter Sit in Equation 5 plays an important role 
in analyzing convergence within a panel. For example, for any given country if  8it 
converges to a constant (5;), this implies that prices (taxes) among a few countries may 
eventually converge to a steady state, if  for each country Equation 8 holds:
Unlike other conventional convergence methods, this method does not require 
pre-specification of the nature o f the trend or linearity of the time path of the economic 
distance 8it. Note that in my model (Equation 8), both Yt and y it may follow either 
deterministic or stochastic trend. This is one of the attractive features of this convergence 
modeling approach. At the same time, the path o f the trajectory parameter 8it o f every 
individual country i in the EU determines if convergence within a panel will occur in the 
long-term.
According to Equation 8, for motor fuel taxes (prices) to converge among 
countries in the same panel, a common component (g it) shall dominate transitory 
components o f individual heterogeneity ((pi t ). If an individual country’s heterogeneity 
dominates over a common trend in the EU, these members will follow their own paths, 
resulting in divergence of fuel taxes or prices. Such specification allows for temporary 
transitional periods, when economic distance between any two EU countries temporarily 
diverges (8it =£ <5)t). Equations 5, 8 and 9 imply that a relative long-run equilibrium 
exists between, for example, countries i and j  if:
plimfc_oo 8it+k = 8 iff 8t =  8 and oc> 0 (8)
lim - lt+k =  1 for all i and / (9)
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In order to empirically examine long run behavior I first remove business cycle 
components (Kit) from the data prior to the analysis. Phillips and Sul (2007) show that a 
removal of cyclical components improves power of their test for finite samples. This 
transforms Equation 5 into Equation 10:
yu  ~  SitYt + Kit for all i and t, (10)
where Kit is a business cycle effect. To smooth out a non-linear representation of 
European fuel price and tax data, I employ the widely used Hodrick and Prescott (1997) 
filtering technique. I employ this procedure prior to conducting club convergence 
analysis for every sub-sample in order to remove the cyclical trend from the data. This 
filter can be used with sorter time series; it is also popular for its convenience: it does not 
require pre-specification of the nature of the common trend Yt . The smoothing parameter 
of the filter (/I) is typically chosen based on data frequency; in my application of weekly 
data A = 6400.
2.3.2. The Log t-Test
Both motor fuel tax convergence and price convergence can be examined by 
estimating the transition parameter 8it and testing whether it converges to a constant. 
Because of the over-parameterization issue, the transition parameter 5it in Equation 5 
cannot be estimated directly. I, therefore, introduce hit -  a relative transition coefficient 
that measures in relation to a panel average (Equation 11). Figures 13-34 (Appendix 
2.B) display relative taxes and prices by fuel type, or relative transition curves (h it). For 
every EU member state these figures portray country series relative to the EU average, 
and suggest that countries in the EU often follow their individual time paths to 
convergence.
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yit sit ( U )
Phillips and Sul (2007) offer a specific 3-step procedure and the log t-Test that 
determines if  the cross sectional variance (Ht ) of the relative transition parameter h it 
converges to zero as time approaches infinity (Equation 12):
where Ht is the variance of the relative transition parameter hit. The condition stated in 
Equation 8 implies that 8it converges to S. The null hypothesis of convergence for a 
given number of countries N, therefore, tests if  hit -» 1, Ht -* 0, as t  -» oo (Equations 
12-14). Thus, the hypotheses of the log t-Test are:
The null hypothesis of the test is that real motor fuel series will converge among 
each other (Equation 13). In the case that the null hypothesis is not rejected for the entire 
sample, this outcome is denoted hereafter as global convergence. Only under specific 
restrictions on oc and L(t), does global convergence imply absolute convergence (or zero 
level differences in the long run) among the panel series (e.g. Apergis et al., 2010). If 
individual decay rates in Equation 7 are negative (oc< 0), the economic distance will not 
converge. This forms the alternative hypothesis of non-convergence of the log t-Test 
(Equation 14). Rejection of the null hypothesis still allows for the possibility of 
convergence in some subgroups of the panel; rejection only implies that at least one 
country behaves differently from the panel average. Even if  the null hypothesis o f global 
convergence is rejected for the entire sample, countries may still converge in sub-groups
Ht =  -  I ) 2 0 as t  -* oo, (12)
0-C0: 8t =  S and <x> 0 (13)
K A: 6i =£ S for all i or oc< 0 (14)
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(clubs). These clubs can be identified using the four-step clustering algorithm described 
in Appendix 2.B. This algorithm is based on sorting countries into subgroups and log t- 
Test repetition. In contrast to the relative convergence, under club convergence each club 
may have its own non-stationary time-path, and clubs may diverge from one other.
The first step of the log t-Test for convergence requires constructing a cross- 
sectional variance ratio by using Equations 11-12. As a second step, I test the
null hypothesis of convergence by running an OLS regression with robust covariance 
matrix (Equation 15):
fo r t  =  rT ,rT  + 1, ...,T  w ith r  >  0. In Equation 15, the time varying function L (t) =
hypothesis. Phillips and Sul (2007) use Monte Carlo simulations and show that setting 
parameter r  G [0.2,0.3] ensures stronger test results and helps eliminating the initial 
effect; I use r  = 0.3, as recommended by them for both satisfactory size and power. The 
third step of the log t-Test requires a one-sided t-test for oc> 0, using b and 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard error. That is, if tg <  —1.65, 
the null hypothesis o f convergence is rejected at the 5% level.
The difference between the asymptotic cointegration approach and the traditional 
cointegration is as follows (also see Phillips & Sul, 2007, p. 1778-1779). Using Equation 
5, the difference between variable y t for two EU countries A and B can be presented as 
Equation 16:
z h  \
l o g V 7 r )  “  2 1 o S L ^  =  a + b \o g t  + u t (15)
log(t), and parameter b =  2 cx, where oc is the estimate o f decay rate oc under null
yAt ~  y s t  — ( ^ A t — $Bt)Yt (16)
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Typically, if the common panel trend Yt is non-stationary and the relative 
distances are not equal to one another ( SAt =£ SBt), then the two series yAt and y Bt are 
not considered to be cointegrated. According to Equation 8, however, as t -* oo, relative 
distances converge to the same common S, in which case yAt and y Bt may be thought of 
as asymptotically cointegrated. Yet, if the speed of convergence in the common panel 
trend Yt is faster than the speed of convergence of the relative economic distances (Sit), 
conventional tests may not always disclose the asymptotic cointegration. This is why they 
construct their test in relative terms, as a ratio, instead of a linear difference. Equation 9 
ensures that when series are cointegrated, their ratio converges to a constant or, in a case 
of deterministic trend, to a random variable.
The approach described here, however, has several limitations. First, the log t- 
Test is an asymptotic test and its properties greatly depend on the number of time periods 
(T) in the panel. Like any asymptotic test, it does not solve the common problem of low 
T. Second, this algorithm is sensitive to the order in which countries are initially sorted 
when one conducts a search for clubs. This critique does not apply to the global test 
because in that case the order does not matter. As new members join the club, the club- 
average also changes. According to steps 2 to 4 of the clustering algorithm (see Appendix 
2.A), every new member is compared to the current club average. In this situation, the 
member joined last is compared to a different club-average than the member admitted 
before him. Lastly, the approach requires a balanced sample, which, depending on data 
availability, may further limit the number of time periods T in a panel.
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2.4. DATA
The weekly data on nominal prices and taxes for four types o f motor fuels are 
extracted from the EU Oil Bulletin published by the European Commission database.19 
The data are for unleaded petrol (Euro-super-95), automotive gas oil (diesel), liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) and lead replacement petrol (Super). To date, only a part o f this 
data and only for OMS has been previously used in the literature (e.g. Wlazlowski, et al., 
2009; Dreher & Krieger, 2008, 2010).
All prices and excise taxes are converted into real values with daily euro 
exchange rates and a monthly consumer price index (CPI) for the period 1994-2010 from 
the UNECE Statistical Division database. Monthly CPI indices are transformed to match 
weekly price levels by constructing weekly series o f CPI price deflators, using the 
geometric mean formula to calculate the average weekly CPI growth rates and between 
months. The listed monthly CPI was assigned to week one. Price index for week two was 
obtained as a product of the CPI for week one, multiplied by the weekly CPI growth rate. 
Price index for week three is the product of the CPI for week two, multiplied by the 
weekly CPI growth rate, etc.
The tax level for each product is estimated as a combination of excise and value
added taxes for any given motor fuel. All price and tax level data is then transformed into
natural logs. Because Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2008, these two countries
are excluded from the panel in order to maximize the number of total time periods. The
remaining members of the EU are denoted as EU-25. Also, in order to maximize the
19 Updated data are periodically published a t : http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/bulletin_en.htm
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number o f time periods, only the original countries that formed the Eurozone and Greece 
are included in the Eurozone group (EZ-12). The data is divided into thirteen separate 
sub-samples and each of them is balanced with no gaps according to availability of 
observations (Table 9). Table 10 displays summary statistics for each balanced sample 
(see Essay 1, Appendix 1 .A, of this dissertation for discussion).
The statistical analysis is conducted using the STATA 11 software package. First, 
I test for a presence of global and club convergence in the EU for all four motor fuels. 
Second, the EU members are separated into OMS or NMS, and convergence is 
determined within these subsets of countries. Next, the analysis is repeated for the 
Eurozone. Convergence test results are summarized in Table 11.
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2.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
2.5.1. Convergence Results for Unleaded Euro-super-95 Fuel
I find a presence of global convergence in taxes, but not in consumer prices on 
unleaded gasoline in the EU. This conclusion follows because, for taxes, the t- 
statistic ( t  =  —0.96) of the left-tailed log t-Test is only slightly above the threshold level 
of t = —1.65 (Table 11, Figure 13). By contrast, for consumer prices the t-statistic of 
global convergence ( t =  —12.00) is below the threshold level (Tables 11-12). Following 
the club convergence algorithm described in Appendix 2.A, I find three clubs for Euro- 
super-95 consumer prices, which implies that this market in the EU is segmented (Figures 
14-16). In addition, consumer prices on this gasoline in Latvia and Poland do not 
converge to any of the three club averages, or between each other (Tables 11-12). To 
further investigate the relationship between prices and taxes in the EU clubs, I repeat the 
analysis using producer prices for unleaded Euro-super-95 gasoline. Like consumer 
prices, producer prices for unleaded gasoline converge in clubs rather than globally 
(Figure 17), which follows from the t-statistic of the global log t-Test ( t  =  —15.23) 
being below the threshold level (Tables 11-12).
The first consumer price convergence club for Euro-super-95 consists of most 
OMS, except for Luxembourg and Spain, and three NMS, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and Malta (Table 11, Figure 14). This is not surprising, given the high praise for strong 
economic performances and GDP growth in the 2000s in such NMS as Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and Malta. In addition, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are among the
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leaders of the EU auto industry and geographical neighbors with each other as well as 
with at least one other OMS. For these three NMS, approaches to motor fuel taxing may 
have also played a role in convergence with other OMS. Relative transition curves for 
taxes in Slovakia and Czech Republic show that in 2004, total taxes on unleaded gasoline 
were lower than in the rest of the EU, but by 2010 they had risen to the EU average 
(Figure 13). Malta also increased its taxes in 2009, but the relative transition curve for its 
Euro-super-95 taxes remained below the EU average (Figure 13). It is worth noting that, 
compared to other EU members, Malta had unusual transition paths for producer and, as a 
consequence, for consumer relative prices (Figures 14 and 17). The erratic nature of 
Maltese producer prices may be due to its location on an island and by the fact that it 
imports all of its gasoline.
The second consumer price club for Euro-super-95 includes Estonia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Spain (Table 11, Figure 15). It is unexpected that such dissimilar OMS 
like Spain and Luxembourg converge with NMS like Lithuania and Estonia. One possible 
explanation is a gradual reduction for motor fuel taxes in Spain and Luxembourg, 
depicted by the transition curves on Figure 13, which possibly contributed to their 
diverging price paths from the rest of OMS. It is, however, expected that Estonia and 
Lithuania are in one club because they have similar political and economic histories and 
belong to the same geographical area. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are somewhat 
isolated from the rest of the EU, and all are former Baltic USSR Republics. Nevertheless, 
in contrast to Latvia, total tax levels on unleaded gasoline in both Lithuania and Estonia 
are much more similar to the rest of the EU than in neighboring Latvia. In addition, 
Lithuania and Estonia form one producer price club with Hungary. This club is
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unexpected, given that these three NMS are not immediate neighbors and differ 
somewhat in terms of their gasoline production. One thing in common is that Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Hungary have remained non-Eurozone countries since they joined the EU in
2004.
The third consumer price club for unleaded gasoline includes Hungary and the 
island of Cyprus, countries that are both NMS since 2004 (Table 11, Figure 16). This 
club is unexpected because Hungary and Cyprus do not share any geographical borders, 
and are dissimilar in terms of population and passenger car fleet. One factor that may 
partially explain this market segment is that Hungary and Cyprus belong to the same tax 
club for Euro-super-95 among NMS. Their relative transition curves indicate that while 
the difference in total taxes between Hungary and Cyprus remains large, both countries 
gradually decrease their total taxes on unleaded gasoline compared to the rest o f the EU 
(Table 11, Figure 13). Thus, a similar trend in taxation rather than production may be the 
reason for consumer gasoline price convergence between them.
For consumer prices on Euro-super-95, Latvian and Polish disintegration may be 
driven by a combination of factors such as their size, geographical location, NMS status, 
or it may be that gasoline producers in these countries have greater market power. Poland 
is the biggest NMS in terms of its geographical size. Unlike in Luxembourg, for example, 
a majority of Polish consumers are less likely to cross national borders to purchase 
unleaded gasoline. This can be seen when I restrict the analysis to just NMS: Polish 
consumer prices for Euro-super-95 converge with prices in Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary 
and Cyprus, that is, with non-neighboring NMS (Figure 19).
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An analysis of producer prices and taxes sheds more light on the Euro-super-95 
market in Latvia and Poland. My test results indicate that producer prices in Latvia, 
Poland, and the U.K. do not converge either among each other or with any of the existing 
club averages. It is not surprising that producer prices in the U.K. do not converge with 
the rest of the EU because the U.K. is the major oil producer in Europe. However, for 
Latvia and Poland, producer price non-convergence is one reason why consumer prices 
follow their own, non-converging path (Figure 20). As for taxes, Latvian tax levels 
remain among the lowest in the EU and are closer to those of Cyprus (Figure 18). Thus, 
given that Latvia does not refine its own gasoline, a non-convergence of Latvian Euro- 
super-95 consumer prices with the rest of the EU or with any other NMS seems to be 
driven by its exports of gasoline and by low, non-converging taxation.
It is worth noting that a few other countries had interesting transition paths in the 
EU. Figures 13 and 14 show that Greece was a country with relatively low consumer 
prices on unleaded gasoline, until it sharply increased its taxes and, consequently, 
consumer prices on Euro-super-95 in 2010. That is, as the economic literature predicts 
(e.g. Rork, 2003), at the time of economic hardship, Greece increased its indirect (excise) 
taxes, followed by a value added tax increase as well.
In summary, my findings on club convergence for unleaded Euro-super-95 
gasoline lend little support to the LOP. It implies that national markets for this fuel in the 
EU are integrated into several regional markets instead of one common European market. 
My results also suggest that differences in consumer price convergence paths among the 
EU-25 countries stem from convergence differences in production prices rather than 
taxes, although relative taxes remain an important component of this dynamic. OMS, but
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not NMS, tend to converge in taxes and prices to their group averages. For the twelve 
original Eurozone members (EZ-12), taxes and prices on unleaded gasoline also seem to 
converge among members (Table 11). The empirical evidence of this convergence, 
however, appears to be slightly stronger for OMS than the Eurozone group, especially for 
taxes. Among NMS, Latvia and Poland are the two countries that have loose integration 
with the rest of the EU market for unleaded gasoline. In addition, there is one producer 
club which is an anomaly among my data: that of Austria, Sweden, and Slovenia. While 
producer prices converge among these three countries, they are part of a much larger 
consumer price club. This is surprising because while Austria and Slovenia are 
geographical neighbors, Sweden is not; and while Austria and Sweden are OMS, 
Slovenia is a NMS country.
2.5.2. Convergence Results for Diesel Fuel
My test results indicate that while diesel taxes converge in most of the EU-25 
countries, except for Cyprus and Latvia, neither consumer or producer prices converge 
(Table 11, Figures 23-35). The situation with the diesel market seems to be similar to the 
unleaded gasoline market: differences in producer price paths drive differences in 
consumer price convergence. The majority of EU-25 countries form the first price 
convergence club (Table 11, Figure 22), indicating that the diesel market among the rest 
of the EU members is somewhat integrated. The largest consumer price club for diesel 
fuel has more members than the largest club for Euro-super-95. It consists o f all o f the 
OMS, except for Luxembourg, and six NMS: Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Malta, 
Slovenia, Poland and Estonia. Thus, with the exception of Hungary and two Baltic NMS,
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diesel consumer prices in the entire Central and Eastern Europe converge with diesel 
prices in Western Europe. This outcome may be a result of higher mobility of diesel 
consumers (truck drivers) across national borders as well as harmonized diesel taxes in 
the EU.
Hungary, Cyprus, and Luxembourg form a second separate diesel consumer price 
club (Figure 23). As described in the previous section, Hungary and Cyprus, both NMS, 
also formed a separate consumer price club for unleaded gasoline. Luxembourg, 
however, is an OMS and is an unexpected member of this diesel club. It is not unusual 
that two geographical neighbors in the Eastern Baltics, such as Latvia and Lithuania form 
the last consumer price club for diesel (Table 11, Figure 24). Their fossil fuels are 
exported from Russia, and the primary users o f diesel, the truck drivers on international 
routes to Europe, may exert an additional pressure for emergence of this separate diesel 
market from the rest of the EU.
There is also strong evidence of convergence in diesel producer prices, and 
consumer prices among OMS and among the EZ-12, but not in the entire EU-25 (Table 
11). For the entire NMS group, I do not find any evidence of convergence in either diesel 
consumer or producer prices. This might suggest that some of the NMS have already 
integrated with the European Common Market for diesel, or are on their way to doing so. 
For instance, diesel consumer prices in Slovakia and Malta display individual, non­
converging behavior among NMS, but converge with many OMS (Table 11). For Malta, 
like for its unleaded gasoline, an erratic consumer price path may be explained by wide 
swings of producer prices compared to the EU average, which is reflected in its relative 
transition curve for diesel producer prices (Figure 25).
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For some countries, relative transition curves for total taxes and prices for diesel 
are worth describing. Compared to the other EU members, the diesel tax levels have 
increased in Greece, Malta, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia and Ireland, but decreased in 
Hungary and Slovakia between 2004 and 2010 (Figure 21). In these countries, diesel 
consumer prices reflected the corresponding tax change. For example, Greece, which 
used to have lower taxes and hence lower consumer prices for diesel than the EU 
average, sharply raised its taxes on diesel in the late 2000s when it had a serious fiscal 
budget problem. Also, by the late 2000s, relative producer prices for diesel in Hungary 
and the Eastern Baltic countries began to increasingly diverge from the rest of the EU 
(Figure 25). My test results show that Hungary and Estonia already form a single 
producer price convergence club in the EU and among NMS (Table 11). This is 
surprising given that Hungary and Estonia are not geographical neighbors.
The U.K. has the most interesting relative transition curves for diesel fuel among 
the EU-25 as well as among OMS. Diesel consumer prices in the U.K. first sharply rose 
in the late 1990s and then somewhat dropped between the early 2000s and 2008 (Figure 
22) as a result of a series of large protests against high motor fuel taxes, while still 
remaining relatively high compared to the rest of the EU. British diesel taxes followed a 
similar pattern but remained the highest in the EU, which explains the path of diesel 
consumer prices (Figure 21). Similar to unleaded fuel, this outcome for diesel in the U.K. 
can be explained by some of the lowest producer prices in the EU, given the fact that the 
U.K. is one of the largest oil exporters in Europe.
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2.5.3. Convergence Results for LPG and Lead Replacement (Super) Fuels
In contrast to diesel and unleaded gasoline, LPG data is available for fewer 
countries during a shorter time span because it is a much smaller market than the market 
for unleaded gasoline or diesel. LPG results indicate that there is no global convergence 
in consumer prices, producer prices, or taxes among the sixteen analyzed EU members. 
For LPG, taxes converge into two clubs and producer prices converge into three clubs or 
do not converge at all (Table 11, Figures 26, 28).
Two separate consumer price clubs exist among the sixteen countries with 
available data, mainly due to non-harmonization of LPG taxes and producer prices (Table 
11). Some OMS, such as France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands form the 
first LPG price club (Figure 27). These countries are similar economically and are among 
the oldest EU founders. These five countries are also a part o f a larger LPG tax club and, 
with the exception of Italy, a larger producer price club. The remaining eleven EU 
members for which the data is available, form the second consumer price club that 
consists of both OMS and NMS (Table 11, Figure 27). This outcome may be driven by 
long term differences in production costs and taxes for LPG fuel in the EU. There is 
strong evidence of two tax convergence clubs for LPG fuel (Table 11, Figure 26). The 
first, a low tax club, includes Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. This first tax 
club is surprising because there are no obvious similarities between these countries, 
except for Belgium and Luxembourg being neighbors. The remaining twelve EU 
members, both OMS and NMS, form the second LPG tax club.
In contrast to unleaded gasoline and diesel fuel, findings for LPG indicate that 
taxes on this fuel are not harmonized in the EU. While accounting for only about 2% of
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the overall EU motor fuel market, the LPG market is relatively small. Yet, there are 
typically some political costs associated with disharmonized tax scenarios. For countries 
where LPG consumers are highly mobile across borders and taxes are high, some 
producers would have to assume a larger share of the tax burden and could be forced to 
shut down, lay off employees, or migrate to countries with lower tax rates, causing social 
and political tensions (see Banfi, et al., 2005; Dreher & Krieger, 2008, 2010 for 
discussions). In contrast, under the harmonized tax scenario, like the situation with diesel 
and unleaded gasoline in the EU, national governments face other issues, such as lesser 
flexibility in addressing local transport-related social costs.
As for lead replacement (Super) gasoline, data limitations restrict my focus to 
only two different subsets of six countries each, for the periods 1994-2001 and 2000-
2005. Moreover, this fuel was officially banned in the EU starting 2000, and in the early 
2000s, the EU countries were slowly phasing it out from the market. Using data for the 
period of 1994-2001, consumer prices on leaded gasoline in France, Italy, Belgium and 
Ireland converge in a single club (Table 11, Figure 30). Consumer prices on this fuel in 
Spain and Greece form the second convergence club -  an unexpected pairing because, 
despite that these countries are both OMS and in southern Europe, they are 
geographically distant from one another (Figure 30). On the other hand, both countries 
are known for their low taxation rates on motor fuels among OMS (Figure 29). This two 
club outcome for prices on leaded fuel can be partially explained by differences in 
convergence paths of taxes among these six OMS countries; my test results show that 
their producer prices globally converge (Table 11, Figure 31). During the period of 1994- 
2001, taxes on Super fuel in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece followed their own, non­
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converging path (Figure 29). Belgium and Ireland, on the other hand, showed relative tax 
convergence and, joined by France and Italy, consumer price convergence.
Meanwhile, a different picture emerges from the 2000-2005 data subset for lead 
replacement (Super) fuel. Producer prices on this gasoline in the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Greece, France and the U.K. indicate strong global convergence (Table 11, Figure 
34). Test results also show weak evidence of global convergence in taxes among these 
OMS countries (Table 11). With the exception of the Netherlands, consumer prices for 
Super gasoline also converge in a single club in this group (Figure 33). Thus, 
convergence for Super fuel occurs in a much smoother fashion based on the data from the 
2000s compared to the late 1990s, in part due to stronger tax harmonization. In sum, in 
the early-mid 2000s, taxes and prices on lead replacement petrol became more similar 
among OMS and also became higher than in the late 1990s, which may reflect a common 
effort to phase out this fuel from the European market at that time (e.g. Lofgren & 
Hammar, 2000).
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2.6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY DISCUSSION
In light of the ongoing EU enlargement, the findings o f this paper can contribute 
to dialogues on motor fuel market integration, policy convergence, ‘fuel tourism’ and 
fiscal harmonization among the EU members. Since I account for countries’ 
heterogeneity and non-linear transition mechanisms, the findings are also useful for 
designing more precise policies related to motor fuels and greenhouse gas emissions from 
transport in Europe. These policies include the upcoming revision of the National 
Emission Ceiling Directive 2001/81/EC (The Council of European Communities, 2001) 
and a proposed Directive that recommends setting tax floors based on the CO2 content of 
each fuel (The European Commission, 2011).
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that my test results of the club convergence 
analysis could be fragile, mainly due to the small sample properties of the Phillips-Sul 
method. One has to keep these limitations in mind when assessing the findings o f this 
paper. Although they could be the best available in the literature, they are nonetheless 
subject to future challenge and could be reversed.
That being said, unlike the prior literature on motor fuels, this paper shows that in 
the EU, the market for motor fuels remains segmented. For the two major motor fuels in 
the EU, unleaded gasoline and diesel, I find some support o f the Law of One Price (LOP) 
for OMS and the EZ-12 groups, but not for NMS or for the EU as a whole. My results for 
OMS are consistent with the findings by Dreher and Krieger (2008, 2010), who use 
nominal data for the period 1994-2004, but do not include NMS in their study. I show,
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however, that in contrast to OMS countries, NMS do not form a motor fuel club among 
each other. The results also indicate that in the long run, motor fuel markets in some 
NMS - Hungary, Cyprus, and the Eastern Baltic countries, for example - may not become 
integrated with the rest o f the EU motor fuel market. I also find that the LOP does not 
hold for LPG fuel, a much smaller European fuel market, either among the sixteen EU 
members for which data is available, or among OMS and NMS groups.
One of the key takeaways from my findings is that in order to reduce motor fuel 
market segmentation in the EU, individual governments should ensure a highly 
competitive environment for motor fuel producers. This is because such long-term 
segmentation is driven more by behavior of producer prices than by taxes. For unleaded 
gasoline and diesel, I do not find global convergence in consumer or producer prices 
among the EU-25, but I find it in taxes. Producer prices converge in the OMS and the 
EZ-12 groups, except for diesel producer prices in Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands in the EZ-12 group. Nevertheless, for the EU as a whole, the persistence of 
clubs in real producer prices indicates that the markets for motor fuels are far from the 
spot market condition, and that relative differences in production prices may remain 
among sub-groups in the long run.
As for taxes, my results suggest that in the 1990s-2000s in the EU, in the presence 
of the statutory tax floor measures (CEU, 2003), unenforced tax ceiling measures (25% 
VAT), and members’ individual environmental policy measures, taxes for two major 
motor fuels began harmonizing. For diesel fuel and unleaded gasoline, total taxes are 
harmonized among the entire EU, but this harmonization is rather fragile. This fragility is 
consistent with limited flexibility o f indirect taxation due to the unanimity rule required
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in voting to approve any changes to the EU tax floor legislation by the member-countries. 
This fragility may also be driven by socio-economic differences of the EU members as 
well as by differences in national-level externalities associated with road transport. Taxes 
on diesel and unleaded gasoline in OMS and in the EZ-12 converge to their group 
averages, but taxes among NMS do not converge. Since these taxes globally converge in 
the entire EU, my results suggest that some but not all NMS countries are less actively 
involved in the process of tax harmonization with the OMS and the EZ-12.
The aims of the Union are to encourage free competition, to smooth the operation 
of the European Common Market, to better integrate NMS, and to reduce overall GHG 
emissions (e.g. Council o f European Communities, 2003; the European Commission, 
2001, 2008, 2010; Eurostat, 2009a, 2009b). Given these goals, my findings suggest that 
the European Commission should consider further narrowing the tax gap among the EU 
members. Harmonized motor fuel taxes typically help to reduce fuel tourism and to 
stabilize the stream of tax revenues to national governments. In a competitive setting, 
under harmonized taxes, mobile consumers lose incentives to strategically purchase fuel 
abroad. If taxes are to become even more harmonized, the EU has a strong foundation for 
a non-distortive operation of the Common Market for motor fuels, but needs to ensure 
that the European market is competitive. At times of financial hardship, however, 
national governments often rely on raising gasoline taxes, such as excise taxes on motor 
fuels (Rork, 2003). Thus, it is important to understand that as time progresses, tax 
convergence among the EU countries may become more fragile or even result in a 
disharmonized tax scenario if the current economic crisis in Europe progresses.
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When it comes to environmental policy, fuel tax harmonization may be viewed as 
an unspoken agreement between countries to tax motor fuels at a common CO2 
benchmark level. In climate change policy debates, policymakers are often concerned 
with forecasting CO2 emissions. Forecasting and simulation models are frequently used 
in preparing such environmental policy proposals and predicting its outcomes. Both 
motor fuel prices and taxes serve as key variables in these simulation studies (e.g. 
England, 2007), including studies of emissions from transport in the EU (e.g. Abrel, 
2010). Recent studies emphasize the importance of testing for club convergence because 
the assumption of cross-country convergence/divergence in CO2 emissions is often 
embedded in simulation models (for discussion see Panopoulou & Pantelidis, 2009). 
With taxes being the primary policy tool for reducing emissions from transport in the EU, 
my findings on motor fuel price convergence and tax harmonization are of crucial interest 
to such policy assessments.
In this light, one current policy proposal, ‘Amending Directive 2003/96/EC 
Restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity,’ help national governments to address both the environmental goals and the 
budgetary goals (the European Commission, 2011). This proposed policy recommends 
imposing tax floors based on the C 02 content o f each fuel, which may strengthen the EU 
tax harmonization. The proposed policy is also in line with emission reduction 
commitments up to 2020 (the European Commission, 2010), and should make motor fuel 
tax policies more consistent with the climate related goals of the EU. National 
governments may also benefit from supporting this unit emission based taxation scheme; 
they are typically confronted with the local social costs o f transport, such as increasing
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emissions. The new scheme allows them to tax fuels in a manner more consistent with the 
European Emission Trading Scheme.
Finally, in a broader sense, the findings of this essay are also relevant to the 
current fiscal policy dialogs in Europe and origination of the European Fiscal Union: in 
2012, the EU members (except for the Czech Republic and the U.K.) signed the Fiscal 
Stability Treaty (CEU, 2012). By using the newly available data for motor fuels as an 
example, this essay provides some insights that twenty seven diverse countries, both 
older and newer members of the Union, fiscally coordinate some of their taxation 
decisions even in the absence of formal policy.
Some studies, however, find that EU members also form clubs in their per capita 
GDP, meaning that in the long run inequality among EU members will remain (e.g. 
Apergis et al., 2010). The big picture consequence of the 2012 EU fiscal consolidation is 
that in the presence of per capita GDP disparity, tax harmonization suggested by my 
results implies a real income disparity across EU members. Then, the income-adjusted 
tax burden on drivers in the relatively poorer EU countries (e.g. NMS) will be much 
higher compared to the burden on drivers in richer EU countries (e.g. Germany, 
Denmark). In this setting, it becomes likely for the European Commission to form a 
central authority that would be responsible for making transfer payments from rich to 
poor EU members. The issue, however, will be to determine the exact size of these 
transfer payments and the least distortive way of recycling revenues from these payments 
by the receiving governments.
As an extension of this essay, it is important to assess the role o f tax competition 
among neighboring states and the rest of the EU members. In addition, as it is discussed
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in the previous section, countries in some clubs seem dissimilar in terms of their 
geographic locations, economic factors, and the lengths o f their EU membership. The 
next essay sheds more light on the factors that influence price and tax dynamics in the 
short run, and on the continuous integration of NMS into the European Common Market 
for motor fuels.
104
Table 9. Balanced Data Samples for Club Convergence Analysis of Fuel Prices and





















6/7/2004 6/7/2010 25 297
(314)
EU-25
3 Diesel 1/2/1995 6/7/2010 15 758
(806)
OMS
4 Diesel 6/7/2004 6/7/2010 25 297
(314)
EU-25
5 LPG 7/26/2004 6/7/2010 16 290
(309)
BE, CZ, DE, EE, 
ES, FR, HU, IT, 
LT, LU, LV, NL, 
PL, PT, SI, SK
6 Leaded
Super
1/03/1994 6/4/2001 6 362
(388)




1/03/2000 8/8/2005 6 278
(293)




6/07/2004 6/7/2010 10 297
(314)
NMS, except BG 
and RO
9 Diesel 6/14/2004 6/7/2010 10 296
(313)




1/1/2001 6/7/2010 12 465
(493)
EZ-12
11 Diesel 1/1/2001 6/7/2010 12 465
(493)
EZ-12
12 LPG 7/26/2004 6/7/2010 8 290
(307)
FR, PT, NL, ES, 
BE, DE, LU, IT
13 LPG 7/26/2004 6/7/2010 8 290
(307)
SK, SI, CZ, HU, 
PL, LT, EE, LV
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Table 10. Summary Statistics, Balanced Samples 1 - 1 3  (real data)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data set 1, Euro-95 N=11370, n=15, T=758
price950 365.46 95.82 157.90 793.21
price951 1074.74 154.28 699.75 1692.53
fuel95vat 19.45 3.17 12.00 25.00
fuel95excise 533.06 104.03 285.44 946.48
Tax level share 65.99 7.38 44.31 85.95
Data set 2, Euro-95 N=7425, n=25, T=297
price950 441.15 77.87 201.03 793.21
price951 1063.95 180.31 535.92 1692.53
fuel95vat 19.51 2.61 12.00 25.00
fuel95excise 448.07 121.79 208.04 732.17
Tax level share 57.99 7.08 39.63 76.74
Data set 3, Diesel N=11370, n=15, T=758
pdieselO 374.25 116.94 154.77 828.11
pdiesell 896.29 177.49 508.57 1615.58
Diesel vat 19.45 3.17 12.00 25.00
Diesel excise 374.74 102.69 236.26 946.48
Tax level share 58.59 8.05 36.29 86.17
Data set 4, Diesel N= 7425, n=25, T=297
pdieselO 478.28 88.43 263.06 828.11
pdiesell 972.38 148.84 586.51 1479.99
Diesel vat 19.51 2.61 12.00 25.00
Diesel excise 334.64 88.17 177.18 732.17
Tax level share 50.63 6.35 33.17 73.39
Data set 5, LPG N=4640, n —16, T=290
plpgO 367.02 72.60 160.94 517.02
Plpgl 519.74 82.37 314.86 750.08
lpg vat 19.12 2.04 12.00 25.00
lpg excise 71.02 35.12 0.00 159.01
Tax level share 29.49 8.13 14.57 53.66
Data set 6, Super N-2172, n—6, T=362
superO 306.23 76.28 157.05 528.29
super 1 1069.07 116.15 779.59 1353.52
super vat 19.20 1.84 15.00 21.00
super excise 589.64 88.21 375.46 747.31
Tax level share 71.31 6.40 52.98 85.03
Data set 7, Super N=1668, n=6, T=278
superO 394.77 77.21 240.66 603.33
super 1 1141.63 186.67 791.20 1666.04
super vat 18.02 1.23 16.00 21.00
super excise 570.68 162.98 318.79 986.80
Tax level share 64.66 8.14 44.90 79.35
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Table 10. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data set 8, Euro-95 NMS N=2970, n=10, T -297
price950 431.87 78.60 201.03 674.44
price951 920.80 122.21 535.92 1343.38
fuel95vat 19.05 2.13 15.00 25.00
fuel95excise 342.33 62.49 208.04 475.62
Tax level share 53.11 5.81 39.63 68.91
Data set 9, Diesel NMS N=2960, n=10, T=296
pdieselO 463.78 86.20 263.06 772.82
pdiesell 891.74 124.86 586.51 1346.17
Diesel vat 19.05 2.13 15.00 25.00
Diesel excise 285.99 57.77 177.18 427.09
Tax level share 48.04 5.73 33.17 62.76
Data set 10, Euro-95 EZ- 
12
N=5580, n=12, T=465
price950 413.57 86.37 203.51 793.21
price951 1099.10 158.27 732.13 1692.53
fuel95vat 18.95 2.35 12.00 22.00
fuel95excise 508.44 105.20 285.44 684.76
Tax level share 62.20 6.69 44.31 79.54
Data set 11, Diesel EZ-12 N=5580, n=12, T=465
pdieselO 434.51 106.94 239.63 828.11
pdiesell 927.55 144.84 616.02 1413.49
Diesel vat 18.95 2.35 12.00 22.00
Diesel excise 342.82 59.50 236.26 487.97
Tax level share 53.52 6.23 36.29 71.51
Data set 12, LPG OMS N=2320, n=8, T=290
plpgO 407.32 58.48 275.15 571.02
Plpgl 549.47 80.08 345.03 750.08
lpg vat 18.56 2.16 12.00 21.00
lpg excise 59.95 37.61 0.00 159.01
Tax level share 25.44 7.27 14.57 45.98
Data set 13, LPG NMS N=2320, n=8, T=290
plpgO 326.71 62.22 160.94 495.59
Plpgl 490.02 73.42 314.86 711.78
lpg vat 19.69 1.74 18.00 25.00
lpg excise 82.09 28.41 0.00 132.86
1 Tax level share 33.53 6.82 15.97 53.66
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b  (t  -  s ta t )
Convergence Club Classification
Group Membership b  ( t  -  s t a t )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2004-
2010
25 Euro-95 tax levels -0.029
(-0.97)







1st club: NL, DK, DE, 
BE, FI, GR, PT, SE, IT, 
IE, FR, UK, SK, AT, 
MT, CZ, SI 
2nd club: LU, ES, LT, 
EE
3rd club: HU, CY 











1st club: DK, MT, IT, 
BE, PT, FI, NL, IE, CY, 
ES, DE, LU, FR, SK, 
CZ, GR
2nd club: AT, SE, SI 
3rd club: LT, EE, HU 








15 OMS Euro-95 tax levels 0.310(12.36) 1st club: all OMS 0.310(12.36)
1995-
2010
15 OMS Euro-95 consumer
prices
0.219 (9.76) l sl club: all OMS 0.219(9.76)
1995-
2010
15 OMS Euro-95 producer
prices
0.722 (10.99) 1st club: all OMS 0.722 (10.99)
2004-
2010
10 NMS Euro-95 tax levels -0.368
(-5.55)*
1st club: CZ, SI, MT, 
PL, LT, EE 










1st club: CZ, SI 
2nd club: PL, LT, HU, 
CY, EE











1st club: MT, CY, SK, 
CZ, PL, SI 






12 EZ Euro-95 tax levels 0.002 (0.10) 1st club: EZ-12 0.002 (0.10)
20 An asterisk (*) indicates rejection o f  null hypothesis o f  convergence at 5% level.
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Table 11. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2001-
2010




1st club: NL, DK, BE, 










1st club: EZ-12 0.559 (7.57)
2004-
2010
25 Diesel tax levels -0.102
(-4.63)*
1st club: EU-25 (except 
CY and LV)









1st club: UK, SE, IE, 
DE, IT, DK, GR, NL, 
BE, PT, CZ, FR, FI, 
AT, SI, SK, ES, MT, 
PL, EE
2nd club: LU, HU, CY 










1st club: PT, IT, FI, GR, 
DK
2nd club: SE, DE, CY, 
NL, LU, CZ, FR, AT, 
MT
3rd club: HU, EE 
N o club: BE, IE, ES, 








15 OMS Diesel tax levels 0.592
(26.87)
1st club: all OMS 0.592 (26.87)
1995-
2010




1st club: all OMS 1.412 (52.97)
1995-
2010




1st club: all OMS 0.983 (16.64)
2004-
2010
10 NMS Diesel tax levels -0.582
(-13.06)*
1st club: CZ, SI, EE, 
MT, HU, PL 










1st club: CZ, SI 
2nd club: PL, EE, HU, 
CY, LT










1st club: PL, MT, SI, LT 
2nd club: HU, EE 







12 EZ Diesel tax levels 0.088
(8.31)
1st club: EZ-12 0.088 (8.31)
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Table 11. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2001-
2010




l sl club: EZ-12 0.243 (7.91)
2001-
2010




l sl club: PT, IT, FI, 
GR, BE, ES, DE, FR, 
AT





16 LPG tax levels -0.729
(-31.54)*
1st club: ES, BE, LU, 
SK
2nd club: IT, LT, NL, 
DE, PL, HU, FR, SI, 









1st club: FR, NL, PT, 
IT, DE
2nd club: SI, ES, EE, 










1st Club: FR, PT, NL, 
ES, SI, BE, DE, LU 
2nd club: EE, SK, HU 
3rd club: LT, LV 







8 OMS LPG tax levels -0.355
(-15.18)*
1st club: IT, NL, DE, 
FR, PT









1st club: FR, NL, PT, 
IT, DE









1st Club: FR, PT, NL, 





8 NMS LPG tax levels -2.028
(-46.74)*
1st club: LT, PL, HU, 









1st club: EE, CZ, HU, 









1st Club: EE, SK, HU 
2nd club: LT, LV






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1994-
2001
6 Super tax levels -1.135 (-81.88)* 1st club: BE, IE 








-1.078 (-23.98)* 1st club: FR, IT, BE, 
IE







1.154(10.83) 1st Club: IE, BE, ES, 





6 Super tax levels -0.006 (-0.19) 1st club: NL, UK, 















0.866(12.50) 1st Club: NL, PT, ES, 












Step 2 Step 3 Step 2 Step 3 Step 2 Step 2 Step 3 Step 2
1 NL Base Core SI
2 DK 6.89 Core SI
3 DE 5.91 5.91 SI
4 BE 1.93 1.93 SI
5 FI 2.32 2.32 SI
6 GR 3.22 3.22 SI
7 PT 3.20 3.20 SI
8 SE 2.54 2.54 SI
9 IT 2.50 2.50 SI
10 IE 3.53 3.53 SI
11 FR 3.49 3.49 SI
12 UK 2.41 2.41 SI
13 SK 3.24 3.24 SI
14 AT 2.04 2.04 SI
15 MT 1.53 1.53 SI
16 CZ 0.54 0.54 SI
17 LU -1.33 -1.33 Base Core S2
18 ES -2.24 -0.60 6.67 Core S2
19 SI
(0.013)
0.25 - - SI
20 PL -3.44 -3.14 -3.14 Base Base -
21 LT -1.31 1.96 - - S2
22 HU -5.62 -0.84 -4.89 Base Core - S3






1.61 - - - - S2
25 LV -8.91 -8.11 -3.97 -3.97 (-0.551)
-4.32 -
Global convergence: -0.438 (-12.00)*
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To test for convergence in subgroups, I use a clustering algorithm that follows 
Phillips and Sul (2007). This clustering algorithm allows identification of such clusters 
and the number of these subgroups:
Last Observation Ordering: Order N countries according to the last observation in 
a panel, from the highest to the lowest.
Core Group Formation: based on step 1 select k highest countries and form a 
subgroup Gk withk = 2,3,..., N. Next, run the log t-Test for convergence within each 
subgroup and choose the size (fc*) of the core group -  the club -  according to the 
following rule of the maximized tk:
k* =  arg maxk {tk} subject to min{tk] > —1.65. (13)
Sieve for Club Membership: Following step 2, all remaining countries are tested 
one at a time on whether to be included in this core group (club). Following a 
conservative choice, the new country is included in a club only if the t-statistic is 
positive. The procedure is repeated until the formation of the first convergence club is 
completed.
Stopping Rule: All remaining countries that are not selected in a core club in step 
(3) are combined in a new complement subgroup. The log t-Test is conducted over this 
subgroup to determine whether this cluster of countries would converge among each 
other, resulting in only two convergent clubs in a panel. If not, the algorithm procedure is 
repeated until all clubs in a panel are determined. The remaining countries display 
divergence behavior.
To provide a better understanding of how Phillips and Sul’s (2007) method is 
used to determine convergence clubs, the following is the detailed explanation of how I 
determined consumer price clubs for unleaded Euro-super-95 fuel. For consumer prices 
on unleaded gasoline, the log t-Test rejects the null hypothesis of global convergence 
among the EU-25 (t = —12.00 ), so the possibility of club convergence is investigated 
(Table 3). According to the guideline suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007), panel series 
first have to be reordered based on the highest, most recent observation, June 7, 2010. 
Based on step 1 of the algorithm, the Netherlands had the highest level of consumer 
prices on Euro-super-95 fuel on that date, so it is denoted as the base country in the 
ordering (Table 4).
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Following step 2 of the algorithm, I perform the log t-Test by adding one country 
at a time to the base and calculating a t-statistic. This process continues until the t-statistic 
becomes lower than the threshold level of t =  —1.65. For example, when Denmark is 
added to the Netherlands, the t-statistic is (t = 6.89), so Denmark is added to the 
subgroup of potential core countries. When Germany is added to the first two countries, 
the new t-statistic (t = 5.91) is higher than the threshold, so Germany joins the subgroup 
and the next country -  Belgium -  is evaluated, etc. After adding Spain, the t-statistic 
(t = —2.24) becomes lower than the threshold, so I stop pre-selecting countries for the 
first club. In this pre-selected subgroup, the highest t-statistic is for the first two EU 
members listed in Table 4 (tk =  6.89; k  =  {1,2}), which implies that the core group for 
consumer prices consists of the Netherlands and Denmark.
Next, according to step 3 of the algorithm, countries are added to the core group 
one by one and a new t-statistic is printed. For the first sixteen countries in Table 4, these 
t-statistics are positive; all of these countries become the members of the first club. 
Because Luxembourg has a negative t-statistic (t =  —1.33), it is not included in this 
club. When Spain is added to the sixteen members o f the first club, its t-statistic is also 
negative (t  =  —0.60), and Spain does not become a new member. Slovenia is the last 
country with a positive t-statistic (t =  0.25) and becomes the seventeenth member of the 
first club. When the remaining countries are added one by one to the existing seventeen 
members, the individual t-statistics for all of them are negative. Thus, none of these 
countries becomes the eighteenth member of the first club.
For a complement group, or the remaining eight countries that are not selected to 
the first club, the log t-Test rejects the null hypothesis of convergence of consumer 
prices (t = —4.19). Because a complement subgroup does not form the second club, step 
4 of the algorithm suggests repeating the club clustering procedure for these countries 
until all clubs are identified.
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Following step 2 of the algorithm, I perform the log t-Test by adding one country 
at a time to the base and calculating a t-statistic. This process continues until the t-statistic 
becomes lower than the threshold level of t  =  —1.65. For example, when Denmark is 
added to the Netherlands, the t-statistic is ( t = 6.89), so Denmark is added to the 
subgroup of potential core countries. When Germany is added to the first two countries, 
the new t-statistic (t =  5.91) is higher than the threshold, so Germany joins the subgroup 
and the next country -  Belgium -  is evaluated, etc. After adding Spain, the t-statistic 
(t  = —2.24) becomes lower than the threshold, so I stop pre-selecting countries for the 
first club. In this pre-selected subgroup, the highest t-statistic is for the first two EU 
members listed in Table 4 (tk = 6.89; k  =  {1,2}), which implies that the core group for 
consumer prices consists of the Netherlands and Denmark.
Next, according to step 3 of the algorithm, countries are added to the core group 
one by one and a new t-statistic is printed. For the first sixteen countries in Table 4, these 
t-statistics are positive; all of these countries become the members of the first club. 
Because Luxembourg has a negative t-statistic (t =  —1.33), it is not included in this 
club. When Spain is added to the sixteen members of the first club, its t-statistic is also 
negative (t =  —0.60), and Spain does not become a new member. Slovenia is the last 
country with a positive t-statistic (t =  0.25) and becomes the seventeenth member of the 
first club. When the remaining countries are added one by one to the existing seventeen 
members, the individual t-statistics for all of them are negative. Thus, none of these 
countries becomes the eighteenth member of the first club.
For a complement group, or the remaining eight countries that are not selected to 
the first club, the log t-Test rejects the null hypothesis of convergence of consumer 
prices (t  =  —4.19). Because a complement subgroup does not form the second club, step 
4 of the algorithm suggests repeating the club clustering procedure for these countries 
until all clubs are identified.
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APPENDIX 2.B
RELATIVE TRANSITION PATHS OF MOTOR FUEL PRICES AND TAXES
IN THE EU (
Figure 13.
R elative transition curves (relative ta x es) on  Euro-super-95 am on g  th e  EU -25
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R elative  transition cu rv es  (relative co n su m er  p rices)
m ------------------------------------------------1------------------------------------------------ 1------------------------------------------------1-----------
01jan2004 01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010
time
------------ NL/CZ ------------- DK/SI ------------ DE
------------ BE ------------ FI ------------ GR
 PT SE    |T




Club 2 among the EU-25: unleaded Euro-super-95 fuel 















Club 3 among the EU-95: unleaded Euro-super-95 fuel 













Relative transition curves (relative producer prices) on Euro-super-95 fuel
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Figure 20.
Relative transition curves (relative producer prices) for Euro-super-95, NMS
Club convergence
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Figure 27.
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Figure 31.
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Figure 32.
Relative transition curves (relative taxes) on Super fuel. 2000-2005 
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Figure 33.
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ESSAY 3: IS THERE MOTOR FUEL FISCAL COMPETITION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION?
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3.1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
This paper examines how political, economic, and geographic factors influence 
motor fuel tax setting behaviors among members of the EU, and whether or not these 
behaviors are strategic. The major question it addresses is how individual countries that 
are integrated in a single union respond in the short run to changes in motor fuel tax rates 
of neighboring countries. By contrast to previous economic literature on motor fuel 
taxation, this paper recognizes the united, inter-related, but fiscally-competitive setting of 
the EU and the dual role of motor fuel taxes. It contributes to a limited empirical 
literature on fiscal competition in the EU and to a complex discussion of motor fuel tax 
and emission reduction decisions of the national governments.
In addition to a country’s traditional budget constraints, every EU country faces 
both the emission targets and pressure from EU peers to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG). This peer pressure can be roughly identified as the difference between a 
country’s emission targets and its actual emissions. In this situation, are some European 
countries more willing to match an increase in fuel tax rates rather than a decrease?
Drawing from prior studies on motor fuel tax matching in the U.S. (e.g. Rork, 
2003), I argue that the overall pattern of fuel tax matching is different in Europe. On the 
one hand, the absolute level of gasoline prices is much higher in Europe than it is in the 
U.S. due to a higher share of fuel taxes in the final price of fuel. Therefore, it might be 
more difficult for European politicians to argue in favor of a further increase in fuel tax 
rates. On the other hand, some of the EU countries have high representation of green
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parties in their governments, and will be more willing either to initiate or to match an 
increase of a fuel tax. The ways in which the EU members respond to changes in the fuel 
taxation of their neighbors may not be the same in terms of reasons, direction and/or 
magnitude when compared to interconnectivity of responses among other regional 
governments like the states in the U.S. The goal of this paper is to empirically test if they 
behave differently, in comparison to how the U.S. states interact with each other when 
neighbors’ fuel taxes change.
The proposed research question is particularly important to address for a few 
reasons. First of all, this question is current given increasing globalization and the 
emergence of new types of economic unions between countries. Historically, the 
integration of separate countries in one union is not a new practice; nevertheless, the EU 
is the first example of a number of independent countries voluntarily forming a union and 
a Common Internal Market. These types of unions may be replicated in the future, for 
example, among some former USSR members. In the case of the EU, the origination of 
the Internal Market took place after the Treaty of Rome was ratified in 1957. Later, with 
the Single European Act of 1986, a group of European countries agreed upon a single 
internal market and free circulation of people, capital, goods, and services between 
member states. One of the major goals of the EU community, as it is outlined by the 
European Treaty, is to ensure that taxation differences between member states do not 
distort the smooth functioning of the Common European Market.21 These distortions are 
facilitated by mobility of individuals across borders, and may lead to uneven pressures on 
producers in different countries because of tax inequality.
21 See the consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Articles 3, 90, and 93 
(Treaty on European Union, 2002).
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The second reason is that the EU represents a good example for analyzing fuel 
taxes. In Europe, unlike the U.S., fuel taxation is chosen as a primary policy tool for 
reducing emissions, which results in an overall higher level of fuel tax rates. Instead of 
heavy reliance on taxes, the U.S. primarily controls emissions from its transport sector by 
utilizing the CAFE emission standards for newly-manufactured vehicles. In the EU, 
member states share common values and treaties, and sixteen out of twenty seven 
members even share a common monetary policy. With such close integration, a single 
member country’s decisions are bounded by common policies and peer pressure from 
other members. In addition, each EU member state faces a limited choice of policy 
instruments, leaving taxation as one of the fewer ‘sovereign’ policy tools still available to 
them. Therefore, countries in the newly integrated Europe make their decisions based not 
only on sovereign interests, but also are forced to consider the consequences of their own 
policies on neighbors and other union members.
The third reason for analyzing fuel taxation, in particular, is that vehicle fuel taxes 
are different from other types of taxes. One can argue that the objective o f taxing vehicle 
fuels in particular is somewhat different from taxing other goods in general. Today, 
taxing vehicle fuels plays an important role in reducing emissions and other vehicle- 
related externalities, in addition to its original historical purpose of generating tax 
revenues for the government to finance road construction and maintenance projects.
The fourth reason for examining fuel taxation in the EU is because it is a current 
leader in addressing global environmental concerns, especially when it comes to reducing 
GHG emissions (e.g. Schreurs, Selin & VanDeveer, 2009, p.3). Common environmental 
goals force the EU members to consider peer pressure from their neighbors when making
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taxation policy decisions. Thus, commitments of the EU members to control exhaust 
emissions are tougher than they are among states in the U.S.
Finally, given some concerns with the consequences of possible ‘fuel tourism’ 
and ‘fuel havens’ in Europe, it is important to determine whether the EU members 
behave in a similar manner to the states in the U.S. when it comes to motor fuel 
taxation.22 Because of the open borders among the EU nations, fuel consumers in the EU 
often include both residents and non-residents of a home country, and changes in fuel 
taxes may result in ‘fuel tourism’ and cross-border fuel shopping. Changes in fuel tax 
rates in one country create a response in its fuel tax base. As a result, vehicle emissions 
may be higher because consumers change their routine routes to purchase fuel due to 
motor fuel tax and, consequently, price changes. In the 2000s, the European Commission 
began to be concerned with this ‘fuel tourism’ issue and, as a result, they put pressure on 
the EU members to further coordinate their tax structures.
In sum, tax setting behavior is primarily driven by political rather than market 
forces. It also greatly depends on the degree of mobility of the motor fuel tax base. This 
paper intends to examine how a combination of these factors shapes fiscal competition 
among the EU members.
22 For example, Jos Dings, the Director o f Transport and Environment of the EU, raises his concerns in 
regards to Luxembourg by calling it a ‘fuel haven’. He states that in Luxembourg fuel taxes are low and per 




3.2.1. Fiscal Federalism. Mobility, and Taxing of Motor Fuels
In public economics, the decisions regarding how to provide local public goods 
efficiently and how much to tax depend on the structure of fiscal authority, the degree of 
decentralization, and the mobility of tax bases. In addition to being neighbors and 
individual nations, the EU members are also united in a single union with a common 
central authority: the European Parliament and the European Commission. The classical 
theory of fiscal federalism (e.g. Musgrave, 1959, 1965; Oates, 1968, 1972, 1991) 
suggests that while greater centralization helps to improve coordination of fiscal 
decisions, decentralization leads to more efficiency in addressing local needs.
The origin of the fiscal competition discussion, i.e. when governments compete 
for mobile resources among themselves to increase tax revenues, can be traced back to 
works by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972). Tiebout’s (1956) “sorting model” allows 
households to move to a selected location based on their sorting of alternatives. 
Subsequently, these alternatives are a result of their demand for local public goods. Oates 
(2008) argues that, according to his famous Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972), 
efficiency gains from a decentralized provision exist regardless of individuals’ mobility, 
but for Tiebout sorting these gains are enhanced by such mobility. The literature on fiscal 
competition, hence, argues that taxation decisions among neighboring states, 
municipalities, and provinces are typically interconnected because tax bases are mobile in 
their nature. This interconnection creates an incentive for governments to compete for
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mobile resources (e.g. Wildasin, 2006; Wilson, 1999). Thus, tax competition between 
neighbors, especially in the presence of greater mobility in their tax bases, may lead to 
more coordinated taxes on motor fuels in the EU.
In more recent literature on fiscal federalism, Oates (2005, 2008) distinguishes its 
two directions: the so-called ‘second generation theory of fiscal federalism’ and the 
‘political economy approach’ to the public sector. The ‘second generation theory of fiscal 
federalism’ has a game-theory framework and can be traced to Komai’s (1979) concept 
of ‘soft budget constraint.’ Because the constraint is ‘soft,’ local public authorities might 
feel insured by higher levels of government in the case of serious financial troubles; 
therefore, they lose an incentive to act fiscally responsibly (e.g. Qian & Roland, 1998; 
Rodden, et al., 2003). Based on this type of fiscal federalism, aggressive tax competition 
in motor fuel taxes may occur in the EU and also may lead to a race-to-the-bottom. The 
degree of tax base mobility is also not very important to local fiscal authorities because of 
their loose incentives for responsible fiscal discipline.
The second alternative development in the fiscal federalism is the ‘political 
economy approach’ to multi-level governance: this is when public officials can 
potentially lose reelections if voters disagree with their rent-seeking behavior (e.g. Besley 
& Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2006). In this setting, local governments are believed to have 
their own objectives and fiscal behavior motives. They may engage in either competition 
or strategic tax-setting, especially under greater decentralization (e.g. Oates, 2001a, 
2001b; Brueckner, 2003, 2004).
One example of the ‘political economy’ fiscal federalism is the yardstick 
competition model (Besley & Case, 1995). The yardstick competition model suggests
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that in light of imperfect information voters compare domestic policies to similar policies 
of their neighbors. This outcome implies that neighbors’ policies serve as a benchmark 
(yardstick) for comparison during elections. Voters may be more sensitive to motor fuel 
tax changes than tax changes in other goods because fuel prices may serve as strong 
signals to voters. In the long run, this may result in harmonization of motor fuel tax rates 
among neighbors if voters are sensitive enough to motor fuel tax differences.
In addition to theoretical fiscal competition literature, there is growing empirical 
support for responses to tax changes between neighbors. Case, Rosen and Hines (1993), 
for example, formalize the theoretical framework of governments’ interdependence and 
use the U.S. data from 1970-1985 to find evidence of fiscal interdependence among the 
U.S. states. Rork (2003), uses the U.S. data from 1967-1996, and shows that if the tax has 
a mobile base, such as a motor fuel tax, an increase in a tax rate by a neighbor is typically 
matched by an increase in a tax rate by a home state. Rietveld and Woudenberg (2005) 
use 1998 data for 32 European countries and find that geographically smaller EU nations 
are more aggressive than larger ones in lowering their gasoline and diesel taxes. Although 
there are no specific EU studies on race-to-the-bottom in taxes on motor fuel, there are 
some empirical studies of fiscal competition in other taxes in the EU. Lockwood and 
Migali (2009), for example, show that the creation of the single internal market in 1993 
significantly increased fiscal competition in excise taxes for alcohol and cigarettes among 
the original EU-1223 countries. Van der Hoek (2003) compares tax structures in the EU- 
15 for the period 1965-2000 and finds no evidence of race-to-the-bottom in capital taxes. 
As noted by Oates (2001b, p. 137), however, the race-to-the-bottom outcome is simply
23 EU-12 typically refers to the 12 original EU member states; EU-15 are the 15 members that formed the 
EU before 2004, and EU-27 are the 27 member countries after the 2007expansion o f  the Union.
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one of suboptimal Nash equilibriums of fiscal competition. In sum, these empirical 
studies suggests interdependence of motor fuel tax setting behavior among neighbors, at 
least in the short term, which may eventually lead to tax harmonization.
3.2.2. Fiscal Competition and Its Outcomes: Forces Leading to Motor Fuel Tax 
Coordination
According to the European Commission, the difference in tax systems among the 
member states is one of the major reasons for the inefficient, unsmooth functioning of the 
Internal Market: ‘The existence of 25 different tax systems creates barriers to the 
mobility of factors and thus to the full implementation of the Internal Market’ (Ilzkovitz 
et al., 2007, p. 13). This is why the long-term outcome of fiscal competition, motor fuel 
tax harmonization, is desirable by the European Commission (Newbery, 2005a). 
Nevertheless, greater fiscal competition in the EU may drive motor fuel tax rates to their 
minimal level. By setting tax floors on motor fuels, the European Commission regulates 
this lowest tax level and establishes a minimum benchmark towards which taxes may or 
may not converge (CEU, 2003).
A researcher’s view on the outcomes of fiscal competition in the EU depends on 
his/her perspective on fiscal federalism, discussed in the previous section. On the one 
hand, under strong centralization, the pressure to harmonize motor fuel taxes among the 
EU members and, at the same time, keep them relatively high is also strong. On the other 
hand, under the ‘political economy’ view and the race-to-the-bottom principle, fiscal 
competition between neighbors should drive tax rates to the lowest possible level.
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Both of the above outcomes also depend on an individual’s mobility. Higher 
mobility of a tax base should lead to the following: higher tax competition among 
neighboring EU member countries, lower motor fuel tax rates, a decrease of motor fuel 
tax revenues in total tax revenues, weaker reliance on motor fuel excise taxes over time. 
Rork (2003), for example, shows in the U.S., the share of revenues from motor fuel taxes 
in states budgets have declined over time. Although there may be many reasons for this, 
one possible explanation is that the American motor fuel consumer tax base may be 
relatively mobile.
Under some degree of tax base mobility in the EU, changes in fuel tax rates create 
a response by the tax base (which includes both residents and non-residents of the home 
country): ‘fuel tourism’ and cross-border shopping. There are two types of consumers 
that can contribute to fuel tourism and, as a result, to higher exhaust emissions: truck 
drivers and local consumers who live along country borders and engage in cross-border 
shopping. Truck drivers travel long distances, cross European national borders, and may 
strategically change their routes to refuel. ‘Fuel tourism’ is typically associated in the 
policy literature with the first type of consumers, while economic literature refers to both 
types of consumers as ‘fuel tourists.’
Eurostat indicates that consumers of unleaded gasoline are primarily private 
vehicle owners, while consumers of diesel are primarily road transport businesses 
(Eurostat, Panorama of Transport, 2009). Commercial truck drivers have different fueling 
incentives than private car owners, resulting in different purchasing behavior. Because of 
higher mobility, truck drivers are more price-elastic and consumer price convergence is 
expected to be faster for diesel than for other types of motor fuels (e.g. Dreher and
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Krieger, 2010). Accordingly, stronger tax and price harmonization for diesel fuel is also 
expected because of added pressures on low-tax countries to eliminate motor fuel ‘tax 
havens.’
Empirical literature on the topic of fuel tourism is rather limited.24 Banfi et al. 
(2005) find some evidence of fuel tourism along borders in Switzerland from 1985-1997. 
Leal et al. (2009) find some evidence of cross-border motor fuel shopping as a response 
to price changes among regions in Spain. Wlazlowski et al. (2009) also provide evidence 
of ‘fuel tourism’ in the EU by investigating European price dynamics with the vector 
error correction model to account for asymmetry in price transmission. Rietveld et al. 
(2001) examine fueling behavior of Dutch auto-owners based on 1997 survey data. They 
find that, for an average driver, a tradeoff between price difference and distance traveled 
is €0.005 per kilometer. Their survey also indicates that 30% of Dutch residents who live 
along the border with Germany will cross-border shop for fuel if the price difference is 
0.056 per liter. Moreover, Rietveld et al. (2001) find that 5% of Dutch respondents will 
travel up to 30km to cross the border and purchase fuel in Germany, even though the 
financial costs of these trips do not outweigh the financial benefits. The authors explain 
this by the differences in the value of time among drivers.
3.2.3. Fiscal Competition and Its Outcomes: Forces Leading to Slowing of Tax 
Harmonization and Coordination
The first argument in favor of slow tax coordination is that EU members are 
limited in their repertoire of policy tools. Once they become EU members, countries
24 See Wlazlowski, Giulietti, Binner and Milas (2009) for one o f the most recent reviews o f fuel tourism 
literature.
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agree to align their policies with European treaties. In addition, sixteen25 members out of 
twenty seven share a common monetary policy, forming the Eurozone. These countries 
have agreed to follow a strict common monetary policy, leaving themselves with even 
fewer available policy tools than before. With Brussels pressuring for further tax 
harmonization, these countries have to give up even more in terms of policy-setting and 
budgetary freedom (e.g. Angelier & Sterner, 1990). Until the recent financial crisis of the 
late 2 0 0 0 s, taxation was always thought of as a sovereign decision of an individual 
country, and member states were relatively protective of this type of ‘sovereignty’ (e.g. 
Ring, 2008).26 If countries resist giving up this sovereignty in the area of motor fuel 
taxation, taxes on fuel will not converge, and may even diverge in the long run.
The second factor that is important to recognize when discussing tax setting and 
its outcomes is that individuals might perceive fuel taxes differently from other taxes. For 
example, numerous trucker strikes such as the ones in Spain, France and the U.K. in the 
2 0 0 0 s suggest that the general public is much more politically sensitive to levels and 
changes in motor fuel prices in part due to fuel tax policies. In addition, some studies 
show that since fuel prices and policies are consistently discussed by the media, 
individuals seem to change their attitudes towards gasoline taxes because of these 
discussions (Lofgren & Nordblom, 2010). If individual consumers see fuel taxation as a 
tool for decreasing GHG emissions and improving the environment, then they might be 
more tolerant of increases in taxes in a given place and time. In this case, the convergence 
in fuel tax rates may slowly occur. If individuals and their politicians perceive fuel
25 Seventeen Eurozone members as o f January 2011.
26 The EU members (except for the U.K. and the Czech Republic) recently signed a Fiscal Compact Treaty 
(2012) and collectively agreed upon tightening fiscal measures in the Union (European Council, 2012).
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taxation as a symbol of sovereignty, convergence in fuel rates across all EU members 
may not occur. In either case, governments and politicians use fuel taxes as a strong 
signaling device. It is also possible that the governments may use fuel taxes to ‘signal’ 
low tax environments to consumers and producers, when other forms of taxes may be 
‘hidden.’ Changes in tax policies are also politically challenging and costly for individual 
politicians, which will slow down harmonization of motor fuel taxes among EU 
members.
Geography is the next factor that may lead to motor fuel tax divergence or to 
slower tax convergence. Some European countries are located further from others and 
may be geographically secluded by water or mountains from most neighbors. Cross- 
border shopping is difficult under these circumstances, consumer price of fuel may not 
converge or converge very slowly, and the pressure to harmonize motor fuel taxes will be 
weak. Thus, for some tax convergence to occur, countries have to have sufficient 
infrastructure between neighbors.
Finally, this paper suggests that mixed signals from Brussels may serve as forces 
that slow tax convergence in general. Since the formation of the Single Internal Market in 
1993, the EU body seems to increasingly aim to ‘coordinate’ from above or ‘harmonize’ 
tax structures across the EU members (e.g. European Community Treaty, Article 93; EC,
1998). In 2001, however, the EU published an official communication ‘Tax Policy In The 
European Union -  Priorities For The Years Ahead’ in which it diverged from promoting 
harmonization of tax structures across Europe: “It is clear that there is no need for an 
across the board harmonization of Member States' tax systems. Provided that they respect 
Community rules, Member States are free to choose the tax systems that they consider
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most appropriate and according to their preferences” (EC, 2001, p.8 ). In 2006, tax 
convergence, as opposed to tax harmonization, was unofficially described as a corridor of 
common policies, with a minimum fuel tax level for protecting European social structure 
and a maximum tax level for retaining fair tax competition.27 On the one hand, according 
to the EU Community rules, nations are free to design their own tax systems.28 On the 
other hand, during the last fifteen years there has been an increase in bureaucratic 
‘coordination’ to achieve harmonization of tax systems of individual countries to 
safeguard the European Common Market. Thus, during this time, a degree of tax 
coordination and harmonization was not always well communicated by Brussels.
3.2.4. Environmental Aspects of Motor Fuel Taxes in the U.S. and in the EU
Since Pigou (1932), economists recognize that the objective of taxing vehicle 
fuels is somewhat different from taxing other goods. Traditionally, the Pigouvian tax is 
praised by environmental economists as a tool to discourage polluters’ activity to a 
degree when, in theory, marginal cost of pollution will be equal to marginal benefits of 
abatement and the level of pollution is reduced to a socially-optimal level.29 Pigou (1932) 
used the motor fuel example when he famously argued that per-unit tax (or subsidy)
27 For example, interview with Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister o f Belgium at the time o f the interview in 
January 2006 (the member of European Parliament), that is available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hs01hQNA82Q
28 The situation has changed in 2012 when the EU members, except for the U.K. and the Czech Republic, 
signed a Fiscal Compact Treaty to collectively tighten fiscal measures in the Union (European Council, 
2012 ).
29 Environmental economists, however, acknowledge issues associated with the Pigouvian tax. The biggest 
issue concerning most environmental policies, including the Pigouvian tax, is imperfect information about 
social costs as well as uncertainty about the estimates o f social benefits from removing externalities (e.g. 
Baumol & Oates, 1971; Kolstad et al., 1990). In addition, critiques of the Pigouvian tax note that collected 
revenues are typically paid to the government, that is, victims of pollution may not be necessarily 
compensated because revenues are not earmarked for projects that improve the environment.
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solves the problem of divergence between the values of marginal social consumption and
marginal private net product, and that tax compensates for the externality:
It is, however, possible for the State, i f  it so chooses, to remove the 
divergence in any field by "extraordinary encouragements ” or 
"extraordinary restraints” upon investments in that field. The most 
obvious forms which these encouragements and restrains may assume are, 
o f cause, those o f  bounties and taxes... The principle... is employed... in 
the British levy o f  a petrol duty and a motor-car license tax upon the users 
o f  motor cars ... (Pigou, 1932, §13, p.192-193).
The motor fuel consumer is also the producer of exhaust emissions and has no 
economic incentives to supply socially-optimal levels of exhaust emissions. Motor fuel 
tax, in this case, presents the second-best solution, yet one that is administratively simpler 
when compared to a technically challenging task of taxing vehicle emissions directly (e.g. 
Fullerton & West, 2002; Harrington et al., 1998). A Pigouvian tax raises the price of 
gasoline and should, in theory, encourage drivers either to drive fewer miles or, in the 
long run, to replace their vehicle with the one that is more efficient. Thus, theoretical 
environmental literature portrays vehicle emission tax as a tool to discourage tailpipe 
pollution and to compensate a portion of the social costs associated with vehicle 
emissions.30
Compared to other types of consumption goods, motor fuels are different because 
of the environmental externalities and other social costs associated with their 
consumption (e.g. Parry & Small, 2005; Newbery, 1988). In addition to its original 
purpose of generating tax revenue for governments, fuel taxes also partially reduce social
30 Climate change is considered to be one of the negative externalities arguably caused by increasing stock 
of emissions in the atmosphere. See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) for earlier general discussion o f a link 
between economic policy, emissions, and climate change. This debate on uncertainty, urgency, severity o f  
economic policies and estimated social costs o f  climate change continues after a publication o f the Stem 
Review on Economics o f Climate Change (2007) and its critiques by Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman 
(2007), among others.
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costs associated with both fuel consumption and production, including harm to the 
environment (e.g. Baumol & Oates, 1971; Barthhold, 1994; England, 2007).
Because marginal social costs associated with fuel consumption differ across 
individual nations, there is no logical reason for fuel taxes to converge in absolute levels 
among EU members, unless politicians have their own hidden objectives. The empirical 
literature provides some quantitative estimates of both per-mile cost estimates as well as 
per-gallon cost estimates of external and social costs associated with transport. For 
example, estimations of the external component of the motor fuel tax in the U.K. are €0.6 
per liter for petrol and €0.67 per liter of diesel (in €2000) (Newbery, 1988). Parry and 
Small (2005) account for such marginal external costs of gasoline consumption as 
pollution, accidents, and congestion; they calculate an optimal gasoline tax rate of $1 .0 1  
for the U.S. and $1.34 for the U.K. Newbery (2005b, p.221) provides a comprehensive 
review and discussion of the environmental component of motor fuel tax; his estimates of 
the costs associated with motor fuel consumption in the U.K., are £0.36 per liter of 
gasoline and £0.40 per liter o f diesel. These estimates include costs of air pollution, 
global warming impact, water pollution, noise, and road costs.
A comparison of social costs across studies, however, remains challenging 
because different studies take into consideration different types of social costs (e.g. 
Newbery & Santos, 1999); there is no uniform approach across studies. Viscusi et al.
(1994), for example, estimate that in the U.S. in 1986 gasoline taxes were roughly equal 
to externality costs, or 17% of the final gasoline price. At the same time, taxes on diesel 
fuel accounted for about 13% of the final price, which was far below estimated external 
costs of 50%.
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From the perspective of theoretical environmental economics, the motor fuel tax 
is, first of all, a tax on emissions in a second best policy setting. According to the 
theoretical environmental literature, emission charges and fees, including motor fuel 
taxes, are aimed at either increasing the price of emission-associated good or improving 
the quality of emissions by encouraging development of cleaner technologies (e.g. 
Hanley, Shogren & White, 1997).
In reality, revenues from fuel taxation are spent on compensating social cost 
reduction (e.g. Tingsong, 2001; Fullerton, 2001). In the U.S., the original purpose of 
taxing fuels was to generate revenues for road projects to local and federal governments, 
and it remains to be the major purpose today (e.g. Barthold, 1994; Newbery & Santos,
1999).31 According to Fullerton (2001, p.230), in the U.S. certain taxes on motor fuels are 
called environmental not because they are Pigouvian in nature, but because revenues 
from these taxes are earmarked for specific expenditure programs or used in social 
insurance premiums to fund contaminated site cleanups. Barthold (1994, p. 136) states 
that the U.S. federal gas excise taxes on motor fuel “much resemble the textbook model 
of a Pigouvian tax.” He suggests that among other factors, both political considerations as 
well as regional impacts are typically excluded from economic neoclassical models of 
tax-setting. Compared to the U.S. where gasoline taxes are earmarked for highway- 
related projects (e.g. Sterner, 2007), motor fuel tax revenues in the EU are not
31 According to the report by the Transportation Research Board o f the National Academies 
(2006), fuel taxes generate about 64 percent (in 2004) o f all highway user fee revenues. Out o f $136.4 
billion the U.S. government has spent on highway-related expenditures, $104.8 came from highway users, 
including 31 percent from federal, 32 percent from state and 1 percent from local fuel tax revenues. The 
concern is that fuel taxes may become a lesser reliable source of revenues by 2025 due to expected higher 
oil prices, more technologically efficient vehicles, and changes in perception of transportation 
infrastructure quality by the drivers. The Report also shows that while in Western Europe fuel tax revenue 
structure is similar to one in the U.S., road user revenues exceed highway-related expenditures roughly 2:1, 
and occasionally 3:1 (p. 39).
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specifically earmarked for the purpose of highway projects (National Academies, 2006, 
p.86-89). For example, Newbery and Santos (1999) state that earmarking of road user 
charges, including fuel excise taxes, as an ‘unsuccessful’ and ‘inadequate’ practice in the 
U.K.
The European Commission officially states that transport-related taxes are tools of 
reducing social costs and controlling mobility (e.g. EC, 2008, p.2). Environmental 
emphasis of the motor fuel tax in the EU results in higher levels of taxes, but not 
necessarily tax harmonization because externalities are different among EU members. 
Newbery (2005a, p.7) suggests that the negative externality argument is directly “relevant 
to the EU agenda of energy tax harmonization,” because fuel pollutants cross national 
borders (Newbery, 2005a, p.7). In addition, Sterner (2012) empirically shows that 
regressivity of motor fuel taxation in the EU is minimal, and that the impact of fuel tax is 
mostly proportional. Thus, if nations are concerned with stock pollutants and cross- 
border environmental impacts caused by tax differences, taxes on motor fuel may 
eventually harmonize across European nations.
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3.3. MODELING MOTOR FUEL TAX INTERDEPENDENCE
3.3.1. Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this paper is built upon the literature on horizontal tax 
competition, which suggests that in hierarchical government systems, there exists tax 
competition among governments of the same level (e.g. Wildasin, 1988; Briilhart & 
Jametti, 2006; Devereux, et al., 2007; Goodspead, 2002). This literature generally 
concludes that such tax competition depends on two factors, the degree of tax base 
mobility (Oates, 1968) and the discrepancy of tax bases for a specific tax (e.g. Kanbur & 
Keen, 1993; Wilson, 1991). The question in hand, therefore, is to determine how mobility 
of national motor fuel tax bases impacts motor fuel fiscal competition among the EU 
countries.
Prior empirical studies of motor fuel tax competition provide some evidence for 
the U.S., but not for the EU. Rork (2003), for example, finds that for taxes with a 
relatively mobile tax base, such as gasoline excise taxes, home governments respond 
positively to changes in a neighboring state’s tax rate (ft). At the same time, he finds that 
for taxes with a relatively immobile tax base, such as VAT or sales taxes, home 
governments respond in an opposite direction to a neighbor’s tax change. Nevertheless, 
the latter outcome suggests two possible scenarios for taxes with an immobile tax base: 
( 1) a decrease abroad matched by a tax increase at home (ff), or (2 ) an increase abroad 
matched by a tax decrease at home (ff). If a state government is aware of inelastic 
response by its residents, it is plausible that the government may increase a home tax in
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response to a neighbor’s tax drop. Yet, it seems counterintuitive that home state would 
decrease its motor fuel tax rates in response to a neighbor’s tax increase (f j,). In this case, 
if the home politicians are aware of inelastic response to home tax changes, they would 
be willfully decreasing home tax revenues by lowering their taxes. One possible 
explanation for such behavior could be home politicians’ personal motives for reelection 
and an opportunity to make a political statement by decreasing home taxes with an 
inelastic tax base. As a general tax setting approach, Rork (2003) suggests that, to ensure 
stable tax revenues, states in the U.S. should gradually shift their reliance from taxes with 
a mobile tax base to taxes with an immobile tax base, such as income and sales taxes. 
Thus, they should shift away from taxes with mobile base, including excise taxes on 
motor fuels.
My analysis, however, concentrates only on motor fuels and looks at the fuel tax 
base mobility for the case of the EU, where both levels of taxes on motor fuels and the 
variation among the EU members are much higher than among states in the U.S. I argue 
that if mobility of the tax base matters in constructing national motor fuel tax policy, it 
should definitely matter in Europe, because of its Common Internal Market and common 
environmental objectives. Thus, it becomes important to determine whether the motor 
fuel tax matching pattern is different in the EU than in the U.S.
Since VAT rates are higher in the EU compared to sales taxes in the U.S., motor 
fuel tax base of a European country depends on both excise taxes as well as the VAT. 
Moreover, in the economic literature VAT is typically considered a tax with a relatively 
immobile tax base, while the excise tax is typically referred to as a tax with a relatively 
mobile tax base. Hence, the interacting aspect between the two types of taxes impacts the
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mobility of national motor fuel tax bases of the EU countries. This impact of the VAT on 
the mobility of the motor fuel tax base may occasionally either lessen or outweigh the 
impact of the excise tax. What I expect to find is that motor fuel tax base is less mobile in 
Europe than it is in the U.S. As a result, in the EU motor fuels are taxed at higher and 
more differentiated rates because individual EU countries are less afraid of tax 
competition from their neighbors. In this setting, the hypothesis is that the EU members 
are more willing to match a motor fuel excise tax increase and less willing to match a 
decrease.
My modeling approach is inspired by the Economic Law of Market Areas 
formulated by Fetter (1924) and Hyson and Hyson (1950). The initial idea behind the 
Law can be traced back to the late 1800s, to work by two European scientists Launhardt 
(e.g. 1885) and Cheysson (1887) (see Shieh, 1985 for discussion). The Law deals with 
the relationship between any two geographical markets as a function of relative prices 
and freight costs.
Figure 35. The Law of Market Areas
$
A's market area B's market area
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Keeping the original notation, Figure 35 demonstrates a simple logic behind the 
Law of Market Areas for two identical geographical markers, A and B. If commodity 
prices p and q as well as transportation costs s and r  are equal in both markets, then the 
geographical distance between AP and PB is the same. The geographical position of the 
point P is determined by the intersection of the two Y-shaped figures. The length of the 
stem of each Y-shaped figure is the price of a good (p or q) in that market; the slope is 
the transportation cost (r  and s) for that market. For example, even if prices in both 
markets A and B are equal (p = q), point P will be closer to the center of the market A if 
the transportation cost for that market is higher (r > s).
Subsequent developments of the theory behind the Law of Market Areas include 
the discussions of special cases when either prices or transportation costs may not be 
equal either between the two markets (e.g. Hebert, 1972; Parr, 1995a; Shieh, 1985) or 
among multiple markets (Parr, 1995b). My theoretical model is built for a general case 
when prices between two markets are not equal because of differences in taxes. The 
model presented here, therefore, explicitly includes both transportation cost as well as 
differences in prices between two countries that are caused by differences in taxation 
rates. I, however, look at the transportation cost not as a cost to the producer, but as a cost 
to the consumer who lives in one area and can travel to other areas. In addition, I 
explicitly allow for a representative individual to choose between purchasing gasoline at 
home or abroad, or both. The resulting theoretical model is flexible enough to implicitly 
show the impact of changes in either motor fuel excise tax, VAT, or both, which allows 
capturing an additional impact of double taxation of motor fuels in the EU.
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3.3.2. Theoretical Model
In order to examine home government’s reaction to changes in neighbor’s tax 
rate, I develop a two-stage sequential model with two EU countries. The first stage solves 
the utility maximization problem of the representative individual in “home” country. By 
assumption, all individuals are identical in all aspects. The representative individual 
observes prices and taxes in two countries and makes a decision about the share of 
gasoline she/he will buy at home. The remaining income, by construction, is spent on 
either gasoline purchases abroad or on transportation costs. The second stage of the 
model is the home government’s problem of choosing the optimal home tax rate on motor 
fuels, based on the knowledge of the individual’s reaction function to tax rates. All tax 
revenues are spent by the home government on the provision of a public good to home 
residents. Both the home and foreign governments levy gasoline taxes. When reacting to 
changes in a neighbor’s tax, the home government takes into account the potential change 
in its national tax base. The government’s optimization problem becomes to maximize 
utility of a representative individual, a consumer of both gasoline and public good, 
subject to budget constraints.
A representative individual’s preferences are captured by an additively separable 
utility function, which is defined over private good X, gasoline, and per-capita level of G, 
a domestically provided public good (Equation 17):
U(X,G) = u (X )  + v(G) (17)
To ensure well-behaved consumer preferences, the utility function is defined as 
continues, strictly monotonic, and strictly concave, such that u '(.) >  0  and u"(.) <  0  
andv'(-) >  0 and v"(.) < 0. The separability assumption assures that an individual
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chooses the relative level of expenditure on domestic and foreign gasoline independently 
from the amount of public good received. That is, gasoline demand depends only on 
motor fuel prices (taxes) both at home and abroad, and not on consumption of public 
goods.
For simplicity, the exogenous income of the representative individual is entirely 
spent on fuel purchases and cost of traveling abroad. An individual is free to move across 
a border to choose where to purchase fuel. By assumption, all individuals are identical in 
all aspects; they all have identical preferences. Obtaining fuel abroad has an associated 
cost C =  C(0) > 0. The term 0 3 [0,1] denotes the proportion of fuel bought abroad. By 
definition, the proportion of fuel bought domestically becomes (1 — 0). If an individual 
spends the entire income at home, then 0 = 0 and C(0) = 0. By construction, C '(0) >  0 
and C"(0 ) > 0 , implying that the marginal cost of acquiring fuel abroad is positive and 
increasing. Other models with mobile tax bases, for example, income tax models, 
typically require that individuals permanently relocate first, and by doing so, permanently 
choose where to pay all taxes -  at home or abroad. My model is fundamentally different; 
it is a generalized case with continuous 0  3 [0 ,1 ], meaning that individuals do not have to 
commit to paying taxes only in their country of residents. Individuals in my model can 
freely move across national borders to fuel shop both abroad and home.
Equation 18 shows the individual’s budget constraint; the representative 
individual spends all of her/his income on fuel both at home and abroad, and on the 
associated cost of traveling abroad in order to purchase foreign fuel:
y  =  (1 -  0)XpT1 +  9XT2 +  XC[9] (18)
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where y  is the exogenous income, p is exogenous pre-tax domestic price of gasoline 
relative to the foreign price (foreign price is set equal to 1), and Tt =  ( 1  +  t*) , where 
r i for i = 1,2 is the tax rate paid on motor fuel. By assumption,p7\ >  T2 , so that the 
consumer has an incentive to accept the cost of shopping abroad. It is worth noting that 
Tl and r 2 can represent the combination of two types of taxes that are typically levied on 
motor fuels in the EU, a specific lump-sum motor fuel excise tax and a general ad 
valorem VAT. Comparative static results showing the effect of a change in tax t* can 
represent changes in either motor fuel excise taxes or VAT rates as a reaction to a change 
in either type of these taxes abroad. Under this flexible construction, even changes in the 
VAT of a neighboring country may trigger changes either in the excise tax, the VAT, or 
both in the home country (see Essay 1 for discussion).
The representative individual maximizes utility (Equation 17) subject to a budget 
constraint (Equation 18). Re-writing the budget constraint gives Equation 19:
y  y
X ~  (1 -  0)p7\ + 9T2 +  C[9] ~  0(7*2 -  pTx) +  pTx +  C[0] (19)
For notational simplicity, let the denominator of the Equation 19 be denoted as
function A(0) =  9(T2 — pTx) + pTx + C[6]; A[Q] > 0. Substituting Equation 19 into the
utility function (Equation 17) and differentiating it with respect to 9 gives the first order
condition (Equation 20):
- u x -Xg = 0 (20)
where X 0 = Given that the marginal utility is always positive, it
\A \u \l
follows from Equation 20 XhdXXg =  0. The numerator of Xq implicitly describes 9* =
e{p,Tx,T2y-
157
(T2 — p T ^  + Cg — 0 (21)
Equation 21 shows that the consumer is willing to engage in cross-border 
shopping up to the point when the marginal benefit of money saved equals marginal cost. 
To see this, note that the cost premium that consumers pay at home compared to abroad, 
M[0], is captured by multiplying the quantity of domestically bought gasoline by the 
post-tax price difference between domestic and foreign fuel (Equation 22):
The marginal benefit (negative cost premium) of cross-border shopping can be 
derived as the first derivative of Equation 2 2 :-^  = —X(pT1—T2). As the share of 
gasoline bought abroad (0) increases, cost premium changes by the amount X(pTt —
Equation 21 gives an implicit solution for the optimal share of motor fuel to be 
bought abroad 0* = 0(p,T1,T2) as long as A[0] ^  0. By implicit function theorem, the 
solution can be obtained by plugging the optimal value#* = 9(p,T1,T2) back into the 
first order condition (Equation 21) and differentiating it with respect to Tx.
Differentiating Equation 23 with respect to 7\ and T2 and solving for —  and —
dT i &Ti
gives:
M[0] =  (1 -  9)X(pTx -  T2) (22)
t 2).
CeiOip.Tt.Tz)) + T2 -  pTt = 0 (23)
(24)
d9  1
d T 2 Cgg
(25)
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Since the marginal cost of cross-border shopping is always positive and 
increasing (Cge > 0), Equations 24 and 25 suggest that as either domestic taxes on motor 
fuels increase or foreign taxes decrease, the share of foreign fuel consumption also
d^ Qincreases. For simplicity, I also assume  -------=  0, which is equivalent to assuming that
third and higher-order derivatives of the cost function equal zero.
Just like in a Stackelberg problem, a home government sets its taxes on motor fuel
knowing the reaction function of home residents. Given this reaction function the
second stage of the model is home government’s decision. The home government 
finances its expenditures on the public goods using revenues from taxes levied on motor 
fuels. For the government, choosing Tt is the same as choosing T t . Since, by assumption, 
all individuals are identical, the home governments’ motor fuel tax revenues are entirely 
spent on provision of public goods to home individuals (Equation 26):
G =  TtNX{l -  0)p = (Tx -  1)NX(1 -  9)p  (26)
where N is the number of home country’s residents. In this setting, the home country
government pays attention to the mobility of the motor fuel tax base because the 
government’s spending on public goods depends on individuals’ purchases of motor fuel 
at home.
The problem of the home government, hence, is to choose the local level of
gasoline tax so that it maximizes the representative individual’s utility (Equation 17),
subject to an individual’s and home government’s budget constraints (Equations 18 and 
26), evaluated at the representative individual’s optimal choice 9*. Substituting the 
budget constraints into the objective utility function, and noting that 9* =  9*(y,p,Tl t T2} 
is now endogenous, government’s maximization problem becomes (Equation 17a):
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max U{X,G) = u {X {9 {y ,p J l ,T2),T1,T2)) + v{X{9(y,p ,T1,T2),T1,T2))  (17a)
The first order condition of the home government’s maximization problem takes 
the following general form:
^x(Xg9Tl +  XTJ  + vc (Gg9Tl +  GTl) =  0 (27)
Given that, from Equation 20, Xe =  0, the first term in the brackets in the 
Equation 27 is zero:
uxXrt T- vgGq9Ti + vgGTi = 0 (28)
From Equation 19 XTl =  ^[e]}** <  0> suggesting that the first term of the
Equation 28 depicts lost utility of reduced motor fuel consumption caused by an increase 
in home tax. The second and the third terms of Equation 28 depict utility from 
consumption of extra pubic goods. This additional public goods is associated with 
additional tax revenues collected by the home government. An increase in home tax, 
however, also induces the representative consumer to cross the border and increase 
her/his share of foreign gasoline purchases, indirectly decreasing the provision of home 
public goods.
Next, I’ll plug in the specific constraints (Equations 19 and 26) into the home 
government’s objective function (Equation 17a) and solve it for the optimal tax rate Tf. 
Differentiating the objective function with respect to home tax Tt gives the first order 
condition (Equation 27):
ux (Xg0Tl +  XTl) +  vg(NX(  1 -  0)p +  (7\ -  l)[N(Xe8Tl +  XTJ ( 1  -  9)p -
NX9Tlp]) = 0 (27a)
Since Xq =  0 from Equation 20, Equation 27a becomes Equation 28a:
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uxXTl + vcNp(X (1 -  0) + (Ti -  l )[XTi( l  -  0 ) -  X6tJ )  =  0 (28a)
Equation 28a can be re-written as Equation 29:
uxXTl + vcNp (x(l - 9 -  Tt 0Tl +  9TJ + (T, -  l )X Tl (1 -  0)) = 0 (29)
Equation 29 implicitly gives the solution to the home government’s optimal motor 
fuel tax. The optimal tax rate Tf =  Tx ( y, p, N, T2) is a function of income, population 
size, prices, and the neighboring country’s fuel tax.
The goal, however, is to examine the impact of changes in motor fuel tax in a 
neighboring country (Tz) on a home country’s optimal tax Tx = ( y, p, N, T2). This
means that as foreign prices get more expensive, a representative consumer is affected 
because it ( 1) reduces overall spending power, (2 ) causes a shift in domestic taxes 
(further affecting spending power) and (3) causes a shift in the optimal mix between the 
amount of foreign and domestic fuel purchased. Since the consumer has already 
optimized, the impact of that third path is zero -  differential changes in the tax don’t 
cause changes in the mix; the representative agent already chose Xe = 0. By the implicit
function theorem the solution to — ■ can be derived using Equation 29 by differentiating it 
with respect to T2 (Equation 30):
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/  /  dTx \  dTx \
uxx yXg \ Ot-x +  # r 2 J  +  +  - ^ t 2 J  ^ r a  + uxB
+ v GGNp (x(l - 9 -  Tx9Tl + 9tJ  + (Tx -  l )X Tl( l  -  9))  
+ v cNp ( ^ X g (e Tl ^  +  0r2) + * Tl “  + XT) j  { 1 - 9 -  Tx9Tl + 9TJ
( (  dTi \  dTx t  d r t \ /  dTt \ \
" x (y  r> w 2 + ®T>)+w 29t' + Ti v™  w 2 + 9t‘t>) ~ (9t^  dr2 + 9t't0  j
+ ^ jrxn (1 -  8) + (T2 -  1) ^B(l -  9) -  Xr, (f>Ti ^  + 0Ti) j  j
= 0 (30)
where B = XTlTl +  XTlg (j)Tl +  9T^ .
Recall that r £ = Tt — l , Xg  =  0 (Equation 20), and, by assumption, 9TlTz = 0. 
Then, Equation 30 simplifies to Equation 31:
uxx ^ r a ~j^ r +  XT^ j XTi + ux B +  v GGNp  ^ ( l  — 9 — Tt 9 Tl)  +  Tj'Xj'^l — 9)^
+ vGNp ^ ( x Tl ^  +  XT2) { 1 - 9 -
( dT, d T ,\ dTi
~ X { 9^ +  2 dT2 e^ + Ti 6t^  d7j) + dT2X^ (1 ~ 0)
+ Tl ^? (1  -  9) -  XTl ( e Tl ^  + 0T2) j j  =  0 (31)
where X = — ------- ^------- —— and Tx is a home country’s optimal tax
& ^ - p T ^ + p ^ + C i d  J
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Re-writing Equation 31 as —  =  ^  suggest that the sign of the numerator D
d Tdetermines the sign of —- because the sign of the denominator, E (.), is negative by the
dT2
second order condition and:
D =  uxx^ t2^ t1"^ ux(Xt^t2 +  XTxq9t )^ +  vgg^ P ( ^ ( l  — 9 — tx9t )^ +  t1XTi (1 — 9)J 
+ v cNp X^-p2 ( l  — 9 — — X9T2
+  Tx ( ( XTlT2 +  XTiq9T2)(  1 — 0 ) — ■^ 7’107’2)^  (3 2 )
If D(.) < 0, the home government at least partially matches a foreign tax 
increase. If |D(. )| > |£ ( .) |,  the home government increases taxes more than 
proportionally. Although some terms in Equation 32 can be clearly signed for example -  
uXxXt2XTt and T\XTi (1 — 0) are both negative -  the overall sign of Equation 32 is not 
easily determined. The slope of the reaction function of the home government appears 
ambiguous. Thus, the next chapter will empirically examine the direction of the slope of 
the home governments’ motor fuel tax reaction function.
There are two possible extensions of this simplified model that may be worth 
pursuing in future research: (1) setting up the model as an interactive tax matching game 
with a non-cooperative outcome; and (2 ) introducing heterogeneity of individuals into the 
model. The first extension will allow both governments to set their motor fuel taxes 
strategically. The second extension will introduce the median voter into the government’s 
decision. It will also allow exploring how differences in individual’s fueling costs 




3.3.3.1. Spatial Lag and Spatial Error Models. There are three categories of 
variables that may impact motor fuel tax rates in the EU: geographical, political, and 
socio-economical. By drawing from the economic spatial theory literature (see 
Brueckner, 2003, for discussion) and the spatial econometrics literature32, this sub-chapter 
examines geography and the importance of space in understanding motor fuel tax 
competition in such a large region as the EU.
Space can enter the model in two ways, resulting in two types of models: spatial 
lag and spatial error models (Anselin, 1988). Spatial lag models are built upon the 
theoretical idea of interaction between economic agents and the existence of a spatial 
reaction function among them, that is, spatial dependence (Cliff & Ord, 1973). These 
models of spatial dependence fit the idea that national governments react to changes in 
motor fuel taxes in neighboring EU countries. In a general form, such interaction among
national governments is captured in the model by a spatially-weighted lag of the
dependent variable (Equation 33). Spatial lag models, hence, facilitate separation of a 
spatial trend in data and allow for more accurate inference of p-coefficients than non- 
spatial models (e.g. Anselin & Lozano-Gracia, 2009, p. 15).
T = pWT + X/3 + e (33)
Under the second specification, space enters these models in the form of spatially 
autocorrelated error terms. Equation 34 shows the basic spatial error model:
T = Xp + ( I -  ( p w y 1^ (34)
32 See e.g. Anselin, Florax, Rey, 2004; LeSage & Pace, 2009; Anselin & Rey, 2010 for discussion o f recent 
developments in the spatial econometrics literature.
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where £ are well-behaved errors with zero mean and symmetrical diagonal variance- 
covariance matrix (52/). Spatial error correlation in such models is the result of 
unobserved national variables that have a spatial structure but are omitted from the 
model. For example, in the EU, such unobserved spatial factors could be unmeasured 
cultural driving habits or behavioral aspects of the population across Europe. 
Environmental externalities from transport that cross national borders could also play a 
role in explaining variations in European motor fuel tax rates. These spatial error models 
are fundamentally different from the spatial lag models because the expected value of the 
dependent variable is the same as in non-spatial models (e.g. LeSage & Pace, 2009, 
P-21):
E(T) =  Xp  (35)
Although Equation 35 suggests that unobservable omitted factors are important in 
explaining motor fuel tax levels in the EU, it is more crucial to identify the impact of 
spatially distributed observable factors, such as in a spatial lag model. In addition, spatial 
lag models are more consistent with the public economics literature on inter-jurisdictional 
competition and the formal theoretical framework for strategic interactions by Brueckner 
(2003).
3.3.3.2. Spatial Autocorrelation and Spatial Weights. Spatial distributions of 
motor fuel excise taxes and total tax levels in the EU in 1995, 2004 and 2010 are 
portrayed in Figures 35-40. These figures show that the neighboring EU members often 
belong to the same distribution interval, informally suggesting spatial correlation of 
motor fuel taxes among European neighbors. The concept of spatial autocorrelation (e.g.
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Cliff & Ord 1973; 1981, p.7-10) implies that spatially located data like motor fuel tax 
rates are likely to be related across different locations in space, in our case across the 
European continent. Unlike one-directional temporal correlation when taxes may depend 
only on past taxes and not on future values, spatial autocorrelation is multi-directional 
(Whittle, 1954). While the assumption of non-spatial independence is embedded in non- 
spatial panel models, ignoring spatial patterns may produce inaccurate empirical results. 
In order to determine what kind of spatial patterns among neighbors fit the actual 
distribution of motor fuel taxes, it is important to discuss several criteria for guiding this 
choice.
The structure of spatial connectivity among neighbors is typically incorporated 
into empirical models with the help of a spatial weight matrix W. This spatial weights 
matrix that was originally introduced by Cliff and Ord (1973, 1981) is designed upon the 
concept of potential interaction between any two neighbors in space. The economic 
literature provides few formal sets of rules for choosing the “correct” weights, the 
elements of the spatial weight matrix wtj (e.g. Florax & Rey, 1995; Anselin, 2006, 
pp.909-910 for discussion). Prior studies of tax competition typically used contiguity and 
population weight structures (e.g. Rork, 2003, 2009; Rork & Wagner, 2008). The 
contiguity matrix is one of the simplest and most popular tools for formally establishing 
connections among neighbors. Elements of contiguity matrix wtj are equal to one if two 
countries i and j  in the dataset are geographical neighbors, that is, if they share a common 
border; wi; equal zero otherwise. In addition, weight matrixes are typically row- 
standardized, so that wtj =  1.
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Since the contiguity matrix may be a rather simplified way of treating spatial 
weights, this paper tests a variety of more complex spatial weights to assess the 
sensitivity of results. These matrices are the row-standardized contiguity matrix (W 1), 
the inverse distance weights matrix (W2), the population-contiguity matrix (W3), the in­
land neighbor’s border length matrix (W4), the population-border contiguity 
matrix (W5), and the inverse distance matrix with a limited radius (W 6). Figures 41-46 
depict graphical representation of these spatial weight matrices.
The simple row-standardized contiguity matrix (14/1) embeds the assumption that 
every neighbor has an equal weight in impacting the home country’s motor fuel tax rate. 
It also suggests that the more neighbors a country has, the weaker the influence of any 
particular neighbor is. For example, Ireland will be influenced by only the U.K., but 
Luxembourg is equally influenced by France, Germany and Belgium (Figure 41).
The contiguity type matrices (W l, W3, W4, VF5), however, only take into 
consideration immediate, or so-called, first-order neighbors, that is, countries that share a 
common border. By contrast, in the inverse-distance setting, the closest neighbors have 
the most influential impact on the home country’s motor fuel taxes, and this impact 
decays with the distance. The inverse distance matrix (W 2) allows capturing the impact 
of not only immediate neighbors, but also all other EU members. For example, Austrian 
motor fuel taxes will have the biggest impact on taxes in Slovenia, and Spain will have 
one of the weakest influences (Figure 42). Matrix (W6) also captures the impact from all 
countries within the radius of about 1,000 km, an average distance between two European 
capitals. In order to capture the spherical surface of the earth, I use the haversine formula 
to calculate the distances between the EU countries.
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The in-land neighbor’s border length matrix (W4) assumes that the neighbor with 
the longest border has the most influence on motor fuel taxes in a home country. The 
elements of this matrix are constructed as shares of relative border length with a given 
neighbor in relation to the total border perimeter of the home country. Such an 
assumption seems plausible under the fuel tourism hypothesis: if presented with 
incentives, consumers that live near national borders may easily cross them to purchase 
fuel abroad. Then, matrix (W4) ensures that neighbors with the longest common border 
present more opportunities for crossing the borders and have the biggest influence on a 
home country. For example, according to matrix (W4), Slovakia will have the largest 
influence on Hungary because it has a longer common border with Hungary than other 
Hungarian neighbors (Figure 44). Countries with longer in-land borders and closer 
effective distances are also more likely to engage in tax matching. These countries will be 
potentially more willing to match both a fuel tax increase and a fuel tax decrease. 
European countries with smaller territories and shorter neighboring borders, for example, 
Luxembourg, may be less likely to match the fuel tax increase because they strategically 
wish to attract additional fuel consumers from neighboring countries.
Finally, the population weight matrices (W3, VF5) ensure that more populated 
neighbors have a higher weight in determining the average level of motor fuel taxes in 
neighboring countries. For example, the construction of a population-contiguity matrix 
(VF3) suggests that Germany will have the biggest influence on motor fuel taxes in the 
Czech Republic out of its four neighbors (Figure 43). However, in this case, Romania and 
not Slovakia has the biggest impact on Hungary (Figures 43 and 44). In order to take into 
consideration the impact of both population size and border length, I construct the
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population-border contiguity matrix (W5). Before row-standardizing, each element of 
this matrix is constructed as border length with a given neighbor, weighted by its 
population size, and equals zero otherwise (Figure 45). In this setting, in the example 
with Hungary, Romania remains the neighbor with the strongest influence on Hungarian 
motor fuel taxes (Figure 44).
To formally test for spatial autocorrelation in the entire EU sample, I use two 
common tests: the Moran’s I  test (Moran, 1950) and the Geary’s C test (Geary, 1954) 
(Table 14). Although both tests produce an index of global spatial autocorrelation, the 
Moran’s I statistic is not bounded by the [—1,1] interval. Typically, a zero value of the 
Moran’s /  index indicates no spatial similarity and a value of one indicates either positive 
or negative association, depending on the corresponding sign. By contrast, Geary’s C 
index takes on values between zero and two and smaller values suggest stronger spatial 
correlation. Zero values of the Gary’s C test imply perfect positive spatial correlation, 
value of one implies no spatial correlation, and value of two implies perfect negative 
spatial autocorrelation.
Both tests deserve a few important words of caution when analyzing motor fuel 
tax patterns in the EU. Firstly, both tests rely on the assumption that fuel taxes are 
normality distributed; otherwise they produce poor estimations of true variances v a r( /)  
and var(C) that are later used in construction of tests’ global indices. Anselin and Florax
(1995) compare finite sample properties of the Moran’s I  test and seven other large 
sample asymptotic tests and confirm good properties of the Moran’s /  against other tests. 
Secondly, the Moran’s I  test is sensitive to the choice of spatial weights and trend to 
over-reject the hull hypothesis of no spatial dependence for some matrix specifications,
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for example, for the rook case (Anselin & Rey, 1991; Anselin & Florax, 1995). This is 
why I use both the binary type weights matrices and the inverse distance type matrices. 
Lastly, the Moran’s test may also produce spurious results in the presence of other trends 
in the data such as time trends (e.g. Bivand, et al., 2008, p.260-261 for discussion); 
hence, I perform both tests by year.
Test results suggest that motor fuel excise tax rates across the European continent 
are spatially correlated (Table 14). The null hypothesis of spatial independency is 
rejected in almost all cases for the excise tax rates and for the overall real tax level levied 
on motor fuels, but not for the VAT taxes. In both Moran’s I  and Geary’s C tests, the 
inverse distance weights produce stronger test results for both unleaded gasoline and 
diesel. Test results for unleaded gasoline also tend to be slightly more significant than for 
diesel.
3.3.3.3. The Empirical Model of Motor Fuel Tax Competition in the EU. This 
paper models spatial nature of motor fuel fiscal competition in the EU in the spirit of 
Rork (2003).
Equation 36 shows a reduced form model of the motor fuel tax competition in the 
space-time lagged autoregressive model specification.
Tit = pWTit + Xtp  +  jr* +  +  u lt (36)
where Tlt represents home tax at time t in country /; W  is the spatial weights matrix; p is 
the scalar of spatial dependence of motor fuel taxes in the EU, hence, pW Tit is the spatial 
lag variable; Xt denotes socio-economic factors that influence home taxes for motor 
fuels; n i are country fixed effects; p t are time fixed effects; u it is the error term.
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Coefficient p in Equation 36 implies that tax policies in the neighboring countries have a 
contemporaneous effect on tax levied on motor fuels in the home country.
In the theoretical framework, I modeled only the overall level of taxes on motor 
fuels and expressed it in an ad valorem form. However, in my empirical analysis I ’ll 
examine both types of taxes separately, in order to comment on the role of each tax in the 
total tax burden. The general form of the above model specification (Equation 36) allows 
this by selecting a different explanatory variable each time I run the model. Thus, I will 
run the model three times and separately analyze the hypothesis of fiscal competition in 
excise tax, VAT taxes, and total taxes paid per unit of motor fuels in the EU.
This model may produce inconsistent estimates if estimated by OLS because of 
the potential endogeneity problem (e.g. Ord, 1975; Anselin, 1988, p.58-59). Endogeneity 
may arise if the spatial lag WTit (or any explanatory variable) is correlated with the error 
term u i t . Moreover, in the case of spatial motor fuel tax dependency, for example, 
lagging variables on the right hand side (e.g. Rork, 2009) may not solve the problem, 
because if there is a serial correlation among the error terms u it , then WTit_1 will be 
still correlated with u i t . In my spatial lag model with a simultaneous senders-receivers 
type set-up, ‘senders’ can also serve as ‘receivers’, meaning interdependence of taxes on 
motor fuels in the EU. Such simultaneity serves as a source of the endogeneity issue in 
Equation 36 (Franzese & Hays, 2007; Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001). That is, in my 
model, not only neighboring countries influence home country’s tax motor fuel rates in 
the EU, but also home country’s taxes influence taxes in the neighboring states.
Equation 36 can be estimated using either the maximum likelihood method (ML) 
or the instrumental variables (IV) approach to address potential endogeneity. Compared
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to the ML estimation that assumes a normal distribution of the error terms, the IV 
approach has a lesser restrictive parametric framework and still produces consistent 
results (Anselin, 1988, ch.7, p.81-86). The efficiency of the IV estimator strongly 
depends on the proper choice of the instruments; hence, I use the popular spatial IV 
procedure developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 2004, 2007, 2010). Following 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), in the first stage, this two-stage estimation procedure uses 
weighted values of the exogenous variables ( WX) as instruments for the spatial lag (WT). 
In the second stage, the predicted values of the spatial lag are included as explanatory 
variables in Equation 36.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning one important factor: neither my theoretical nor 
empirical model addressed the potential substitutability between the two types of taxes -  
VAT and excise tax. This is because from the revenue generation perspective, 
governments may perceive two taxes as substitutes for one another. There exists a large 
economic literature on optimal taxation (see Selim, 2007 for a comprehensive literature 
review) and the double dividend of environmental taxes (e.g. Parry, 2003; Glouder, 2005) 
that examines the interacting effect between taxes in every detail. Although a thorough 
examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, one can examine such 
tax substitutability and interdependence by using, for example, a computational general 
equilibrium model. In the case of European motor fuels, national governments are likely 
to take into consideration VAT in deciding on changes to motor fuel excise taxes. Motor 
fuel excise taxes, however, are not likely to significantly influence the government’s 
decision about newer VAT rates because the uniform VAT is levied on most goods and
172
services. In addition, the data suggest that in the 2000s, the EU countries were slowly 
switching away from excise taxes towards higher VATs (see Chapter 1 for discussion).
3.3.4. Determinants of Motor Fuel Tax Rates in the EU
While the previous sections of this essay discussed geography as the factor of 
motor fuel tax setting behavior in the EU, this section discusses both political and socio­
economic factors. Both types of these factors are important to control for in explaining 
motor fuel tax changes in the EU. Table 13 provides a description of these explanatory 
variables.
According to the ‘political economy’ view of the fiscal federalism literature 
described earlier, the political atmosphere remains a crucial factor of tax setting behavior. 
I include two variables to control for national political climates, the parliamentary 
election year dummy and the dummy indicating whether the head of the government is 
from the same political party as the major party in a country’s parliament. Fiscal stress is 
another major factor of tax setting behavior (e.g. Aim, et al., 1993; Man, 1999). At a time 
of financial trouble, states in the U.S., for example, tend to turn to gasoline and sales 
taxes for additional revenues (Rork, 2003). In the EU, Greece is one country that recently 
dramatically increased its motor fuel excise and VAT taxes as a response to a widespread 
national economic crisis. Thus, the EU countries that experience greater fiscal pressure 
may be more likely to match their neighbor’s fuel tax increase and less likely to match a 
neighbor’s fuel tax decrease. Using the data from the Eurostat on-line statistical database, 
fiscal stress is measured as a national government debt (or surplus) as a percent of GDP.
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Given the common nature of environmental responsibility in the EU, some EU 
members may face pressure from the European Commission and from other members 
directed towards meeting a country’s individual emission reduction goals. By contrast, in 
the U.S., states do not face similar peer pressures because managing the emissions from 
gasoline consumption is delegated to the Federal government. Then, the EU members 
that face lower Kyoto targets or milder peer pressure to comply with their emission 
reduction goals may have lower fuel tax rates, for example, some newer member 
countries. They may be more willing to match both a fuel tax increase as well as a fuel 
tax decrease. The EU countries that are not successful at reaching their individual targets, 
however, may be willing to respond in a more similar way to a fuel tax rate increase of 
their neighbors, but not to a fuel tax decrease. I measure the environmental pressure as 
the level of greenhouse gas emissions relative to its level in 1990, because Kyoto 
emission targets for each country are also constructed relative to emissions in 1990. The 
EU emissions data comes from the European Environment Agency.
Among socio-economic factors, I include per capita income to measure the 
overall wellbeing of a country’s citizens. This variable is included because the mobility 
of the fuel tax base depends, among other factors, on the value of time that individuals 
place on traveling across borders to purchase gasoline. Thus, it is expected that in Europe 
income is positively correlated with tax levels because tax base mobility reduces with an 
increase in income.
I also include the country’s unemployment rates because the unemployed tend to 
drive shorter distances, make fewer trips, or even to sell their vehicles all together. On the 
one hand, the unemployed may support higher taxes on motor fuel because they would
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advocate for higher unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the EU governments with 
a large unemployed population may also raise taxes to partially compensate for large 
budgetary needs to support the unemployed. Rork (2003), for example, finds a positive 
correlation between state sales taxes and unemployment rates in the U.S. Thus, the EU 
members with a large unemployed population may be more willing to match a motor fuel 
VAT tax increase and less likely to match a tax decrease.
Differences in national inflation rates among the EU members matter for setting 
motor fuel excise taxes because these taxes are imposed in the form of a lump-sum. 
Higher inflation rates may require frequent excise tax rate changes to make up for lost 
revenues (England, 2007). The data on per capita income, a share of elderly population, 
unemployment and inflation rates come from the Eurostat on-line statistical database.
Lastly, country fixed effects are also included to capture all time-invariant 
national characteristics that may impact motor fuel taxes in the EU. Natural geographical 
barriers such as mountain ranges, for example, may prevent some fuel tourism between 
two neighboring EU countries and reduce incentives for motor fuel tax competition. Such 
natural geographical characteristics are invariant in time and are captured by country 
fixed effects. In addition, the Eurozone membership and whether a country is an older or 
a newer member state are important factors that are also captured by country fixed 
effects. This is because motor fuel prices in the Eurozone countries are denoted in 
common currency and consumers can easily compare gasoline taxes and prices. The 
Eurozone members, hence, may be more willing to match both a tax increase and a tax 
decrease. Year fixed effects control for factors that influence all the EU members in 
every particular year, such as business cycles and the price of oil. Due to relatively short
175
time series in the panel, I do not automatically include year fixed effects in all model 
specifications, and use the Wald test to determine when to include them.
The data for the dependent variable, motor fuel taxes, comes from the EU Oil 
Bulletin published by the European Commission on its web-site. The weekly tax data is 
for two types of motor vehicle fuels, the unleaded gasoline (Euro-super-95) and the 
automotive gas oil (diesel), and has been aggregated to yearly averages. The balanced 
panel is for twenty seven EU countries for the period from 2004 to 2010.
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3.4. THE RESULTS
Tables 15-20 report spatial IV estimation results for Equation 36. This equation is 
estimated six times, each time with a different spatial weights matrix. The analysis is 
repeated for the following dependent variables: excise taxes, VAT, and the total level of 
taxes both on unleaded gasoline and diesel fuel. The first column of each table displays 
results using the contiguity matrix (W 1 ), the next column reports the results for the 
inverse distance matrix (W2), the third and the fourth column -  for the population 
weights matrix (W3), the fourth column -  for the common border matrix (IV4), the fifth 
column -  for the border-population matrix (W5), and the sixth -  for the inverse distance 
weights matrix with an area limit (W 6 ).
3.4.1. The Results for Excise Taxes on Unleaded Gasoline and Diesel Fuel in the EU
The results for excise taxes on unleaded gasoline and diesel fuel are presented in 
Tables 15 and 16 respectively. All signs for the estimated coefficients are as expected. 
The results illustrate that the spatial lag coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
in every case of spatial weights, meaning a positive relationship between the neighbors’ 
excise taxes on motor fuels in the EU. For unleaded gasoline, a 10% increase in a 
weighted neighbors’ excise tax leads up to a 5.99% increase in home excise tax rate. For 
diesel fuel, a 10% increase in a neighbors’ excise tax rate results in an up to 4.18% 
increase in home tax rate. It is worth noting that the coefficients for a spatial lag variable 
for W2 and IV6  in Tables 15 and 16 should be interpreted with caution. The magnitude
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of these coefficients is different from the rest of spatial weighting schemes, because the 
inverse distance matrices are not row-standardized. These coefficients, hence, suggest 
only the direction of the spatial relationship, but not the elasticity of this relationship to 
the dependent excise tax variable.
The coefficients for national debt in Tables 15 and 16 are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that, as national debt increases, governments decrease 
their excise taxes for motor fuels in lieu of other taxes, including VAT. Environmental 
pressure, however, seems to play a less important role in excise tax setting behavior in 
the EU than originally anticipated, as the coefficient for this variable is positive but 
statistically insignificant in most cases. The positive relationship suggest that in the EU 
countries, an increase in the national level of greenhouse gas emissions relative to a 
country’s 1990 level results in an increase of the excise taxes for unleaded Euro-super-95 
gasoline. For diesel fuel, the sign of the environmental variable is also insignificant.
There is also some evidence that unemployment rates are positively correlated 
with excise taxes on motor fuels. The unemployed may drive fewer distances, buy less 
fuel and may even eventually sell their cars during long periods of unemployment. Thus, 
as a country’s unemployment rate increases, national governments in the EU face lower 
motor fuel tax revenues and, at the same time, have to provide unemployment benefits to 
a larger share of population. Hence, it makes sense for national governments in the EU to 
seek quick and easy ways to collect additional tax revenues by increasing indirect taxes 
on goods with low price elasticity, such as excise taxes on motor fuels. In addition, 
inflation rates seem to be positively correlated with excise taxes on unleaded gasoline,
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but not for diesel. This is consistent with the notion that as inflation rates increase 
national governments have to impose new, higher excise tax rates for this lump-sum tax.
3.4.2. The Results for VAT Taxes in the EU
The results for VAT also show a positive relationship between a home country’s 
VAT and changes in neighbors’ VAT rates among the EU members (Tables 17 and 18). 
Under all weighting schemes, the measure of fiscal competition in VAT is positive, 
relatively small, but statistically significant. My results suggest that when neighbors’ 
weighted VAT rate increases, for example, 1.10 times, or from 20% to 22%, a home 
country reacts by increasing its rate up to 1.0187 times, or from 20% to up to 20.374%.
The direction of this reaction by the EU home governments is different from the 
direction of reaction among the U.S. states to their sales tax changes. Rork (2003), for 
example, finds that a 10% sales tax decrease by neighboring states in the U.S. leads up to 
a 2.37% increase in home state sales taxes. Unlike Rork’s (2003) findings that suggest 
that state governments in the U.S. perceive their state tax bases as relatively immobile, 
my results suggest that national governments in the EU recognize some mobility of their 
VAT bases. Alternatively, my findings suggest that the EU countries engage in the 
yardstick competition among themselves more often than the U.S. states. At the same 
time, the magnitude of fiscal interdependence in VAT in the EU is small relative to, for 
example, excise taxes on motor fuels.
The results also strongly suggest that in the EU, both unemployment rates and a
country’s debt are positively correlated with VAT rates. As expected, higher
unemployment prompts the EU national governments to rely more heavily on indirect
sales taxes, such as VAT, to provide sufficient benefits to the unemployed. In contrast to
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excise taxes, a country’s national debt is also positively correlated with VAT rates, 
meaning that at times of financial hardship governments rely on VAT to raise additional 
revenues.
Finally, there is some weak evidence of inflation being negatively related to VAT 
rates, which may be due to national governments’ efforts to reduce the magnifying 
impact of this percent tax on prices. VAT is an ad valorem (percent) tax; in the presence 
of inflation, VAT magnifies nominal price growth initially caused by inflation. In 
addition, the OLS results suggest that, unlike the U.S., the EU per capita income has a 
positive relationship with VAT rates. It appears that tax bases in wealthier EU countries 
are less mobile than tax bases in the EU countries with relatively low per capita income. 
Since high income consumers have higher value of time, they seem to engage less in fuel 
tourism, reducing the mobility of tax base in their EU home country.
3.4.3. The Results for Total Real Taxes Levied on Motor Fuels in the EU and the 
Influence of VAT and Excise Taxes on These Levels
In spite of relatively strong Moran’s /  and Geary’s C test results in favor of 
spatial correlation in real overall motor fuel tax levels among the EU neighbors, 
regression results find weaker support of such interdependence (Tables 14, 19, and 20). 
For unleaded Euro-super-95 gasoline, results for two model specifications with inverse 
distance spatial weight matrices show that the fiscal competition variable is positive and 
statistically significant. In the remaining four model specifications with spatial weights 
based on contiguity, this variable, although statistically insignificant, also has a consistent 
positive sign. These findings suggest that as neighboring countries increase their overall
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tax level on unleaded gasoline by an average of 1 0 %, a home country increases its real 
overall tax level by 2.2% (Table 19). As in the case with VAT and excise taxes, model 
specifications based on inverse distance spatial weights matrices W2 and W6 can only 
suggest the direction of the relationship and not the magnitude because these matrices are 
not row-standardized.
For diesel fuel, the results of spatial dependence in real overall tax levels are 
somewhat weaker than for unleaded gasoline, which is also consistent with the Geary’s C 
spatial correlation test results. The sign for the fiscal competition variable is positive in 
most cases, except for model specifications based on borders-related weight matrices. 
The magnitude of response is statistically insignificant and small compared to fiscal 
competition in unleaded gasoline; an average 1 0 % change in real overall tax levels on 
diesel by neighboring EU member-countries results in less than a 1% change by the 
home country (Table 20).
Overall, my findings suggest that inflation strongly influences real total tax levels 
levied on motor fuels in EU: as inflation rises, real tax levels drop. At times of financial 
hardship in the EU, national governments may be especially concerned with the 
magnifying impact of ad valorem VAT taxes on already inflated prices on domestic 
commodities, including motor fuels. In addition, Tables 19 and 20 show that national 
debt is statistically significant and negatively correlated with overall tax levels for 
unleaded gasoline; the sign for the debt variable is also negative for diesel fuel. At time 
of financial hardship and increasing debt, therefore, national motor fuel excise tax 
policies overshadow the effect of increasing VAT policies on real overall motor fuel tax 
levels. Thus, compared to findings for nominal excise and VAT taxes, it appears that
181
decreasing excise taxes have a stronger influence on the real overall level of taxes levied 
on motor fuels in the EU, forcing them to drop as well.
Given that the EU nations fiscally compete with their neighbors in both excise 
and VAT taxes, as the economic crisis progresses and national debts across Europe rise, 
the EU countries are more likely to engage in growing fiscal competition. As a result, 
they would more actively switch from excise taxes to VAT. Such substitutability between 
taxes may eventually result in the situation when excise taxes will bottom out and real 
overall taxes on motor fuels will start rising. This outcome would also have negative 
consequences for the environment because of the decreasing Pigouvian role of the excise 
tax. Subsequently, as national debts rise and fiscal competition flourishes, national 
exhaust pollution levels would also rise along with VAT rates. Moreover, the tax burden 




The EU traditionally has higher taxes on motor fuels than the U.S., in part due to 
a more predominant Pigouvian role of taxes and common environmental goals among the 
Union members and commitment pressures to lower greenhouse gas emissions. Because 
of this complex nature of political interactions among these twenty-seven united member 
countries, the goal of this paper was to explore whether the EU national governments 
engage in fiscal competition. This paper was set to empirically examine taxes on motor 
fuels in the EU and the impact of neighbors’ tax changes on a member’s tax policy.
My key finding is that in the EU, national governments positively react to tax 
changes by their neighbors in setting both VAT and motor fuel excise taxes. Moreover, 
my results indicate that for motor fuel excise taxes, the magnitude and the direction of the 
discovered relationship in the EU is similar to the one among the U.S. states found by 
previous studies (Rork, 2003). In setting their VAT taxes, however, the EU national 
governments seem to behave differently than the U.S. states in terms of sales taxes. The 
EU countries respond positively to VAT changes of their neighbors.
One of the key takeaway messages is that unlike excise taxes that are levied only 
on specific goods like motor fuels, VAT taxes are levied on almost all goods in the EU. 
Fiscal competition in VAT taxes, therefore, has a much broader impact on the 
functioning of the Common European Market. Race-to-the-bottom in VAT taxes would, 
for example, have a strong economic impact by increasing per capita consumption. At the
183
same time, race-to-the-top would result in slowing down of economic activity because 
higher sales taxes discourage consumption.
These results are consistent with the political economy view of the fiscal 
federalism, suggesting that this tax competition among the EU members could be driven 
by a variety of incentives: from politicians’ own objectives, for example, re-elections, to 
passive mimicking of neighbors’ taxation policies by the national governments. In 
addition, national governments may be purely driven by comparing the size of their 
national budgets or national-level externalities associated with gasoline consumption, to 
those of their neighbors. My findings also support the traditional fiscal federalism view 
that member governments in the EU may recognize a relative mobility of their tax base 
and compete for it with their neighbors.
Under certain assumptions, including free, competitive markets, fiscal 
competition may eventually lead to the establishment of a single tax level across the EU, 
at least in theory. In the long run, the outcome of tax matching behaviors of individual 
governments would cause harmonization of tax rates across the entire EU, that is, either 
to race-to-the-bottom or race-to-the-top. Race-to-the-bottom in motor fuel excise taxes 
would result is a substantial increase in greenhouse gas emissions from transport in 
Europe. The extent of this race in the EU depends on mobility of tax base and on the 
stringency of the political will of national governments.
On the contrary, race-to-the-top in motor fuel excise taxes would likely result in a 
substantial reduction of emissions, but at the expense of efficiency loss. Given that 
individual EU member countries differ in their characteristics, tax harmonization could 
lead to reduction of efficiency in addressing national-level externalities associated with
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motor fuel consumption. Fullerton (2001), for example, suggests that a geographically 
differentiated fuel tax may be more efficient that a uniform tax, yet not politically 
feasible to administer. Nevertheless, the race-to-the-top outcome is only possible when 
there is either sufficient peer pressure among the EU members or strong bottom-down 
political pressure from the higher levers of the EU government. In 2008-2012, for 
example, this role was played by the Kyoto targets. Without specific safeguarding 
constraints such as tax floors, race-to-the-bottom becomes inevitable, unless certain 
member countries take strong positions of environmental leaders in the EU and lead the 
race-to-the-top. In either case of tax harmonization, race-to-the-top or race-to-the-bottom, 
continuing fiscal competition in motor fuel excise taxes is likely to result in harmonized 
tax rates across the EU and fewer fuel tourists.
To conclude, it is likely that during the current financial crisis, as national debts 
rise, VAT tax rates are also likely to race-to-the-top across the EU, slowing down the 
economic recovery of the Union. This is because higher taxes discourage consumption. 
One way to address this issue could be a temporary reduction of VAT tax floors in the 
EU, which may prompt member countries to fiscally compete downwards, and, at the 
same time, a temporary increase in motor fuel excise taxes. This policy scenario is 
consistent both with the EU long-term environmental objectives, economic recovery 
goals, and the fiscally competitive nature of the members’ tax setting behavior.
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Figure 36 (a, b). Excise Taxes on Unleaded Euro-super-95 Gasoline in the EU
in 2004 (a) and 2010 (b)
(a)
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Figure 38 (a, b). VAT Levied on Motor Fuels in the EU in 2004 (a) and 2010 (b)
(a)
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Figure 39 (a, b). Average Real Total Taxes Levied on Unleaded Euro-super-95
Gasoline in 2004 (a) and 2010 (b) in the EU
(a)
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Figure 40 (a, b). Average Real Total Taxes Levied on Diesel Fuel in 2004 (a)
and 2010 (b) in the EU
(a)
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Figure 41. Spatial Weights Matrices W1
Contiguity weights matrix of the EU 
(row-standardized)
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Figure 42. Spatial Weights Matrices W2
Inverse distance weights matrix of the EU
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Figure 43. Spatial Weights Matrices W3
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Figure 44. Spatial Weights Matrices W4 
Borders-contiguity weights matrix of the EU
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Figure 45. Spatial Weights Matrices W5
Population - borders weights matrix of the EU
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Figure 46. Spatial Weights Matrices W6
Inverse distance w eights matrix of the EU 
(with mean distance limit among neighbors)
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Table 13. Description of Variables
Variable Description Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
( 1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6)
next Motor fuel excise tax on unleaded 
gasoline Euro-super-95, in euro 
currency per 1 0 0 0  liters (nominal)
471.12 1 2 1 .8 6 260.98 719.90
nexd Motor fuel excise tax on diesel, in 
euro currency per 1 0 0 0  liters 
(nominal)
353.59 90.34 221.98 714.71
vf Value added tax levied on 1 unit of 
unleaded Euro-super-95 gasoline, % 19.54 2.58 1 2 .0 0 25.00
vd Value added tax levied on 1 unit of 
diesel, % 19.56 2.54 15.00 25.00
avlf Total annual average level of taxes 
paid per 1 0 0 0  liters of unleaded 
gasoline, in euro (real)
616.12 155.53 335.11 895.34
avid Total annual average level of taxes 
paid per 1 0 0 0  liters of diesel fuel, in 
euro (real)
488.81 110.07 300.80 898.85
elec Parliamentary elections dummy: 
l=election year, 0 =otherwise 0.26 0.44 0 .0 0 1 .0 0
ycpi Annual average consumer price 
index (CPI) 107.13 8.92 92.08 139.93
sameprty Same party dummy: l=president(or 
prime minister) is from the same 
party as the major party in 
parliament; 0 =otherwise
0.57 0.50 0 .0 0 1 .0 0
debt Fiscal stress measured as a country’s 
debt/surplus as a percent of GDP -2.81 4.30 -31.20 5.30
env Environmental pressure, calculated a 
country’s greenhouse gas emissions 
relative to emissions in 1990
96.09 32.45 40.31 192.11
inc State per capita income is defined as 
the value of all goods and services 
produced minus the value of any 
goods or services used in their 
creation. The volume index of GDP 
per capita in Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS) is expressed in 
relation to the EU average (EU-27 = 
1 0 0 )
97.94 44.08 34.00 279.00
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Table 13. (continued)
Variable Description Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
(1) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
unemp A country’s unemployment rate as a 
percent of total labor force 7.95 3.35 3.10 2 0 .1 0
infl Inflation rates are denoted by annual 
average rate of change of 
Harmonized Indices of Consumer 
Prices (HICPs, designed for easy 
international comparisons of 
consumer price inflation), %
3.03 2.45 -1.70 15.30
pcnt65 Percent of population 65 years or 
older as a share of a country’s total 
population
15.78 2.14 1 0 .8 6 2 0 .6 6
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Table 14. Global Spatial Correlation Test: Moran’s /  and Geary’s C
Variable













avlf04 0.225** 0.129*** 0.735** 0.786***
avlf05 0 .2 2 0 ** 0.140*** 0.722** 0.774***
avlf06 0.234** 0.153*** 0.771** 0.768***
avlf07 0.191** 0.151*** 0.745** 0.767***
avlf08 0.234** 0.157*** 0.692*** 0.786***
avlf09 0.306*** 0.167*** 0.616*** 0  7 7 9 ***
avlflO 0.214** 0.137*** 0.658*** 0.781***
Nominal excise tax
next04 0.278*** 0.158*** 0.715** 0.768***
nextOS 0.268*** q 1 5 9 *** 0.713** 0.766***
next06 0.278*** 0.164*** 0.704** 0.761***
next07 0.231** 0.151*** 0.730** 0.744***
nextOS 0.257*** 0.159*** 0.675*** 0  7 7 9 ***
next09 0.312*** 0.151*** 0.607*** 0.780***
next 1 0 0.193** 0 .1 2 0 *** 0.665*** 0.785***
VAT tax
vf04 -0.024 -0.049 0.994 1 .0 2 1
vf05 -0.036 -0.047 0.950 0.938
vf06 -0.057 -0.054 0.932 0.896
vf07 -0.030 -0.045 0.877 0.864
vf08 -0.014 -0.042 0.865 0.863*
vf09 0.051 -0.032 0.856 0.857*
vflO 0.095 -0 .0 2 1 0.806* 0.909
Diesel Fuel
Total tax
avld04 0.148** 0.038** 0.954 0.774*
avld05 0.146* 0.045** 0.923 0.761*
avlf06 0.134* 0.055** 0.927 0.752**
avld07 0.106 0.060** 0.947 0.766**
avld08 0.114* 0.070** 0.879 0.820**
avld09 0.260*** 0.081*** 0.733** 0.831**
avid 1 0 0.326*** 0.096*** 0.606*** 0.746***
33 Binary weights for the weights matrix in both tests are constructed slightly differently. The neighbors are 














..... ........... (1 1 ................ (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
Excise tax
nexd04 0.165** 0.040** 0.975 0.771
nexd05 0.167** 0.043** 0.958 0.757*
nexd06 0.152** 0.044** 0.970 0.753*
nexd07 0 .1 1 2 * 0.036** 1 .0 0 2 0.755*
nexd08 0.066 0 .0 2 2 * 1.003 0.827*
nexd09 0.155** 0 .0 1 1 0.903 0.862
nexdlO 0.241 *** 0.041** 0.772* 0.749**
VAT tax
vd04 -0.018 -0.042 0.949 0.953
vd05 -0.036 -0.047 0.950 0.938
vd06 -0.057 -0.054 0.932 0.896
vd07 -0.030 -0.045 0.877 0.864
vd08 -0.014 -0.042 0.865 0.863*
vd09 0.051 -0.032 0.856 0.857*
vdlO 0.095 -0 .0 2 1 0.806* 0.909
34 Binary weights for the weights matrix in both tests are constructed slightly differently. The neighbors are 
defined based on the distance limit from the center of the country. Cyprus, hence, has no neighbors. The 
matrix is row-standardized.
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Table 15. Regression Results for Unleaded Euro-super-95 Gasoline, Excise Taxes
Dependent variable -  ext
Matrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity Inverse Distance Population-contiguity
Estimation IV, IV with IV,ID FE ID FE ID FE
( 1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag q  5 9 9 *** 24.109*** 0.575***
(0.152) (4.445) (0.158)
elec -5.117 -3.685 -7.117
(6.840) (5.909) (9.455)
sameparty -14.087 -1.470 -0.816
(10.041) (8.370) (12.360)
debt -2.346** -1.013 -3.723***
(1.139) (1.030) (1.393)
inc 0.493 0.710 1.809
(1.176) (0.961) (1.348)
env 0.846 0.959 0.563
(0.877) (0.744) ( 1 .1 1 0 )
unemp 3.114 4.092** 1.860
(1.865) (1.565) (2.423)
infl 0.719* 0.171 -0.633
(1.991) (1.733) (2.627)
constant 0.849 -158.466 -183.798
(171.277) (155.688) (224.953)
R2 0.928 0.946 0.934
Adjusted 0.908 0.931 0.902
F-test 46.66 62.37 29.17
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
SarganN*Rsq p-value 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 1 1
Basmann p-value 0.004 0.023 0.061
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Table 15. (continued)
Dependent Variable -  ext






Estimation IV with IV, IV withID FE ID FE ID FE















debt -2.510** -2.911** -1.873*
(1.090) (1.119) (1.009)
inc 0.864 1.131 0.554
(1.105) (1.128) (0.982)








infl 0.809 0.488 1.151
(1.907) (1.964) (1.747)
constant 4.254 -49.866 -375.756*
(164.753) (175.740) (2 0 0 .1 1 0 )
R 2 0.934 0.931 0.944
Adjusted R 0.915 0.911 0.929
F-test 50.76 48.26 60.70
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sagan N*Rsq p- 
value 0.000 0.000 0.083
Basmann p-value 0 .0 0 2 0.000 0.182
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Table 16. Regression Results for Diesel Fuel, Excise Taxes
Dependent Variable -  exd
M atrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity Inverse Distance Population-contiguity
Estimation IV, IV with IV,
ID FE ID FE ID FE
( 1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag 0.418*** 23.020*** 0.362***
(0.139) (4.667) (0.133)
elec -4.504 -3.654 -3.149
(5.472) (4.959) (7.159)
sameparty -12.151 -3.583 -8.353
(8.141) (7.019) (9.405)
debt -2 .0 2 2 ** -0.718 -2.837***
(0.909) (0.871) (1.057)
inc 0 .8 8 8 0.601 1.654
(0.913) (0.800) (0.999)
env 0.472 0.772 0.127
(0.718) (0.630) (0.834)
unemp 1.879 2.443* 1.463
(1.475) (1.307) (1.823)
infl -0.638 -0.988 -0.172
(1.601) (1.458) (2.006)
constant 32.289 -103.230 -27.728
(138.182) (131.106) (168.727)
R2 0.916 0.930 0.930
Adjusted R2 0.892 0.910 0.895
F-test 38.99 47.46 26.84
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
SarganN*Rsq p-value 0.005 0.300 0.037
Basmann p-value 0.018 0.471 0.156
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Table 16. (continued)
Dependent Variable -  exd
Matrix W4 W5 W 6
Weights Borders- Population- Limited Inversecontiguity borders Distance
Estimation IV with IV, IV with
ID FE ID FE ID FE
(4) (5) (6 )
Spatial lag 0.387*** 0.337** 31.730***
(0.131) (0.130) (6.949)
elec -3.995 -4.881 -3.828
(5.417) (5.453) (5.070)
sameparty -11.620 -10.975 -8.150
(8.042) (8.067) (7.223)
debt -1.992** -2.277** -1.358
(0.902) (0.904) (0.859)
inc 1.025 1.199 0.664
(0.889) (0.884) (0.820)
env 0.286 0.313 0.621
(0.685) (0.710) (0.637)
unemp 1.717 1.961 2.982**
(1.480) (1.469) (1.332)
infl -0.703 -0.667 -0.265
(1.592) (1.593) (1.478)
constant 43.663 24.250 -121.451
(136.363) (139.793) (136.794)
R2 0.917 0.917 0.927
Adjusted R2 0.893 0.894 0.906
F-test 50.76 39.61 45.36
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sagan N*Rsq p- 
value 0 .0 1 2 0.006 0.245
Basmann p-value 0.037 0.019 0.408
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Table 17. Regression Results for VAT Tax on Unleaded Euro-super-95 Gasoline
Dependent Variable - vf
Matrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity Inverse Distance Population-contiguity
Estimation IV, IV with IV,ID FE ID FE ID FE
(1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag 0.187*** 14.081*** 0.146**
(0.064) (3.200) (0.064)
elec 0.017 0.027 -0.007
(0.134) (0.118) (0.193)
sameparty -0.293 -0.023 -0 .1 2 1
(0 .2 1 0 ) (0.168) (0.257)
debt 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.030
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0.027)
inc 0 .0 1 0 -0.005 0.019
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0.027)
unemp 0 .1 1 1 *** 0.099*** 0.088*
(0.035) (0.031) (0.048)
infl -0.060 -0.072** -0.074
(0.039) (0.035) (0.054)
constant 15.049*** 10.685*** 14.820***
(2.571) (2.480) (3.349)
RJ 0.934 0.938 0.935
Adjusted R2 0.916 0.924 0.904
F-test 53.06 67.16 30.69
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sagan’s N*R-sq 
p-value 0.606 0.189 0.543
Basmann ’s p-value 0.734 0.319 0.757
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Table 17. (continued)
Dependent Variable - vf




Estimation IV with IV, IV withID FE ID FE ID FE







elec 0.009 0.007 0 .0 2 0
(0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
sameparty -0 .2 2 1
(0.195)




debt 0.050** 0.047** 0.063***
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 )
inc 0.017 0.016 -0.007
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 1 )
unemp 0 .1 1 2 ***
(0.033)




infl -0.061* -0.062* -0.042
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
constant 15.311*** 15.583*** 9 017***
(2.398) (2.420) (2.841)
R2 0.943 0.942 0.941
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.926 0.925
F-test 60.88 60.08 59.61
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sagan’s N*R-sq 
p-value 0.326 0.321 0.173
Basmann ’s p-value 0.478 0.472 0.299
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Table 18. Regression Results for VAT Tax on Diesel Fuel in the EU
Dependent Variable - vd
Matrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity Inverse Distance Population-contiguity
Estimation IV, IV with IV,ID FE ID FE ID FE
(1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag 0.187*** 14.081*** 0.146**
(0.064) (3.200) (0.064)
elec 0.017 0.027 -0.007
(0.134) (0.118) (0.193)
sameparty -0.293 -0.023 -0 .1 2 1
(0 .2 1 0 ) (0.168) (0.257)
debt 0.057*** 0.079*** 0.030
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0.027)
inc 0 .0 1 0 -0.005 0.019
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0.027)
unemp 0 .1 1 1 *** 0.099*** 0.088*
(0.035) (0.031) (0.048)
infl -0.060 -0.072** -0.074
(0.039) (0.035) (0.054)
constant 15.049*** 10.685*** 14.820***
(2.571) (2.480) (3.349)
R2 0.934 0.949 0.935
Adjusted R2 0.916 0.935 0.904
F-test 53.06 68.80 30.69
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Sagan’s N*R-sq. p-value 0.606 0.189 0.543
Basmann’s p-value 0.734 0.319 0.757
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Table 18. (continued)
Dependent Variable - vd
Matrix W4 W5 W6
Weights Borders-contiguity Population-borders Limited Inverse Distance
Estimation IV with IV, IV with
ID FE ID FE ID FE
(4) (5) (6 )
Spatial lag 0.129** 0.126** 21.494***
(0.054) (0.051) (5.141)
elec 0.009 0.007 0 .0 2 0
(0.125) (0.126) (0.127)
sameparty -0 .2 2 1 -0 .2 2 2 -0.204
(0.195) (0.194) (0.185)
debt 0.050** 0.047** 0.063***
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 )
inc 0.017 0.016 -0.007
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0 .0 2 1 )
unemp 0 .1 1 2 *** 0 .1 1 0 *** 0.113***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
irtfl -0.061* -0.062* -0.042
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
constant 15.311*** 15.583*** 9 017***
(2.398) (2.420) (2.841)
R 2 0.943 0.942 0.941
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.926 0.925
F-test 60.88 60.08 59.61
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Sagan’s N*R-sq 
p-value 0.326 0.321 0.173
Basmann’s p-value 0.478 0.472 0.299
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Table 19. Regression Results for Unleaded Euro-super-95 Gasoline,
Total Tax Level
Dependent Variable -  avlf
Matrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity Inverse Distance Population-contiguity
IV, IV, IV,Estimation ID YR FE* ID YR FE ID YR FE
(1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag 0.224 49.501* 0.223
(0.153) (28.981) (0.135)
elec -8.333 -8.531 - 1 0 .6 6 8
(6.456) (6.800) (8.228)
sameparty -2.331 -2.989 6.432
(9.805) (10.078) (11.142)
debt -2.938** -3.883** -3.690**
(1.348) (1.649) (1.603)
inc 0.706 0.476 1.236
(0.956) (1.032) (1.118)
env 0.728 0.512 0.585
(0.893) (0.909) (1.037)
unemp -0.107 -0.599 -1.291
(1.721) (1.827) (2.095)
infl -5.286** -4.620* -4.452*
(2.208) (2.389) (2.587)
constant 304.882* -10.500 223.028
(168.606) (232.526) (209.324)
R2 0.957 0.952 0.958
Adjusted R2 0.944 0.938 0.941
F-test (40, 140) 77.18 69.66 54.54
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
SarganN*Rsq p-value 38.584 14.409 26.383
Basmann p-value 46.303 11.590 21.597
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Table 19. (continued)
Dependent Variable -  avlf






Estimation IV, IV, IV,ID YR FE** ID YR FE** ID YR FE
(4) (5) (6 )
Spatial lag 0 .1 2 0 0.085 45.286**
(0.138) (0.125) (20.496)








debt -2.646** -2.589* -3.750**
(1.334) (1.371) (1.492)
inc 0.938 0.975 0.468
(0.916) (0.920) (1.009)
env 0.535 0.531 0.875
(0.861) (0.875) (0.935)
unemp -0.267





infl -5.403** -5.592** -4.113*
(2.168) (2.159) (2.420)
constant 356.940** 367.779** -308.322
(165.818) (171.102) (368.507)
R 2 0.958 0.958 0.952y
Adjusted R 0.946 0.946 0.938
F-test (38, 90) 80.54 79.77 69.32
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Sagan N*Rsq p- 
value 41.126 38.699 12.632
Basmann p-value 39.399 36.442 10.054
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Table 20. Regression Results for Diesel Fuel, Total Tax Level
Dependent Variable -  avid
Matrix W1 W2 W3
Weights Contiguity InverseDistance Population-contiguity





(1) (2 ) (3)
Spatial lag 0.024 15.890 0 .0 1 0
(0.143) (21.180) (0.128)








debt -1.259 -1.593 -1.510
(1.176) ( 1 .2 2 0 ) (1.391)
inc 0.819 0.701 0.815
(0.806) (0.827) (0.950)
env 0.098 0.126 0.026
(0.788) (0.759) (0.901)
unemp -1.114 -1.046 -1.501
(1.469) (1.509) (1.781)
infl -6.322*** -6.125*** -4.396**
( 1 .8 6 6 ) (1.937) (2.205)
constant 377.815** 134.103 383.767**
(146.211) (365.208) (177.076)
R2 0.937 0.934 0.941
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.915 0.916
F-test 52.25 49.43 37.52
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
SarganN*Rsq p-value 37.948 7.644 31.247
Basmann p-value 35.547 5.908 26.851
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Table 20. (continued)
Dependent Variable -  avid
Matrix W4 W5 W6
Weights Borders- Population- Limited Inversecontiguity borders Distance
Estimation IV, IV, IV,ID YR FE*** ID YR FE*** ID YR FE*
(4) (5) (6 )
Spatial lag -0.040 -0.042 16.099
(0.133) (0.118) (15.711)
elec -7.210 -7.078 -7.572
(5.490) (5.492) (5.639)
sameparty 3.650 3.775 -1.588
(8.549) (8.385) (8.509)
debt -1 .0 1 1 -0.960 -1.603
(1.178) (1.206) (1.160)
inc 0.897 0.903 0.679
(0.793) (0.790) (0.818)
env -0 .0 2 2 -0.044 0.251
(0.768) (0.776) (0.776)
unemp -1.152 -1.156 -0.854
(1.465) (1-462) (1.527)
infl -6.365*** -6.341*** -5.921***
(1 .6 6 8 ) (1.862) (1.956)
constant 414.919*** 419.671*** 173.857
(145.438) (145.915) (246.602)
R* 0.937 0.937 0.934
Adjusted R2 0.919 0.919 0.915
F-test 52.12 52.36 49.60
F-test p-value 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
Sagan N*Rsq p- 
value 36.886 39.258 8.038
Basmann p-value 34.297 37.114 6.227
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CONCLUSION
Taxation of motor fuels is an important factor of both economic development and 
addressing greenhouse gas emissions, especially in a setting like the EU, where multiple 
economic agents are acting both as independent nations and as members of a single 
Union. Since the creation of the EU and its Common Internal Market, both political and 
market forces influenced the motor fuel tax-setting behavior of its member states, 
including the occurrence of fiscal competition among them. This dissertation contributes 
to the explanation of these phenomena by examining several specific aspects of European 
motor fuel price and tax behaviors.
The first essay of this dissertation discussed the important historical factor that 
reshaped the Union, the policy-setting behavior of its members, and its market for motor 
fuels: the multi-stage enlargement of the EU. The results show that in 1994-2010, real 
motor fuel prices in the EU have, on average, increased only slightly for unleaded 
gasoline and LPG fuel, but have increased by about 25% for diesel, with the price gap 
remaining between the older and newer member states. These changes were primarily 
driven by the production side, as the EU member states were slowly switching away from 
motor fuel excise taxes towards higher VAT rates.
The next essay improved upon traditional modeling of motor fuel tax and price 
dynamics by addressing non-linear aspects of the price/tax analysis. By using a flexible 
newer club convergence methodology, the second essay addressed non-linear features of 
prices and eliminated pre-specification of club memberships traditionally used by other 
methods. The results of the second essay showed that the EU members converge in their
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total motor fuel tax levels, but this convergence is fragile. In addition, the results 
suggested an occurrence of motor fuel market segmentation.
The third essay of this dissertation included spatial considerations of fiscal 
competition among the EU members. In other words, it examined how taxes on motor 
fuels in one EU country depend on taxes in neighboring countries. The results of the last 
essay showed that motor fuel excise tax-setting behavior of the EU members is similar to 
the excise tax setting behavior of the U.S. states, found by previous studies. VAT tax- 
setting behavior, however, is found to be different in the EU than in U.S. This signals that 
either the EU national governments recognize the mobility of their tax base, or that they 
have political motives of their own when engaging in tax competition.
The key contributions of this dissertation are as follows. Firstly, my dissertation 
research has a theoretical contribution. By building upon existing theoretical models of 
the income tax competition, I develop a new, generalized, two-country-single-good 
model of the horizontal fiscal competition and a tax-induced tourism. My model is 
fundamentally different from these models, because an individual consumer in my model 
does not have to permanently relocate to another country in order to make his purchasing 
decision, and, subsequently, a decision on where to pay sales and excise taxes. Instead, 
based on the tax rates that he observes in both countries, he can choose to purchase fuel 
both at home and abroad.
Secondly, my dissertation also contributes to a limited, yet a growing empirical 
literature on fiscal competition and tax harmonization, as well as to the empirical 
literature on the LOP. To the best of my knowledge, I am also the first to use a newly-
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available motor fuel tax and price data for the ten newer EU member-countries and to 
compare these findings with findings for OMS.
Finally, in a broader sense my dissertation research is closely relevant to a current 
economic situation and fiscal coordination policy dialogs in Europe. By using the newly 
available data for motor fuels as an example, I provide some insights on how twenty 
seven diverse countries, both older and newer members of the European Union, make 
their tax-setting decisions, and whether they coordinate fiscal behavior among 
themselves. My findings also contribute to some current policy discussions related to 
GHG emissions from transport. These policies include a revision of the National 
Emission Ceiling Directive and a proposed Directive that recommends setting tax floors 
based on the CO2 content of each motor fuel.
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